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Turning Around Schools: A View From School Board Members as Policy Implementers 
by 
Anna Carollo Cross 
Dr. Rebecca Lowenhaupt, dissertation chair 
ABSTRACT 
 
This single case study examines how stakeholders of a local education agency (LEA) 
understand and implement state turnaround policy for its chronically underperforming schools. 
While there is ample research on how to improve chronically underperforming schools that 
research becomes limited when looking at turnaround implementation actions that are in 
response to policy mandates. This qualitative study uses the theory frame of policy sense-making 
to identify how implementers come to understand turnaround policy and to explore how that 
sense-making impacts their implementation decisions.  
This individual study examines how school board members make sense of their roles as 
policy implementers. Findings resulting from interviews, observation and document analysis 
highlight how the role of the turnaround school board has become ambiguous and misunderstood 
particularly as their historical roles have evolved, state activism has increased and the authority 
of the superintendent has expanded.  Results indicate that board members tend to make sense of 
their turnaround policy implementation role primarily through their budgeting and financial 
oversight responsibilities. In so doing, they depend on the social and political capital they have 
accrued as experts of the local context which allows them to serve as resource facilitators, 
resource bridge builders and resource navigators.  
Communication between school board members and internal/external policy 
implementers emerged as an influencing factor in board member sense-making.  Findings 
 ii 
 
indicate that school board members identify the superintendent as the primary conduit for 
communication, and interpretation of their internal turnaround policy role. Communication from 
external agents such as state monitors had a mixed influence on board member policy sense-
making. An unexpected finding was the role of a “dissenting voice” on school board sense-
making. Recommendations are made for clarifying and strengthening the role of school boards in 
turnaround districts to increase the effectiveness of policy implementation.  
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CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 Improving chronically underperforming schools, has been identified as 
one of the nation's top priorities. Reforming schools has required not only a 
significant investment of federal, state and community tax dollars but has also 
served as a lightning rod for issues of accountability and equity for underserved 
students.  The successful implementation of education reform policies leading to 
“turning around” schools or the entire Local Education Agency (LEA) can 
significantly influence student lives.   
Raising student achievement is the goal of education reform policy 
implementation, but implementing school reform policy, is a complex and multi-
layered endeavor that involves multiple stakeholders.  As the consequences for 
failing to meet state driven accountability measures increases, it is critical that 
LEA leaders and communities understand how to navigate successfully from 
policy intent to policy implementation in the local context.  Data from this study 
can inform leaders as to where potential gaps exist and how to develop 
strategies to accomplish the stated goals. 
This research examined how multiple stakeholder groups in a LEA viewed 
their roles in the implementation of turnaround policies.  Additionally, the 
research examined what factors influenced policy implementer understanding. 
 The implementer groups studied included; school board members, 
superintendent/central office personnel, building leaders and teachers.   
The LEA in this study is a semi-urban school system serving ten-thousand 
students who represent an increasingly diverse population.  The community is 
challenged by high unemployment, poverty, limited local financial resources to 
support education and a LEA that is precariously balanced between 
maintaining local control of its schools or risk takeover by a state entity.  During 
the time of this study, the LEA was engaged in an aggressive campaign to 
turnaround its most recently designated underperforming schools and was 
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under state mandate to address the growing student achievement gap. The 
LEA had successfully turned around two of its schools in the last year and was 
about to embark on a planning process to develop a strategy for turning 
around another underperforming school. 
LEA leadership had identified a few important strategies that it felt were 
needed to turnaround a failing school based on previous turnaround 
experiences.  Many of those strategies had been implemented after the school 
had been designated by the state as underperforming.  The 
superintendent/central office staff, teachers, school leaders and school board 
members each had policy roles in turning around schools in the LEA. Through 
interviews, document analysis, and observations of meetings these interwoven 
studies examined how each implementer group understood their role and 
whether their understanding ultimately affected implementation of the policy 
itself.   
The study focused the initial research on four key areas. It first examined 
the current legislation and the process for designating underperforming schools. 
Then the study examined research on the characteristics of underperforming 
schools and effective turnaround practices.  Researchers reviewed the current 
literature on policy implementation and identified sense-making as a theoretical 
lens and finally, reviewed the literature for internal and external factors that 
might affect policy sense-making.  As the researchers assessed and analyzed 
the study data, several ideas began to emerge.  Factors such as role definition, 
data, communication, resources, context, culture, trust, social and political 
capital all contribute to how implementers go about the business of making 
sense of what they are being asked to do. The results of this study are intended 
to offer guidance and recommendations to the LEA and community leaders 
who are responsible for implementing turnaround policies. This study is also 
intended to add to the theoretical and practical research literature on how 
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turnaround policies are implemented in the local context and what factors 
influence local implementers. 
RESEARCH  
SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND SENSE MAKING 
In reviewing the literature, researchers explored the intersection between 
chronically underperforming schools, turnaround policy intent, policy 
implementation and the overarching factors that influence implementers as 
they create meaning in turnaround situations. 
The researchers began by looking at the literature that examines how 
turnaround schools are defined by Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahn & Tallant (2010) 
and then related it to the work of Murphy & Meyers (2008) Duke, Tucker, 
Salmonowicz, Levy & Saunders, (2005), Corallo & McDonald (2001), Gezi (1990) 
and Clubine, Knight, Schnieider & Smith (2001) on the challenging conditions 
that contribute to chronically underperforming schools such as poverty, stress, 
student mobility, low parent involvement and poor home-school collaborations. 
The strengths or weaknesses of leadership, teacher quality and teacher morale 
were also cited as factors in chronically underperforming schools.  To examine 
these concepts further, researchers reviewed the work of Fullan (2006), 
Hargreaves (2004), Leithwood (2010) Murphy & Meyers (2008) and McQuillan & 
Salomon-Fernandez (2008).   
Turning around schools requires knowing not only what contributes 
negatively to underperforming schools but also identifying the conditions that 
contribute positively to creating an effective school environment. The research 
of Mintrop (2004), and Bryk et.al, (2010) speaks to the importance of shared 
vision, goals and shared values as one way in which to improve schools.  
The purpose of our research was to examine how specific state legislation, 
which outlines policy requirements for school turnaround, is put into practice by 
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identified implementers. To understand the theoretical framework behind policy 
implementation research we turned to a review of the work of researchers who 
argue that successful policy implementation of systemic reform is complex and 
may be influenced by the politics of the policy adoption, how the policy 
problem is framed and even the language and symbols used to communicate 
the intent of the policy  (Hess, 1999; Honig, 2006; Malen, 2006; McLaughlin, 2006; 
Hill, 2006, Smylie & Evans, 2006). To provide a theoretical construct for 
understanding how individual policy implementers understand and interpret 
policies and their intended meaning, what the study will define as “sense-
making,” the researchers referred to the work of Weick (1995) and Honig et. al, 
(2006). 
METHODOLOGY 
This research examined how turnaround work is implemented according 
to the state turnaround legislation. Looking at the research questions through a 
single case study design, the research team was able to gain a deeper 
understanding of how each stakeholder group made sense of the turnaround 
policy and how that sense-making influenced their decisions and actions 
around policy implementation. The LEA selected was one that had already 
been engaged in the process of implementing turnaround policy, with at least 
one level D school in the LEA, and with participation in the turnaround work by 
the four implementer groups that were the focus of this study, school board, 
superintendent/central office, school leadership and teachers. In this LEA, there 
are total of 16 schools (with one school closed in spring 2013).  In addition to the 
one high school, there are nine elementary schools, three middle schools, one 
pre-K through grade 7 school, one therapeutic high school, and one 
therapeutic middle school.  The LEA is considered a Level D district by the state, 
a designation that resulted from one or more schools in the LEA failing to meet 
student achievement goals relative to student performance on the state 
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assessment system. Presently there are four level A schools, one level B school, 
seven level C schools and one level D school. 
Once the LEA was selected, the research team utilized several data 
collection tools in order to have multiple sources of data and use triangulation in 
our analysis (Yin, 2009). These included observations, document review, and 
interviews. Participants were selected purposefully for interviews based on their 
participation in turnaround policy implementation (Creswell, 2012). Teachers 
came from level D schools and school leaders came from level C as well as level 
D schools. Participants also included the superintendent, central office 
personnel and school board members. This participant sampling allowed the 
research team to gather data from each of the four implementer groups. 
Once data was collected, the team coded and analyzed to look for 
themes. Using Dedoose coding software, the team coded the interviews, both 
collaboratively, for the purposes of calibration, and individually (Hill, et. al, 1997). 
Codes were modified as part of the coding process and as suggested by the 
data. From there, each of the research team members identified the major 
themes for their implementer group. That was followed by an analysis of the 
themes across the implementer groups that led to recommendations for the 
district. Below summarizes these themes and recommendations. 
FINDINGS 
SCHOOL LEADERS 
The findings in this study show that there are influences on school leaders’ 
sense-making and that this sense-making occurs primarily around three areas, 
policy requirements, diagnosis, and effective practice.  This sense-making then 
leads school leaders to exercise specific strategies and leadership moves when 
they take on the tasks of turning around a chronically underperforming school. 
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Sense-making begins with the elements that influence school leaders’ 
understanding of the turnaround policy and process. There were three primary 
influences on sense-making, which led to implementation decisions: 1) previous 
experience, which generated background knowledge around school 
turnaround, 2) communication with other stakeholders and implementers, and 
3) consideration of school context all factored into how school leaders 
understood the policy. Each one of these influences impacted specific areas of 
sense-making.  
Table 1: The Relationship Between Sense-making Influences and Areas and 
Implementation Decisions 
Influences on 
Sense-making 
Areas of 
Sense-making 
Implementation Decisions 
Communication   Policy Requirements 
[1. What does the policy 
say about staffing and 
resources?] 
Organize Staff 
Utilize Resources 
Communication 
School Context 
Diagnosis 
[2. What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of the 
school?] 
Use Data to Diagnose 
Communication 
Background Knowledge 
Effective Practices 
[3. What practice will 
leverage strengths and 
address weaknesses?] 
Focus on Instruction 
Communicate a Vision 
Build Capacity 
 
 Working in tandem with each other, these three influences shaped how 
school leaders thought about their current turnaround situation. Context had a 
role in the diagnosis of the school. Previous experience had a role in decisions 
about practices that would be effective in targeting the needs of the school. 
Communication was the one influence that impacted all areas of sense-making 
as school leaders were able to hear input from other stakeholders and 
implementers. Table 1 shows the relationship between the influences on sense-
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making, the areas of sense-making and the implementation decisions. With 
each of the areas of sense-making there were key questions that school leaders 
asked. This table depicts the questions in a certain order. While there is not 
necessarily a clean division between each of these questions in terms of their 
order, generally, school leaders asked about the policy requirements early on in 
the process. Questions about the school’s strengths and weaknesses then 
quickly followed. Once diagnosis was underway, they then began to look at the 
effective practices for turnaround implementation. These then led to a range of 
implementation decisions and actions. 
These implementation actions aligned with specific areas of sense-
making. From the questions about policy requirements came decisions about 
how to organize staff and utilize resources. Staffing decisions occurred relative to 
the staffing authority afforded by the regulations to move staff in and out of the 
building. Yet, school leaders that did not have that authority, often looked to 
reorganizing positions or repositioning staff members to put people in places 
that would maximize their strengths. Similarly, decisions about how to use 
resources were made based on what became available through level D 
designation. School leaders who received additional funding, used it to 
implement programs such as ELT and wraparound. However, schools that did 
not have additional funding focused their school improvement on the practices 
that could be implemented despite a dearth of resources. In this way, resources 
were not only a question of what is available, but also about how best to use 
what is there. 
The process of diagnosing the school for its strengths and weaknesses led 
school leaders to make data use a critical part of turnaround. In fact, the 
prevalence of data in sense-making and implementation of turnaround is 
notable. It was at the crux of school diagnosis, it helped school leaders explain 
to their staffs the criteria of designation as outlined in the policy, and it became 
a significant part of implementation as school leaders put data at the forefront 
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of teaching and learning in their buildings. Data was a driving force in efforts to 
improve schools in this LEA as it guided how implementers changed their 
practice, and elements of sense-making and implementation stemmed from 
how school leaders interpreted the data. 
Finally, questions about what practices would effectively move the school 
forward led to implementation decisions to focus on instruction, communicate a 
vision, and build capacity. These actions stemmed from two key areas: diagnosis 
of the school and background knowledge. The diagnosis highlighted the areas 
on which to focus improvements and to identify practices to target those areas. 
Background knowledge was applicable particularly where school leaders had 
turnaround experience. They often entered into new turnaround situations 
already with a body of knowledge about effective practices from which to 
draw. In this LEA, the school leaders saw that these three implementation 
actions, focusing on instruction, communicating a vision and building capacity, 
would prove to be effective in raising student achievement in their schools. 
The influences of communication, background knowledge, and context 
had key roles in how school leaders made sense of their turnaround work. They 
shaped how school leaders viewed their schools, how they understood what the 
turnaround work would entail, and how they decided the steps needed to 
develop a school that is a place that facilitates learning among its students. For 
school leaders approaching turnaround work, they should leverage these 
influences to push their thinking around diagnosing and identifying effective 
ways to raise school performance.  
 
 
TEACHERS          
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        Findings in the teacher study not only fit nicely with the literature written 
about turnaround work in general, but went further and drilled into those 
general findings to provide much more specific recommendations for 
practitioners.   
 The first finding from the literature had to do with the importance of 
creating a shared vision at the school needing turnaround.  Teachers are the 
most important resource in turnaround (Murphy & Meyers, 2008) and the most 
important thing a school leader needs to do with all the teachers and other 
administrators in their building is to clearly articulate a shared vision of how the 
turnaround will happen. Successful leaders in low-performing schools drive the 
work at hand by communicating and maintaining a highly focused vision and 
mission that is about student learning (Clubine, et al., 2001; Duke, 2006; Gezi, 
1990; Jacobson, Johnson, Ylmaki, & Giles, 2005; Leithwood, Harris & Strauss, 2010; 
Murphy, 2010; Murphy & Meyers, 2008; Picucci, Brownson, Kahlert, & Sobel, 2002; 
Potter, Reynolds, & Chapman, 2002; Salmonowicz, 2009; Duke et al., 2005).  The 
finding of this particular study showed that for teachers it was very clear that this 
vision had to come from the building principal, it needed to come at the very 
beginning of the turnaround process and it very likely needed to happen with 
the help of involuntarily transferring teachers who were not on board with the 
vision out of the building.   
 The creation of a shared vision by changing the staff of a building until all 
the teachers were on board with the principal was a very precise description 
from the teachers of the first step in the turnaround process at both the turned 
around school and the newly designated one.   This first step was necessarily 
described by teachers from both schools and members of the central office as 
being directive in nature.  They talked with great passion and detail about the 
reassignment process as a part of getting the staff in place that could and 
would do the work leaders saw as necessary for turnaround.  At the turned 
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around school, teachers described the principal of the beginning stage of 
turnaround as “her way or the highway” and went on to say that if people 
didn’t do what that principal said she would make their life a “living hell” until 
they either did change or left.  Another teacher described a second principal 
she had worked for at another turnaround elementary school in the city as 
someone who, “… got what she want(ed) by throwing keys in meetings, 
slamming books against the wall, flipping over chairs.”   Two of the three 
turnaround principals referenced in this study were described as having this type 
of intimidating and strict control at the start of the process.  There was no 
distribution of leadership during this stage of the process. 
        A second stage of the turnaround process for the teachers of these 
schools also fits with one of the second recommendations that came out of the 
literature review that centered on the building of teacher capacity through 
professional development.  Richard Elmore’s famous “reciprocity of 
accountability,” which asserts that teachers need to be provided with 
additional capacity if schools expect them to perform different tasks or familiar 
tasks at a higher level (Elmore, 2004).  Teachers at both these schools stressed 
the importance of their professional development.  The researcher defined this 
from their comments as internal professional development they got from each 
other through all of their school, grade, and department meetings as well as 
other informal conversations they had with colleagues at lunch, during their 
prep periods, and even in out of work settings.  This was also defined as the 
external professional development they got from outside presenters on topics 
ranging from “guided discipline” to changing the tone of their school to data 
training that helped them develop skills to improve their students’ learning 
based on findings in their assessments.   They specifically identified training on 
how to use data to improve instruction as necessary to move their schools 
forward and this matches with much of the literature as well (Clubine et al., 
2001; Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 2005; Stein, 2012).  Teachers at 
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these schools both identified extended learning time as necessary to be able to 
engage in both kinds of professional growth.   It is in this second stage of 
turnaround as this study defined it that teachers understand their practices have 
changed and in the turned around school it is where they saw student growth 
through data on internal and external assessments. 
        A second finding from the literature had to do with the importance of 
teacher voice in the turnaround process.  Creating a culture where leadership 
can be shared makes the job doable for the principal, but also makes the work 
more meaningful for the rest of the people being asked to do it.  “Sustainable 
leadership spreads.  It sustains as well as depends upon the leadership of others” 
(Hargreaves & Fink, 2006).  The finding of this study is that teachers in these 
schools did not recognize they had any leadership role in the turnaround 
process until the principal was certain the shared vision for the school had been 
clearly articulated.   The teachers in this study thought it necessary for teacher 
voice to come after the right people were put into place, and the vision of the 
principal specifically had been clearly articulated as the vision for turning 
around the school. 
        The third stage of the turnaround continuum for these teachers is rooted in 
a fear about the sustainability of their improvement.  This was true of both the 
turned around school who was currently in the third stage and the newly 
designated school that was concerned about what would happen if they ever 
made it to the stage where their data had improved.  Teachers described to me 
a fear that they could lose valuable resources of time, money, and even 
motivation when the watchful eye of the state and its’ grant funds disappeared 
as result of the school’s improved designation.  In the interview done with two 
teachers from the turnaround school they described their fear this way: 
 
But how are you going to sustain it?  …We still have wellness but the grant 
was cut this year.  Our professional development was already cut this 
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year.  We had separate math and science days in the summer and that 
was totally cut.  Most teachers still participated but it wasn’t paid and 
they didn’t have the regular consultants that we usually do come in.  Look 
at the amount of PD we had this year versus last, all these years, beyond 
already taken away. 
 
These were two of the most positive teachers we interviewed in terms of being 
proud of what they and their school had been able to accomplish.  They spoke 
passionately about how well the teachers there worked together and how 
advanced they felt when talking to teachers from other places because they 
had had so much professional development.  Yet they still had this fear about 
how they were possibly going to be able to sustain this same improvement they 
were so proud of. 
        Where the researcher found hope for sustainability in this study had to do 
with the relational trust that was established at the turned around schools.  The 
creation of this culture of trust happened over time when teachers worked 
together with the common goal of improving their students’ achievement.  Here 
teachers described how they sustained each other when they were having bad 
days, how they could go into each other’s classrooms looking for ideas or 
inspiration and even how they became so close they went on vacations 
together and attended each other’s weddings.  The fear for turnaround schools 
is that the policy will overtake the people when it comes to focusing on what is 
important to do in this work.  “If truth is the first casualty of war, then trust is the 
first fatality of imposed reform” (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006, p. 212).  The fact that 
trust was not dead at the turned around school may be one of their greatest 
successes and their hope for sustaining their improvement.  
 
 
SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS 
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        The focus of this study was to examine the role of school boards in 
turnaround policy implementation. School boards have an important part to 
play in the implementation of education policy because of their role as 
democratically elected representatives of the community’s voice in determining 
the education of its children. Because of their legislative authority and because 
they are agents of the community’s interests, the school board can influence 
the ways in which policies are implemented (Rice, Delagardelle, Buckton, Jons, 
Lueders & Vens, 2001; Hess, 2010)  
In general, findings in this study indicate that school boards make sense of 
their roles and responsibilities by responding to internal as well as external factors 
and influences. First, findings indicated that the role of school boards has 
become ambiguous and undefined as their historical roles have evolved, state 
activism has increased and the requirements of education reform legislation 
and the competing interests of turnaround legislation have become intertwined. 
Second, when faced with trying to make sense of their roles in turnaround, 
school board members reverted to the role they most closely identified with and 
understood best, that of approving budgets and allocating resources. School 
board sense-making was also influenced by two factors; communication and 
the role of a dissenting voice.  
The first finding indicated that the school board’s turnaround role in this 
LEA was undefined and sometimes misunderstood by board members as well as 
other policy implementers. School board members were caught between 
balancing their political roles as elected officials and agents of state policy with 
their community roles as education advocates and community members. The 
role of school boards described in turnaround legislation is inconsistent with 
education reform legislation and contributes to the lack of clarity. For instance, 
education reform legislation calls for school boards to play an active role in 
approving policy and establishing goals for the LEA but turnaround legislation 
limits the role of the school board. In this LEA, an increase in state activism and 
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the superintendent’s influence coupled with a decrease in school board 
authority contributed to the lack of clarity for members trying to make sense of 
their roles and responsibilities. Opportunities for formal training to help school 
board members clarify and make sense of their specific role in a turnaround 
district were limited. While members were aware of their four areas of legislative 
responsibility they tended to focus primarily on two; selecting and evaluating the 
superintendent and setting the budget, both areas where they felt they had the 
most expertise and influence. District goal setting and policy development and 
implementation were seen as the work of the administration and building level 
leaders with the school board as a supporting actor.  
        As a result of school board members viewing their role in turnaround 
policy as one of budget and resources members focused on how to acquire 
and allocate resources, and how to distribute them equitably. They viewed 
long-term sustainability of turnaround as one of their primary concerns 
particularly since the district was heavily dependent on outside funding sources. 
Members viewed relationships, alliances and their understanding of the political 
landscape as important levers in solving the resource puzzle. In order to prioritize 
resources school board members relied on the direction and guidance of the 
superintendent. While limited, members benefited from opportunities to engage 
in direct contact with front line implementers who could translate the resource 
needs to board members. Board members used these opportunities to create 
shared understanding of the resource needs and were then able to use the 
information to advocate for additional resources from the community.  
 Board members viewed their resource role in three distinct ways; as 
facilitators, as bridge builders and as  navigators. As facilitators, they brokered 
internal discussions to help them understand the resource needs, as bridge 
builders they interpreted and translated the districts needs to the community 
and as navigators they negotiated their way through the complex budget and 
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finance environment of the city and state to access needed resources for the 
district. 
         A number of influencing factors were identified that also contributed to 
school board turnaround sense-making. Communication with internal and 
external stakeholders was key. School board members relied on communication 
from the superintendent as the central conduit for distributing, interpreting, 
clarifying and making sense of turnaround policies. The effectiveness of the 
superintendent’s use of data to communicate turnaround information, an 
influencing factor found with other implementer groups, was viewed as mixed 
by board members. Members understood the importance of using data to 
guide their decision making, however they often lacked the background 
knowledge, training and expertise to use it successfully. Communication from 
external agents such as the State Education Agency (SEA) was also identified as 
influencing school board sense-making. Members viewed the intervention of 
state monitors from diverse perspectives. While members understood that the 
resources and support that came with state intervention were invaluable to the 
district, they still viewed themselves as the experts of the local context. As such, 
they viewed themselves as the community’s voice when faced with mandates 
that conflicted with the values and beliefs of the community. 
 In addition to communication as an influencing factor in turnaround 
policy sense-making, the role of a dissenting voice also emerged as a factor. 
Dissenting voice in this study was viewed as one way to make sense of 
turnaround  policies and requirements. “Sense-making through arguing” as 
noted by Wieck is central to organizational sense-making. In this study school 
board members functioned as a collective group and made sense of the 
information before them as part of a social process. Their own beliefs, actions 
and expectations provided the structure through which sense-making occurred 
(Weick, 1995). The role of the dissenting voice contributed to sense-making by 
providing the opportunity for members to challenge each other and argue, 
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what researchers have cited as a natural part of the process of sense-making. 
By engaging in sense-making through arguing board members clarified 
strategic ideas, potentially leading to more effective group decision making 
(Kayes & Kayes, 2012).  Constructively engaging rather than suppressing 
dissenting voices can be an important strategy for strengthening rather than 
weakening sense-making. Turning around schools calls for creative and new 
ways of thinking, suppressing dissent can limit the expression of diverse beliefs, 
alternative views of the world, and ideas for improvement that may be exactly 
what is needed to increase student achievement.  
As elected officials, school board members answer only to the electorate. 
They have an important role to play as representatives of the democratic 
process. Because of this, they may be the only implementers uniquely positioned 
to contribute to policy sense-making by engaging in debate, dissent and 
arguing as strategies for clarifying policy intentions and implementation. 
SUPERINTENDENT/CENTRAL OFFICE 
 The superintendent and selected central office administrators within the 
LEA are often the initial implementers of school and district turnaround policy. 
This study seeks to understand the role of central office in turnaround policy 
sense-making by collecting data on the superintendent and central office 
administrator sense-making and its impact on policy implementation. While 
recent research on school improvement has focused on school improvement 
actions and responsibilities of principals and teachers, this study seeks to address 
the research gap of the essential role of school districts offices in school 
turnaround and improvement. In seeking to understand how district leaders 
make sense of turnaround policy implementation to support school turnaround, 
the findings revealed the superintendent and central office administrators found 
strong superintendent leadership, monitoring and support schools, strategic 
distribution of resources, and management of human capital as key 
implementer actions.  
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 The first finding encompassed superintendent leadership and the it’s 
essential role in moving forward turnaround work. Multiple interviewees 
attributed student achievement gains and therefore successful policy 
implementation to the superintendent’s ability to effectively communicate with 
the community and build relationships with key stakeholders. The superintendent 
also established for central office administrators that their purpose is to support 
schools, and that they work for schools, schools don’t work for them. 
Additionally, central office administrators, teachers, and principals noted more 
of a central office presence within their schools and an increased emphasis on 
teaching and learning during professional development.  
 This case study also revealed that the LEA’s central office staff provided a 
support, monitoring, and accountability framework for it’s schools. The school 
review partner process is created to provide support to the schools principal 
and teachers and to serve as a thought partner for the school’s improvement 
processes. More frequent and better aligned monitoring of student 
achievement data and of the effectiveness of instructional initiatives. 
Additionally, accountability is provided for principals and central office staff to 
ensure alignment of vision and follow through with instructional initiatives. While 
these practices are not perfectly and fully embedded within every facet of the 
district’s work, there are key shifts that have taken place alongside the LEA’s 
turnaround, and it’s turnaround of two chronically underperforming schools.  
 The third major area of finding is in the realm of access to financial and 
human resources to support school and system-wide turnaround. The case study 
LEA has limited resources like most urban districts, and often-times resources are 
key levers in school and system-wide turnaround. While some implementers, 
teachers and principals, believed that resource allocation varied across schools, 
central office implementers viewed resource allocation as equitable. For human 
resources, the superintendent provided building principals with latitude and 
control over the management of human capital. The superintendent also 
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provided intentional leadership around making it clear to central office staff and 
principals that they could either join the district’s turnaround philosophy or be 
asked to leave the district.  
 Recommendations for school system leaders / practitioners include next 
steps for various stakeholders within the turnaround process including, school 
boards, superintendents, and central office administrators. School boards of 
urban school districts with turnaround schools should consider the leadership 
competencies of superintendent candidates look at some of the leadership 
moves of the superintendent in this case study in developing a profile of their 
leadership needs. Superintendents have a complex and multi-faceted set of 
responsibilities and could reflect on their own leadership competencies to 
ensure successful implementation of turnaround policy. Superintendent’s also 
have responsibility for the sense-making of central office administrators to ensure 
alignment with the organizational vision. Finally, it’s recommended that central 
office administrators touch schools in meaningful ways to ensure support, 
monitoring, and accountability.  
The superintendent and select central office administrators within the LEA are 
often the initial implementers of school and district turnaround policy.  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
Our study looked at sense-making of policy implementation from the 
perspective of four different implementer groups in a single district’s chronically 
underperforming schools. Examining the four implementer groups, school board, 
superintendent/central office, school leadership, and teachers, we wanted to 
understand the role sense-making played in what the implementers actually did 
and what they thought was effective to improve school performance. The 
research team looked at the findings of each of the implementers groups and 
identified recommendations for the LEA around communication, the 
importance of data, and the use of resources to support turnaround. 
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RECOMMENDATION ONE: 
INCREASE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN IMPLEMENTERS 
A common theme that emerged from the findings was that there is a 
need for the turnaround policy to be communicated on a continual basis up 
and down the implementer chain. With the understanding that increased 
communication helps to facilitate sense-making, we looked at how facilitating 
communication between all parties increased their understanding of what they 
were being asked to do. We found structures in place in the local education 
agency for this communication to happen. Specifically, technical 
communication between and among the implementers was already being 
done and implementers had a functional understanding of what turnaround 
was and what the school had to do in order to be successful. While this 
technical communication was in place, we found that communication that 
centered implementer sense-making more on their beliefs about their role and 
expectations rather than merely on the technical requirements of the policy was 
needed. With the aim to facilitate sense-making, the research team identified 
three ways to strengthen communication, which focus on better defining the 
communication that takes place within current communication structures. 
The first recommendation is about using the building principal meetings 
with central office staff to develop a common language around what it means 
to turn around underperforming schools. Because sense-making around 
expectations and role was prevalent in the findings, these meetings can include 
discussion about these two important elements of sense-making. The common 
language and wisdom gleaned through communication at these principal and 
central office meetings would also be valuable for the principals of schools who 
are not yet designated as level D schools. Explicit communication about what 
has led to turnaround success in other schools would be invaluable for school 
leaders throughout the district, especially those whose schools are level C. 
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Central Office staff can discuss with building leaders the different scenarios of 
schools that resulted or did not result in successful school improvement. 
The second recommendation around communication is to bring 
community involvement into the implementation of turnaround through an 
extension of the Local Stakeholders Group (LSG). Comprised primarily of 
community members, school staff, and central office staff, the LSG submits 
recommendations to the superintendent who uses those recommendations to 
develop the turnaround plan for the local education agency. The policy does 
not require further action by the LSG, which means that community 
participation in the work of turning around the school can be reduced. Here, 
there is opportunity to extend the role of the LSG to the implementation phase 
of the turnaround plan, which would increase the engagement and 
responsibility of the community to contribute to turnaround efforts. One way to 
do this is through consistent meetings, possibly through the redesign team. 
Consistent meetings about the progress of the school will help keep everyone 
informed and would help to facilitate sense-making not only for the educators in 
the school building and district, but also for the larger school community. 
Another recommendation pertains to communication with the school 
board. The findings reflect a need for the school board to have an opportunity 
to have more clarification about their expectations and role in turnaround. The 
school board has four areas of authority: budget, policy, evaluation of the 
superintendent and collective bargaining. These areas of authority are 
impacted by the turnaround legislation in that the school board has been 
grappling with how to make sense of their role in the context of the school 
district’s focus on implementing turnaround policy. More explicit communication 
among the school board may help their understanding of the significant 
questions they have about their role and expectations in turnaround. Whether 
this is done through workshops or other professional development opportunities, 
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the school board may benefit from these conversations that allow them to 
further their sense-making about what it means to be a school board member of 
a turnaround district. 
           A final recommendation about communication would be around paying 
special attention to the role of collaboration in the turnaround process at all 
levels.  In our study one of our theoretical lenses was the role of social capital in 
policy implementation.  This theory posits that what actually gets implemented 
depends on who the implementers know and trust.  Building trust by improving 
collaborative working relationships, between and among all implementer levels, 
through transparent communication will help insure consistency of 
understanding in terms of what is actually to be implemented in the turnaround 
process. In authentic collaboration there is room for working with dissenting 
voices who may in fact have much to offer in terms of improving the work of 
turnaround along the way.   
 
RECOMMENDATION TWO : 
SPECIFY A TRANSPARENT PROCESS FOR ALLOCATING RESOURCES 
 
The findings indicated that implementers have questions about how 
resources are allocated throughout the LEA. There is confusion about why some 
schools get certain resources that other schools do not. This recommendation to 
specify a transparent process for allocating resources intends to alleviate some 
of this confusion. 
As limited resources challenge the LEA, a process needs to define the 
priorities that guide how resources are distributed to specific programs and 
schools. By being explicit about these priorities for school improvement, all 
implementer groups, including school board, superintendent/ central office, 
principals, and teachers, would have a better understanding of where the 
resources should go and why. For example, the LEA can clarify their framework 
for resource allocation based on school level, programming, and student needs. 
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This framework should include details of funding streams for academic 
programs, extracurricular programs, additional pay for teachers, and other 
areas essential to effective implementation of turnaround policy. Another 
example is to make transparent how staffing is allocated. Staff allocation 
includes teacher excising if they have not union protection and/or staff “opt-
out” which means teachers choosing to transfer to other schools in the city after 
the new designation.  Transparency may involve identifying how teacher “opt-
out” of level D schools occurs with the aim to ensure consistency of 
implementation of “opt-out” across schools. 
This recommendation involves assessing the time provisioning of central 
office administrator’s delivery of support and monitoring across high priority 
(level D and C) schools. Currently, the perception among some in the LEA is that 
level D schools receive more support and attention from central office than 
other schools in the district. Clarifying this LEA’s system to monitor school-level 
support from central office administrators would ensure clear and equitable 
support. This would help to assuage the concerns that level D schools receive 
the most attention and support. 
This LEA makes decisions about how resources are allocated to schools 
and programs across the district. The recommendation here is about making 
these decisions more transparent. This would help to alleviate confusion about 
resource allocation and the perception that some schools in the LEA receive 
more support than others. 
RECOMMENDATION THREE: 
DEVELOP THE CAPACITY OF ALL IMPLEMENTERS TO WORK WITH DATA. 
 
An area that became prevalent in the findings across implementer groups 
was the use of data. It is apparent that data is at the crux of school 
improvement efforts as it became one of the most talked-about areas of school 
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improvement by teachers, school leaders, central office personnel, and school 
board members. Indeed, the LEA has strengths regarding the capacity of 
implementers to use data where building and LEA leaders, along with numerous 
teachers, understand the importance using data and prioritize its role in school 
improvement. Although data is a significant part of school and LEA 
improvement planning, findings point to inconsistencies with the level of comfort 
and ability different implementers have with data analysis. The recommendation 
here is to increase capacity so that there is more consistency in terms of how 
implementers understand and use the data. Central office plays a key role in this 
recommendation in that they would need to set the stage around how to use 
data in school improvement planning. 
One opportunity to build capacity for analyzing data among teachers is 
to bring them together to share data analysis practices. While teachers interact 
with other teachers in their own schools, and perhaps informally with teachers in 
other schools, more formal structures could allow this to occur more prevalently. 
Giving teachers opportunities to collaborate across schools would increase their 
contact with other teachers around best practices of data. This could open up 
new ideas and ways of using data to inform their instruction. 
Sharing of best practices can also occur among school leaders. Currently, 
school leaders meet with central office personnel, along with members of their 
faculty, to analyze data in their data review meetings. In addition, there are 
meetings that occur with central office, including the superintendent, and 
principals of all the schools in the LEA. As school leaders work together to build 
their own skills around applying data analysis to school improvement, there is 
opportunity here to look more at how they can lead their staffs through the 
process. Findings suggest that there is some inconsistency in how school leaders 
lead their staffs through the process of analyzing data and using that analysis to 
improve practice. School leaders might benefit from more in-depth 
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conversations around how to effectively lead faculty in conversations about the 
data. 
Another opportunity for building better understanding of the data is with 
the community of this LEA. This begins with working with school board to 
promote their sense-making of the data. Findings suggest that school board has 
little interaction with data and have fewer opportunities than the educators in 
the schools to analyze the data. Focusing some meetings and/or sessions with 
school board on looking at the data would help to increase their understanding 
of and how it informs turnaround. These conversations do not necessarily need 
to be overly cumbersome in detail. Rather, they might give an overview of what 
the data is saying about the LEA and why designations occur. This then would 
put school board members in a position to discuss with their constituencies 
about the turnaround work that is happening in the LEA. While school board 
meetings are perhaps likely places for this communication, and indeed 
discussions around data have occurred there, opportunities offered outside the 
context of a school board meeting may be beneficial. This may lead to a more 
informed community about what the data means in terms of their schools’ 
performance. 
RECOMMENDATION FOUR:  
COMMUNICATE A CLEAR VISION OF LEADERSHIP FOR THE LEA 
 
Looking at the findings across the four implementer groups, it became 
clear that the groups were looking at turnaround differently and focusing on 
different aspects of the turnaround process. They were expressing different 
priorities about what needed to be done to improve the schools. There 
appeared to be a lack of interdependence among the different implementer 
groups. That is, they tended to operate in silos, distinct from each other, and 
often not in tune to what other implementers were thinking or doing with the 
turnaround work. 
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There were several places where this lack of interdependence was 
apparent. Central office directors spoke about the importance of their 
monitoring role and how they worked with school leaders to put practices in 
place to improve school performance. Yet, school leaders did not talk much 
about this and were more focused on how they were working with their staffs. 
Teachers described a style of leadership in their schools at the beginning phase 
of turnaround that was directive, whereas, when school leaders described their 
approach, it resembled more of an instructional leadership approach. The 
school board was knowledgeable about the responsibilities given to them under 
education reform but they were less clear on their role in turnaround. The other 
three implementer groups rarely mentioned the school board, indicating that 
the school board leadership role was not prevalent in their view. This lack of 
interdependence may be attributed to the fact that a clear vision from the LEA 
about what implementers should be thinking and doing to raise school 
performance was absent. Rather, some implementers were relying on the policy 
to set their vision for them. That is, upon designation, their vision was about doing 
what was necessary to exit turnaround status within a specific timeframe. 
Implementers did not speak about any kind of long-range vision that the LEA 
established about leading turnaround. LEA leaders did not describe whether 
they saw the LEA as a system whose parts should be working together towards a 
common vision or how they envisioned the system supporting learning at the 
building level. 
For this LEA, a clear vision of leadership is needed to help guide and 
sustain school improvement. When talking about turnaround leadership at the 
school building level, Leithwood et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of vision 
when they recommend turnaround leaders engage their staffs in developing 
the vision of a school as a source of motivation to commit to the work of school 
turnaround. In implementing this suggestion at the LEA level, this LEA would bring 
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implementer groups more into alignment with each other and with the LEA in 
terms of how they implement turnaround. Fullan (2006) who also focuses on 
turnaround leadership at the building level, discusses the need to implement 
systemic reform by using a “trilevel development solution” that includes 
alignment between the state, LEA, and school. Establishing this alignment 
requires conversation, face to face interactions and the co-construction of 
meaning that are integral to the sense-making described by researchers (Weick, 
1995; Datnow, 2006). In this LEA, the relationships between the district, 
community and the school is critical where all three work need to work in 
concert with each other. A vision of leadership would strengthen those 
relationships and help to create the interdependence needed for implementers 
of turnaround policy to be working in the same direction. Strengthening the 
interdependence between implementer groups can also be reinforced by 
making sure that all voices are represented, including dissenting voices. This 
common vision would not be about merely exiting or avoiding turnaround 
status. Rather, it would be about the kinds of educational experiences that 
leadership would create for students that transcend what the turnaround policy 
mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
This research generated insights into what educators in this LEA think and 
do as they implement turnaround policy. Emerging from these insights are 
recommendations that are intended to enhance the turnaround work that is 
already happening across schools in this LEA. Because sense-making relies so 
heavily on communication, increasing communication is suggested here as a 
way to facilitate understanding of turnaround policy. Yet, this understanding 
goes beyond knowing the policy requirements. Communication can help 
educators in the district better understand their role and expectations, which 
are not necessarily outlined in the policy. This is the process of co-construction as 
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implementers' communication with each other helps them to make meaning. 
Also recommended is to specify a transparent process for allocating resources. 
 This LEA makes decisions about how resources are distributed across 
schools and programs. Yet, the findings in this research suggest that there is 
some confusion as to how those decisions are made. Clarifying these decisions 
would help to alleviate confusion and increase trust in the process, which can 
then help to guide implementers' decisions around turnaround implementation. 
The third recommendation about data use comes from a major theme across 
the studies about the prevalence of data in school improvement planning and 
implementation. This LEA already uses data, but there are some inconsistencies 
in the capacity of implementers to analyze and use data. School leaders, 
central office personnel, and teachers, would benefit from collaborative 
opportunities for work with data. School board members may need more 
experience with data in order to communicate with their constituencies about 
what the data says about the schools in the LEA. Providing more opportunities 
for implementers to work with data would not only help with school 
improvement efforts, but it would also help the community of this LEA to better 
understand the data that informs turnaround work of their schools.  
        These recommendations aim to outline how this LEA can increase its 
capacity to exercise successful turnaround of its chronically underperforming 
schools. Increased communication can lead to more sense-making, which can 
help to guide turnaround implementation decisions. More transparency about 
the way resources are distributed can offer guidance to implementers 
throughout the LEA about how to approach turnaround work. Increasing 
capacity to analyze and use data would inform decisions that successfully leads 
to school improvement. As with most advice about school improvement, this is 
not offered as a universal remedy to this LEA's turnaround challenges. Rather, it is 
intended to enhance the thinking that goes into school improvement planning 
and implementation. That is, these suggestions can help implementers make 
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sound decisions about what they should do when taking on the immense task of 
turning around a chronically under performing school.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION1 
In writing the introduction to the recently released Equity and Excellence Commission 
Report, For Each and Every Child, co-chairs Christopher Edley Jr. and Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar state the case for why improving and turning around our nation's chronically 
underperforming schools is critical. 
The situation is dire, the agenda urgent. From parent associations to Capitol Hill, from 
classroom teachers to the White House—there is work to be done and passion to be spent 
by all of us who appreciate the stakes for our children and for the nation’s future. If we 
fail in this work, we will forfeit our position of economic and moral leadership. We will 
risk the future of our people and of America as we know it (Equity and Excellence 
Commission Report, 2013, p.9). 
According to the 2012 Children's Defense Fund (CDF) Report on the State of America's 
Children, 43% of the children living in poverty live in urban settings where the concentration of 
chronically underperforming schools is the highest. Only 68% of the students who enter 9th 
grade graduate with a high school diploma. African American and Hispanic males have the most 
dismal graduation rates of all, just 43% for Black males and 48% for Hispanic males (Orfield, 
Losen, Wald, Swanson, 2001). Education reform is one of the levers, which can be used to 
ensure that every school is equipped to provide a high quality education to every student.  We 
                                                 
1 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: Anna Carollo 
Cross, Jamie B. Chisum, Jill S. Geiser, Charles Grandson IV 
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contend that the development and implementation of effective education policy that aligns with 
education reform goals is one way to increase achievement for all students. 
Reforming chronically under-performing schools has been identified as one of the 
nation's top priorities. In a May 2009 policy speech, Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education, 
articulated his “turnaround” policy initiative and his intent to aggressively move to improve 5000 
under-performing schools over five years. In School Year (SY) 2010-2011, the federal 
government allocated 14.3 billion dollars via state grants and allocations dedicated to school 
improvement. Reforming schools has required not only a significant investment of tax dollars but 
has also served as a lightning rod for issues of accountability and equity for all underserved 
students.  The successful implementation of education reform policies can significantly impact 
student lives. Yet implementing education reform policy is neither a simple nor linear process. 
Some researchers argue that school reform policy has failed to produce any significant 
change despite the fact that a tremendous number of reform efforts have been attempted (Fullan, 
1991; Hess, 1999; Murphy, 2010).  Others argue that successful implementation of systemic 
reform may be affected by the complexity of the policy implementation, the politics of the policy 
adoption, how the policy problem is framed and even the language and symbols used to 
communicate the intent of the policy  (Hess, 1999; Honig, 2006; Malen, 2006; McLaughlin, 
2006; Hill, 2006 ). The importance of policy and its implementation is the common thread that 
links researchers and ultimately practitioners in the field who are held accountable for decreasing 
gaps in student achievement. Understanding and interpreting policies and their intended 
meaning, what we will define as “sense-making,” can influence the success or failure of reform 
initiatives (Honig, 2006; Weick, 1995). 
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In this state under study, the urgency of understanding how to make sense of and 
effectively implement reform policies has immediate and real time implications for educators, 
communities and students. In 2009 the United States Congress passed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act which re-authorized funding for the School Improvement Grants (SIG) 
program, outlining specific requirements for chronically underperforming schools. In January 
2010, aligning state law to federal regulations, this state passed legislation that outlines the steps 
and timeline required to raise the performance of chronically under-performing schools, within a 
3-year period. These chronically underperforming schools are now known as “turnaround 
schools.” The overall goal of this policy is to raise the level of school effectiveness so that all 
students in the school become well prepared for the next level of education. With a three-year 
window in which schools must show significant progress in student achievement or risk further 
corrective action, multiple implementer groups including administrators, community members, 
teachers and parents each have a significant role to play in developing and implementing plans to 
increase student achievement. 
Educators are called upon regularly to implement federal and locally-designed policies 
and are then held accountable for demonstrating that the implementation of the policy has 
yielded positive results. Our assumption is that the implementation of any policy should be 
aligned with its goals as much as possible and that implementation acts as a bridge between 
realizing the original intent of the policy and the policy itself. We acknowledge that the 
implementation of any policy, particularly school reform policy, is a complex and multi-layered 
endeavor.  Therefore, it is critical to understand how reform policy is being implemented and 
whether there are forces that influence the implementation and realization of the original goals. 
In the case of turnaround policy, where implementers’ actions are expected to lead to improved 
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outcomes for students in order to meet the intent of the policy, how they understand what they 
are being asked to do can make all the difference. With this, we turn to the concept of sense-
making. 
Sense-making considers how implementers interpret such policy to better understand 
what leads to implementation decisions. For example, if implementers do not deeply understand 
or make sense of the policies that are intended to guide the turnaround process, they may 
misinterpret the policy goals or they might not understand how it relates to their day-to-day 
work. They may dismiss it entirely because it does not have an obvious practical application, or 
worse, they may implement it ineffectively. The chances, therefore, of successful 
implementation are greatly reduced. If those policies are intended to increase student 
achievement and the policy is sabotaged, ignored, or misinterpreted, student access to an 
equitable and high quality education may be compromised. 
While this research focuses specifically on turnaround policy, it may have broader 
implications about the role of sense-making in the process of turning around a school or an entire 
local education agency. This research may unearth insights about how implementer sense-
making about policy can lead to school improvement. It may also identify areas of tension or 
confusion for implementers as they begin to make sense of the policies, and those outside factors 
that influence their understanding and the importance of who and how policy is communicated. 
It may also be possible to determine the amount of time and resources each implementer group 
takes to gain a full understanding of the policy. Sense-making could influence each 
implementer's view of their own ability to engage in the turnaround process and may shape the 
decisions they make when faced with the task of turning around a school. It may also affect how 
the policy translates into the turnaround plan, which outlines specific steps to inform the work of 
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turning around a school.  This study examined the impact of sense-making on policy 
implementation by focusing on the following research questions: 
1. How do various implementers’ (superintendent/central office, building leaders,       
 teachers, school board members) make sense of turnaround policy? 
2. How does this sense-making influence policy implementation? 
3. What factors influence sense-making? 
In this single case study, we explored how different implementers in a designated Level 
D district make sense of turnaround policy. We begin by presenting an overview of the current 
legislation and the process by which schools are designated underperforming. The research 
literature on the characteristics of chronically underperforming schools and effective practices 
for turnaround school improvement is discussed (Fullan, 2006; Leithwood, 1994), and we review 
the current literature on policy implementation and why we chose to view policy implementation 
through a theoretical frame that builds upon sense-making as a research construct (Weick, 1995). 
A number of internal and external factors that have been identified through the literature and 
how they might affect policy sense-making are outlined (Honig, 2006; Malen, 2006; Datnow, 
2006). Finally, we present a graphic synthesis of the theoretical frame, which formed the basis 
for our study followed by a description of the research design and methodology. Four individual 
studies were conducted that each focused on the unique aspects of the sense-making process in 
targeted implementer groups: school board members, superintendent/central office, building 
leaders, and teachers. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of the Literature2 
Federal and State Regulations and Policies 
Federal policy setting the stage. Recent federal and state regulations outline detailed 
requirements about what schools need to do to raise their level of performance. In January of 
2002, the U.S. Congress approved “An Act to close the achievement gap with accountability, 
flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind,” colloquially referred to as No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB). The elongated legislative title makes clear that the goal of the federal policy is 
to close the achievement gap. The law requires a number of actions from state education 
agencies (SEAs) and school districts, including hiring highly qualified educators, notifying 
parents on the quality of their child’s education, and requiring states to adopt challenging 
academic standards for all students. Perhaps the most important part of the legislation is the 
requirement that all schools and districts make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), which is the 
minimum threshold for improvement schools are required to meet each year. A school that does 
not achieve AYP for two consecutive years faces the threat of corrective action. The advent of 
NCLB brought attention to measures of school effectiveness and requirements placed upon 
schools to perform incrementally or face consequences (Ravitch, 2010). 
Analysis of state turnaround policy. With federal policy as a backdrop, legislation 
enacted in early 2010 was this state’s interpretation of the NCLB goal to narrow the achievement 
gap. The 2010 law addressed chronically underperforming schools by requiring the state 
education agency (SEA) to designate or level schools within the framework for district 
                                                 
2 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: Anna Carollo 
Cross, Jamie B. Chisum, Jill S. Geiser, Charles Grandson IV 
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accountability and assistance according to student academic performance.[1] Designation of level 
includes a range of factors, such as exclusion and drop-out rate, but it is based primarily on 
student performance on the state assessment. Designation comes out of a compilation of data, 
including the aggregate performance of the school along with the performance of subgroups 
identified by race and ethnicity (e.g. African American, Hispanic, etc.), learning profile (e.g. 
students with disabilities, English language learners, etc.) and income levels (e.g. low-income). 
This is notable because, similar to NCLB, disaggregating the data forces schools to consider the 
performance of all its students by highlighting how each subgroup is doing academically. Once 
the data is compiled, the state designates schools level C and D based on where they fall relative 
to the other schools in their grade level span. The lowest 20 percent of schools in a grade level 
span are classified as level C. A subset of those schools, not more than 4 percent, is deemed 
eligible for level D status. These are chronically underperforming schools, informally referred to 
as “turnaround schools.” It is this level D designation that triggers the turnaround process that is 
outlined in the policy. The turnaround requirements also apply to schools designated level F, and 
a key element of turnaround for these schools is state takeover. This leveling system is used to 
determine where state assistance and intervention is most needed. 
The process that school districts must undergo upon level D designation, as outlined in 
the turnaround legislation, includes a series of steps to develop a turnaround plan. This process 
begins with a local stakeholder group, comprised of members in and outside the school, which 
convenes to develop recommendations for a turnaround plan that is submitted to the 
superintendent. This part of the policy indicates that the state considers that the community has a 
role in the turnaround process. However, the policy does not require that stakeholder groups 
participate in the turnaround process beyond the initial phase of making recommendations. Once 
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recommendations are submitted, the superintendent is responsible for the actual development of 
the turnaround plan and its implementation. The policy appears to emphasize the role of 
educators in the work of implementing the turnaround plan and does not require community 
involvement in the implementation stage. 
In addition to outlining the process, the legislation dictates specific areas that need to be 
addressed in the plan. These include achievement gaps, alternative English language learner 
programs, financial planning, social service and health needs, child welfare services and law 
enforcement, and workforce development services. The plan must also include measurable 
annual goals using a range of data points such as the state assessment system (SAS), student 
promotion, graduation, student attendance, student discipline, and family engagement. These 
requirements reflect a view that there are a range of factors that impact student learning beyond 
what happens in the classroom. The policy requires the school to pay attention to other areas of 
social and emotional health as well as the relationship between the school and students’ families. 
Schools are also compelled to look at different data points to gain a holistic view of student 
performance, which is not only about performance on state assessments. 
Finally, there are optional components of the plan. These include, but are not limited to, 
reallocation of the budget, expanded school day or year, alteration of the curriculum, job-
embedded professional development, and limiting or changing school district policy. There are 
other optional elements that may be subject to collective bargaining, one example of which is 
requiring all staff to reapply for employment. These elements allow for some flexibility with 
school structures that are often thought of as inflexible. For example, little flexibility is typically 
seen with budget and scheduling. These tend to be fixed processes and structures. Yet, this policy 
acknowledges that chronically underperforming schools may need to have the leeway to adjust 
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school time and budgets in order to reach turnaround goals. Similarly, the policy opens the door 
for districts to engage in collective bargaining on areas that are viewed as critical to turnaround 
success, but that need to be agreed upon with the local teachers union. 
State legislation outlines the turnaround process that underperforming schools must 
undergo with the aim to demonstrate higher student achievement within a 3-year period through 
the implementation of a turnaround plan. This is aligned with federal funding regulation that 
imposes requirements on school districts in order to qualify for School Improvement Grants 
(SIG) and Race to the Top (RTTT) funding. According to that regulation, schools and districts 
need to turn around within 2 to 3 years, as measured by student achievement data. A key 
requirement is that schools identified, as “turnaround” must implement one of the turnaround 
models if they want to be considered for a school improvement grant. These models are labeled 
turnaround, restart, school closure, and transformation (Race to the Top Fund, 2009, p. 59763). 
When the turnaround plan is developed and the school improvement grants application is 
submitted, a turnaround model is chosen. The policy or grant requirements do not state who is 
responsible for choosing the model. However, since the superintendent is responsible for the 
development of the plan, as noted earlier, it would stand to reason that the superintendent would 
likely be a primary voice in the selection of the model. What is notable about these models is that 
they all require shifts in staffing, whether that is removal of school leadership and/or part of the 
teaching staff. While these models are not mandated interventions of the legislation, they are 
prioritized through the school improvement grant requirements in that they are tied to funding 
and are not a requirement of the turnaround policy itself. Although this study is not necessarily 
looking at the role of the model, we acknowledge that implementers’ perception of the policy 
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and corresponding turnaround work may be influenced by the requirements of the selected 
model. 
The turnaround policy in the state we studied contains a range of elements that are 
intended to facilitate successful turnaround of level D and F designated schools. Although the 
policy does not explicitly articulate the practices educators need to exercise to raise academic 
performance of their students, its elements suggest that the policy operates on certain 
assumptions about what conditions would help to support turnaround efforts. Whether that is 
flexibility in structures, attention to a range of factors in learning, or community involvement, 
the policy reflects a view that turnaround schools can improve when these elements are 
addressed. Furthermore, although the policy does not contain language around specific 
turnaround models to use, the state prioritizes the use of the models by attaching it to the funding 
that is available to support turnaround efforts. This is important because the turnaround models 
involve shifts of staffing that could impact how the educators in and around the school view the 
turnaround work. 
Understanding Turnaround Schools 
The turnaround policy has a specific view of a turnaround school a chronically 
underperforming school as measured by student achievement performance data. Yet, those data 
points do not reflect the challenging conditions that surround chronically underperforming 
schools. In order to fully understand turnaround schools, we look beyond the leveling of schools 
that emerges from low performance on state assessments to the conditions of those schools and 
their communities. Chronically underperforming schools share many of the same challenging 
conditions regardless of whether or not they are labeled a “turnaround school” via the policy. 
Therefore, we look to the broad range of literature which examines conditions in schools that are 
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considered underperforming, challenging, and/or high-need in order to fully grasp the nature of 
the work that is involved in turning them around. 
One condition that appears to be common in chronically underperforming schools is 
poverty. The literature reveals that the low socioeconomic status of the school’s population is 
often identified as a condition of a low-performing school (Duke, Tucker, Belcher, Crews, 
Harrison-Coleman & Higgins, 2005; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). High levels of poverty often 
increase the level of stress on a school resulting in a need to provide more services for students 
(Corallo & McDonald, 2001). In an opinion article in the New York Times, Reardon (2013) 
emphasizes the central role of social and economic status in the success of students in school. He 
notes in particular that while small gains have been made in closing the achievement gap 
between racial groups, there continues to be a gap between students of different socioeconomic 
status, with students living in poverty persistently performing well behind those of their more 
affluent peers. This means that schools serving high poverty communities often face the 
challenge of raising the academic performance of their low-income students. 
Although the home environment of children living in poverty influences their school 
performance, the low achievement of poor children is not due solely to family background. Their 
school experience also plays a critical role in their academic progress (Gezi, 1990). A number of 
areas that impact student achievement are associated with low-performing schools. Poor teacher 
quality (Duke et al., 2005; Murphy & Meyers, 2008), high teacher turnover (Corallo & 
McDonald, 2001; Murphy & Meyers, 2008) and ineffective leadership (Murphy & Meyers, 
2008) are all associated with a school’s inability to effectively show high student achievement. 
Other school conditions include a lack of teamwork, curriculum that is not aligned, and 
discipline issues (Duke et al., 2005). Educator practices and beliefs also play a role in low 
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student achievement. Blaming students for failure, which often stems from low morale (Murphy 
& Meyers, 2008) and low expectations of students (Corallo & McDonald, 2001), is typically 
found in underperforming schools. From their findings of a study of the Virginia School 
Turnaround Specialist Program (VSTSP), which examined the practices of ten successful 
turnaround leaders, Duke et al. (2005) echo these low expectations by describing the conditions 
of a dysfunctional culture in which educators assume a punitive and reactionary attitude towards 
students displaying a lack of achievement. Low parent involvement is also commonly found in 
underperforming schools where communication and collaboration between school and home is 
minimal and weak (Clubine, Knight, Schneider, & Smith, 2001). This literature illustrates how 
turnaround schools operate in challenging contexts. Rather than view these conditions as barriers 
to school improvement, we feel they need to be taken into account when turning around 
chronically underperforming schools. 
We look to these descriptions of chronically underperforming schools to understand the 
kinds of conditions that may exist in current turnaround schools designated under current state 
and Federal legislation. These are schools with weak school structures and practices in 
communities with high poverty rates. Although all the conditions described above might not 
apply to all schools labeled a “turnaround school,” they are common enough to illustrate some of 
the challenging conditions that educators face when embarking on the work of turning around 
underperforming schools. 
Review of Research on Improving Chronically Underperforming Schools 
Given this characterization of turnaround schools as schools with challenging conditions, 
we examine the research that highlights the practices that have been successful in improving 
chronically underperforming schools. Because research on practices for school turnaround in 
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response to policy mandates is lacking, this review is derived from a broad range of research 
studies of effective practices in underperforming schools, many of which may not necessarily 
have implemented specific policy requirements for school improvement. It is our belief that the 
findings from these research studies could aid our understanding of the kinds of practices that 
educators might draw on when implementing turnaround policy. If the goal of the policy is to 
raise student achievement and to close the achievement gap, what educators do to meet those 
ends is paramount, and research on effective practices can potentially inform how they approach 
the work. These practices have been examined through a variety of lenses, including motivation, 
professional development, development of teacher leaders, vision and goal-setting, data, 
instructional time and programming, and collaboration. 
Motivation. One of these lenses is the role of motivation in the process of change. Albert 
Bandura (1994) defines motivation as the “activation to action.” He argues that people are able to 
remain motivated in stressful situations when they believe they have self-efficacy and the ability 
to overcome their stressors. What school leaders do can influence how educators motivate 
themselves to do turnaround work. Leaders have to instill hope and confidence in the teachers in 
order for the work of a turnaround to even be attempted (Murphy & Meyers, 2008). There is a 
human element to turning around schools and therefore the emotional impact of the reform 
efforts on teachers must be considered in order for the changes to be successful. The school 
leader must take into account how it feels for people to go through change in such a stressful 
environment (Evans, 1996; Norman, 2010). Motivation is particularly important in light of 
policy requirements that are imposed on schools from the state. On the one hand, they might 
contribute to the stress that educators feel. On the other hand, mandates that threaten the 
elimination of jobs, the closing of schools, and even the public shaming associated with 
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turnaround schools can serve a purpose (Duke, Tucker, Salmonowicz, Levy & Saunders, 2008). 
The threat of loss of employment and school closure serve to introduce a crisis into the 
turnaround school, particularly if the teachers there did not feel it already. This is akin to 
accountability pressure that comes into play when achievement targets must be met in order to 
show improvement. It is helpful to leverage this accountability pressure to compel educators to 
focus on their performance (Jacobson, Johnson, Ylimaki, & Giles, 2005; Fullan, 2006). 
Turnaround work can be fostered by the school leadership, or it can be motivated by policy 
mandates with consequences for noncompliance. Regardless of the motivation, educators’ beliefs 
about their ability to create sustainable improvement in student achievement are key to turning 
around an underperforming school. 
Vision and goal setting.  Perhaps the practice most frequently cited for raising school 
performance centers on vision and mission. Successful leaders in low-performing schools drive 
the work at hand by communicating and maintaining a highly focused vision and mission that is 
about student learning (Clubine, et al., 2001; Duke, 2006; Gezi, 1990; Jacobson, et al., 2005; 
Leithwood, Harris & Strauss, 2010; Murphy, 2010; Murphy & Meyers, 2008; Picucci, 
Brownson, Kahlert, & Sobel, 2002; Potter, Reynolds, & Chapman, 2002; Salmonowicz, 2009; 
Duke et al., 2005). While the literature has examined this feature in a variety of contexts, it is the 
one that is primarily noted as having a significant impact on school improvement success. 
Distinguishing between strategies for short-term versus long-term gains, Corallo and McDonald 
(2001) note that developing a common vision and mission is one that would result in long-term 
gains. Gezi (1990) articulates this critical role of vision when he says, “Leadership seems to 
infuse the school not only with the vision but with the positive climate, communication and 
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support that are essential ingredients of a sense of ownership, enthusiasm, commitment and pride 
in achievement” (p. 9). 
Similar to establishing a vision, goal setting has a significant role in the work of turning 
around underperforming schools. Establishing clear goals and priorities is an essential 
component of raising the level of performance for any underperforming school (Anderson et al., 
1999; Gezi, 1990; Leithwood et al., 2010; Murphy, 2010; Stein, 2012) with an emphasis on the 
use of targets to benchmark progress towards goals (Potter et al., 2002). This points to the 
importance of objectives and targets in outlining the improvement goals of the school. Research 
points to the importance of having an overall vision of performance for the school along with 
specific goals. 
Data. Working in tandem with goal setting is the use of data. Some of the research notes 
the value of analyzing student achievement data to guide instruction in low performing schools 
(Clubine et al., 2001; Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 2005; Stein, 2012). Leithwood et 
al. (2010) claim that the leadership practices most associated with successful school turnaround 
include monitoring of student learning and overall school progress. They write, “School and 
district leaders constantly monitor evidence about the learning of students and the efforts of staff 
to improve such learning, continuously adjusting their own decisions and actions in response to 
this evidence” (p. 159). Indeed, turnaround schools need to engage in a continual process of self-
analysis in order to monitor progress and determine areas that persistently lag (Murphy & 
Meyers, 2008). This reflects how data should be used to ensure progress towards goals already 
set, not just in individual classrooms, but also school wide, all of which embodies the process of 
measuring accountability. The literature illustrates that there is a strong link between goal setting 
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and using data to measure progress for leaders in underperforming schools and that using data 
has a key role in school improvement. 
Building capacity. Another key component to improving chronically underperforming 
schools is in the area of capacity building. The work of M. Bruce King and Kate Bouchard 
(2011) on building organizational capacity in schools defines capacity as the “collective power 
of a faculty to strengthen student performance throughout their school” (p. 654). Richard Elmore 
(2004) addresses the role of professional development in bridging the gap between performance 
and human capacity. An expert on the modern school reform movement, Elmore argues for a 
more robust and targeted professional development plan in schools that values the idea of 
“reciprocity of accountability,” which asserts that teachers need to be provided with additional 
capacity if schools expect them to perform different tasks or familiar tasks at a higher level. 
Indeed, professional development is a common means used to increase staff skills and 
knowledge to improve their individual and collective performance. Newmann, King, and Young 
(2000) further claim that schools that used a comprehensive approach to professional 
development were more likely to focus on the long-term consistency, improving teacher 
knowledge over time, thereby building capacity. They add that professional development for 
principals must ensure they understand the importance of building capacity. 
Bringing in external resources is one way to help build capacity. Due to the difficulty of 
developing capacity in low performing schools, King and Bouchard (2011) provide insight they 
gained from the Wisconsin Idea Leadership Academy (WILA), a hybrid program that combines 
the resources of a university school of education, the state education department, a mid-size 
urban district, and six schools. They note that the success of the WILA model is that it provides 
leadership coaching for school leadership teams, instructional coaching for teachers, cross-lateral 
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networks for sharing of best practices between schools, and alignment between WILA coaches 
and state liaisons. School-university partnerships are key external resources as noted by Vernon-
Dotson and Floyd (2012) who found in their research of three K-12 school partnerships with 
local universities that external technical assistance provided by universities to teacher teams can 
build capacity in schools. Consistent with past school reform movements, the work of school 
districts with turnaround schools is to find external resources and service providers to help build 
capacity in schools engaged in the current turnaround experiment (Fullan, 2006; Zavadsky, 
2012). Given the complexity of improving student achievement in turnaround schools providing 
quality professional development for teachers is critical to equipping them for the work of school 
turnaround. 
Teacher leaders. Another aspect that is addressed in the literature is the importance of 
sustained improvement and not just a temporary fix for underperforming schools. One way this 
improvement is sustained is through the identification and development of teacher leaders who 
will commit to continuing the work over time to realize student achievement gains. In their 
research on teacher leadership in the UK, Muijs and Harris (2006) emphasized that being a 
teacher leader was not limited to leading a department or team, but instead entailed having any 
kind of responsibility for making improvements. They found that teacher leadership was a 
significant factor in school improvement as it increased teacher professional learning because 
they were able to learn amongst their peers. In fact, teacher leadership is tied to capacity building 
as noted by Dinham and Crowther (2011) whose research on building sustainable capacity in 
schools found that the distributed leadership model and the relationship between principals and 
teacher leaders is a key factor in building school capacity. Defining what teacher leadership 
looks like, Vernon-Dotson and Floyd (2012) claim that when teachers become immersed in 
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tackling school challenges with a leadership lens, they are inspired to go above and beyond their 
job description and become participants in school-wide change. Furthermore, teachers who 
engaged in collaborative leadership experiences felt valued and were more likely to buy into 
school initiatives because they were a part of the decision-making process.  As a result, teachers 
were more likely to implement commonly developed professional development activities and put 
strategies into action. Spillane and Coldren (2011) further describe distributed leadership in their 
discussion about diagnosis and design for school improvement when they say that it is not only 
about the leadership actions, but includes how people communicate in schools and how the 
situation influences their interactions.  By employing distributed leadership, turnaround schools 
can better maximize their resources by engaging faculty in deeper and more meaningful ways 
that will help sustain the work. 
Collaboration and teamwork. Collaboration and teamwork are also areas that research 
has shown to contribute to successful school improvement. Some studies have found that 
relationship building coupled with collaboration between stakeholders is key to raising the level 
of performance of an underperforming school (Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 2005; 
Fullan, 2006; Harris, 2006; Mulford et al., 2008; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Clubine et al. (2001) 
found that in successful turnaround schools, collaboration took several forms, including common 
team planning where teachers discussed student progress, curriculum, and instructional goals. 
Indeed, this collaboration has a particular role in school reform in that in successful school 
turnaround, there is a collective sense of responsibility for student improvement (Anderson et al., 
1999). Yet, collaboration does not always naturally occur without guidance. In her examination 
of change efforts in schools with difficult contexts in England, Harris (2006) emphasizes the 
need for a leader to be open and honest as they build quality interpersonal relationships. This 
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lays a critical foundation for teamwork and collaboration. In fact, empowerment and a sense of 
trust are a critical part of collaboration. Once these are infused into the organization, a 
collaborative environment can flourish (Fullan, 2006; Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Harris, 2002). 
Educator collaboration can help educators to feel less isolated and more connected to a common 
goal of making gains in student learning. In the end, the value of collaboration is its role in 
supporting educators in the difficult work of school improvement. 
Instructional time and programming. Another significant part of improving 
chronically underperforming schools involves focusing on instructional time and examining 
instructional programming. Studying three high-poverty elementary schools, Jacobson et al. 
(2007) found that successful principals revamped structures, policies, and procedures where 
needed and refocused conversations on how to improve student learning. While this applies to 
the operation of the school overall, what is suggested is that these structures are needed to 
support the instructional programming. Picucci et al. (2002), in their study of school turnaround, 
found that schools that showed rapid achievement gains helped to maintain instructional quality 
by reducing any distractions to teaching. This included strengthening student management 
systems in order to increase teachers’ focus on instruction and less on managing student 
behaviors. Leithwood et al. (2010) also discussed the need to eliminate distractions, but more in 
terms of buffering staff from “being pulled in directions incompatible with agreed-on 
organizational goals” (p. 162). With structures in place to support a focus on teaching and a 
reduction of distractions, the time for actual planning and delivery of instruction can be 
maximized. 
How the Literature Relates to This Study 
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Literature on school improvement, particularly for challenging schools, outline specific 
leadership practices that, when implemented effectively, contribute to the success of school 
improvement. These practices include attending to staff motivation, building capacity, 
developing teacher leaders, setting a vision and goals, using data, maximizing instructional time 
and programming, and providing opportunities for collaboration. While literature has uncovered 
effective practices to raise school performance, most of the chronically underperforming schools 
in these research studies have not necessarily been responding to policy mandates of school 
turnaround. Indeed, new legislation now attempts to improve school performance by imposing 
general requirements around how turnaround work is to occur. However, the policy does not 
articulate the practices educators should use to implement it. That is, the general requirements 
are about the process of developing the turnaround plan and elements that must be included. It 
does not include language around how educators should approach the work of school turnaround 
in order to meet the turnaround goals of raising student achievement. That is left up to the 
educators to determine what practice would most likely be effective in raising student 
achievement. That is where this body of research comes in. School leaders might turn to these 
research studies to understand what practice they should exercise in order to meet the turnaround 
goals. 
The research on practices that improve the performance of chronically underperforming 
schools is ample. Therefore, the purpose of this research is not to explore best practices for 
turning around underperforming schools. Rather, we aimed to unearth how turnaround work 
occurs as a response to policy mandates, in light of these proven effective practices. As discussed 
earlier, educators are responsible for implementing turnaround policy and the practices described 
above might inform how they do that, especially given a policy that does not require or even 
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suggest specific practices. With a policy that does not suggest educational practices for 
implementers, and a body of research that reveals effective practices in turning around schools, 
what is missing is research that looks at what practices educators put in place to implement 
turnaround policy. In order to better understand how these implementation decisions are made, 
we turned to how educators interpreted and made sense of the policy itself. This may have a 
great impact on the implementation and ultimately on the success or failure of the policy. 
Theoretical Basis for the Study 
Policy Implementation 
State legislation requires that turnaround plans lead to rapid academic achievement of 
students. The literature review of best practices outlines what is needed to turn around 
chronically underperforming schools and policy implementers may use these as guides to know 
which actions to take. Whereas the policy articulates the goal of higher student achievement, the 
literature answers the question of what to do to reach that outcome. 
The theoretical basis for this research first looks at policy implementation as a critical 
factor in whether or not practice is aligned with policy goals. Green (1983) provides a theoretical 
overview for the relationship between policy and practice through his discussion of excellence, 
equity, and equality. He identifies the problem of determining whether the tools of public policy 
can impact practice, questioning the nature of public policy and its limitations. He claims that 
public policy addresses the common good and not the good of individuals, and further argues 
that the tools of policy are primarily aimed to minimize evil, rather than promote benefits. 
Green’s work is significant to our study because it points to the role of policy implementation in 
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relation to changing practice. In turnaround schools changing practice is essential to improving 
student achievement. 
The field of policy implementation research formally emerged during the 1960s. Since 
then it has undergone three distinctive generations or waves of research (Honig, 2006). The first 
wave focused on what gets implemented. Early research studies looked at policies that were 
intended to achieve wide ranging societal goals. The second wave, during the 1970s, focused on 
what gets implemented over time, and included a growing recognition of the fact that policy, 
people and places mattered to implementation. During the 1980’s a third wave of research 
evolved which centered on concerns with what works and the field began to focus on 
“implementers’ agency as an important avenue for implementation research” (Honig, 2006, p. 9). 
Honig (2006) notes that past treatment of policy implementation in research relied on a 
distinction between “successful” policies, those that result in higher student achievement, and 
“implementable” policies, those where implementation closely resembles policy design. She 
further states that research needs to acknowledge that there is significant complexity involved in 
policy implementation and includes the interaction between policies, people and places, and the 
demands on implementers. The critical question is about, “what is implementable and what 
works for whom, where, when and why” (Honig, 2006, p. 2). Included in this complexity are the 
factors that have a role in what implementers do with policy and the actions they take, which 
may include their belief systems, background, knowledge, and the contexts that influence what 
they can and will do (Honig, 2006). The process that individuals or organizations engage in to 
create “understanding” when faced with complex, dissonant or ambiguous circumstances leads to 
a more in-depth analysis of the theory base for this study. Here, sense-making may have a 
significant role in policy implementation in terms of how implementers understand the policy 
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that dictates turnaround work. This research study looked at how well implementers’ 
understanding of policy support its execution and if there are influencing factors that impact the 
way in which implementers make sense of the policy. Understanding the impact of implementer 
sense-making is not only important and practical for school districts who are engaging in 
turnaround work in response to policy mandates, but it is also high stakes for the success of 
students currently attending chronically underperforming schools. 
Policy Sense-making 
Defining “understanding” requires a further analysis of a body of research which spans 
multiple disciplines and multiple interpretations. Prior researchers from the fields of 
organizational psychology, sociology, management science, social anthropology and more 
recently education policy implementation have defined this process as “sense-making.” 
Organizational psychologist Karl Weick (1995), a key contributor to the development of this 
theoretical frame, stated simply, “The concept of sense-making is well named because, literally it 
means the making of sense.” Weick (1995) further defined the concept by stating, “how they 
(individuals) construct what they construct, why and with what effects, are the central questions 
for people interested in sense-making” (p. 4). Weick (1995) grounds his version of sense-making 
in seven properties that he argues are most commonly found throughout the sense-making 
literature, including; 1) grounded identity construction; 2) retrospective; 3) enactive of sensible 
environments; 4) social; 5) ongoing;  6) focused on and by extracted cues; and 7) driven by 
plausibility rather than accuracy. He argues that each of the seven properties can be used to 
define various characteristics of sense-making. For example, sense-making begins with the 
sense-maker (grounded identity construction). An individual’s environment as well as their past 
experiences are used in sense-making (retrospective).  Individuals can be active participants in 
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constructing the environment they are trying to make sense of (enactive of sensible 
environments). They can make sense of something either individually, or as part of a larger 
social group (social). The sense-making process has no beginning and no end (ongoing). It is an 
iterative process and can be influenced by the cues individuals chose to focus on in the 
environment around them (focused on and by extracted cues). Finally, sense-making is not about 
truth or getting it right. It is a about creating a story that is plausible and then continually refining 
it with more data and observations so that it can withstand criticism (driven by plausibility not 
accuracy). (Weick, Sutcliff, & Obstfled, 2005). 
In addition to Karl Weick, a number of other researchers have provided their own 
theories and interpretations of sense-making. Dervin (1998), whose research centers on 
communication and the design of communication systems, uses the sense-making frame to 
investigate the interconnectedness between knowledge management and sense-making. Dervin 
states, “One of the premises of sense-making is that there is an inherent intertwined connection 
between how you look at a situation and what sense of it you are able to construct of it” (p. 11). 
The focus of this research was grounded in the field of education and policy 
implementation using sense-making as a frame. Weick and Dervin, among others, provide a 
broad contextual multidisciplinary research framework to understand sense-making; however, 
this research seeks to weave a historical understanding of sense-making with a more 
contemporary understanding of the factors that contribute to sense-making in the educational 
policy implementation context. More specifically, the research examined sense-making and 
turnaround policy through the eyes of multiple policy implementers. 
Contemporary implementation research builds on the work of previous decades but has 
expanded the field to include the study of three key dimensions in policy design: goals, targets 
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and tools. Other researchers have then begun to offer additional theories such as the role of  “co-
construction” in policy implementation (Datnow, 2006), policy implementation and cognition 
(Spillane, Reiser & Gomez, 2006), policy implementation as organizational learning (Honig, 
2006), policy implementation as a political process (Malen, 2006), and the role of social capital 
in policy implementation (Smylie & Evans, 2006), all contributing to an evolving definition of 
sense-making and its role in policy implementation. The concept of sense-making is essential to 
this study, as we hoped to gain insight into how policy implementers of the state turnaround 
legislation make sense of the policy, and what implications their sense-making might have on 
how they go about implementing the policy to reach policy goals. The sections below provide 
further detail about the various components of sense-making as identified in the literature. 
Construction and cognition. The frame begins with a look at how implementers receive 
education policy information and make sense of it in light of existing knowledge. Spillane, 
Reiser and Gomez, (2006) talk about sense-making in terms of a “reconstruction” of knowledge 
for the change implementer.  “What is paramount is not simply that implementing agents choose 
to respond to the policy but also what they understand themselves to be responding to” (Spillane 
et al., 2006, p. 49).  When an implementer encounters new research or policy, they combine it 
with their existing knowledge and experience to construct new knowledge. It is this interaction 
between old knowledge and new information where one creates an understanding of the policy. 
Relating to the effective practices described in the literature review above, the role of prior 
knowledge may be particularly pertinent. Educators typically have a knowledge base about what 
good practice looks like, including best practices around instruction and leadership. When they 
encounter policy that dictates certain ways to turn around a school, that prior knowledge would 
interact with the policy and inform how the implementer makes sense of the policy and the 
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corresponding work. Spillane et al. (2006) further describe this as cognition.  “From a cognitive 
perspective, implementation hinges on whether and in what ways local implementing agents' 
understanding of policy demands impacts the extent to which they reinforce or alter their 
practice” (p. 47).  Spillane et al. (2006) argue that understanding is only one discrete factor. How 
individuals view the world, the beliefs they hold and how their expectations influence their 
actions also contribute to their sense-making. They further argue that learning a new idea may 
not be sufficient in and of itself, particularly in the context of reform and restructuring. New 
ideas may be in danger of being modified or ignored if they are filtered through the same 
existing knowledge schemas that already exist. 
Spillane et al. (2006) offer a caveat about interpretation of policy given one’s preexisting 
level of expertise. If one’s understanding is limited to the superficial aspects of the policy or 
embodies only a rudimentary level of expertise in complex policy implementation, they may 
miss the core concepts of the policy and focus entirely on what is similar to their previous 
experience, leading to a familiar but ultimately shallow interpretation. The expertise one brings 
to their interpretation of a given policy determines their ability to identify key elements of the 
policy. Because implementation decisions are influenced by this sense-making, the interaction 
between expertise and policy sense-making makes a difference in how policy is implemented at 
the ground level (Spillane et al., 2006). 
Datnow (2006) argues that this knowledge is also “co-constructed” with other members 
of the policy chain. Co-construction relies on multi-directionality, since over time the different 
implementers influence each other during the interactions that take place. While policy 
implementation tends to assume a linear process, in reality, implementation is not so much a 
linear process but one that takes on varying directions. It is the interactions between 
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implementers that lead to these various directions and help implementers construct an 
understanding of the policy. Here, the role of communication is salient in that it is through 
communication that people begin to make sense of what they need to do to implement the policy. 
Another critical part of Datnow’s (2006) co-construction is that one’s understanding of 
policy is not divorced from the context in which they are implementing policy. She puts forth a 
concept of a relational sense of context, explaining that, “by this we mean that people’s actions 
cannot be understood apart from the setting in which they are situated, and reciprocally, the 
setting cannot be understood without understanding the actions of the people within it” (p. 107). 
When people implement policy, their thinking is shaped by the situation or environment that 
surrounds them, which in turn influences the actions they take to implement policy. Important to 
consider when examining policy implementation in education, is how educators make sense of 
the policy, in the case of this research, turnaround policy, given their existing knowledge and 
their context. 
Political effect. Malen (2006) provides a framework and case study for assessing the role 
of politics on education policy implementation. She argues that implementation is a crucial point 
in the policy-making process because it is the point where it actually impacts various 
stakeholders. According to Malen (2006), there are “political exchanges” that occur during 
implementation that regulate the various interests of stakeholders “because they are value-laden 
issues that cannot be resolved solely through the acquisition of empirical evidence or the 
application of technical expertise” (Malen, 2006, p. 83). Relationships amongst various policy 
implementation actors, although they may or may not acknowledge one another, are forged and 
impact the degree to which policy is implemented with fidelity, resisted, or subverted. 
Furthermore, because education policies are deeply value-laden and may require reallocation of 
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resources or question utilization of time, reaching resolution is extremely difficult. The author’s 
framework draws extensively on the idea of “political games” as a metaphor as originally 
proposed by Bardach’s (1977) groundbreaking research. Here Bardach outlined a process various 
policy implementers go through in order to achieve specific policy goals. 
The key components of the educational policy implementation political frame include an 
analysis of the varied interests of actors and their capacity to influence implementation based on 
policy currency, and the influence of social and institutional context on implementation.  Malen 
(2006) explains that policy implementation literature overwhelmingly identifies “policy dilution” 
as a major theme. In this instance, the varied interests of implementers erode social reform. The 
author further adds: 
Even at the local level, deeply rooted traditions of incremental decision making and 
broadly held views about occupational survival may prompt district officials to select and enact 
policies that “attract...notice” and enhance legitimacy, but do not alter fundamentally, the 
orientations and operations of the school system (Malen, 2006, p. 97). 
For Malen, the political frame can provide unique insights into policy implementation 
and, as the above quotation indicates, various political phenomena and “political games” played 
by policy implementers can greatly influence policy outcomes. The insights are key in 
understanding the interface between actor’s interests and resources, and policy initiatives, 
premises and outcomes. 
Social capital. Smylie and Evans (2006) provide insight on the impact social capital can 
have on education policy implementation. While social capital is a broad concept, used in 
various disciplines and contexts, for the purposes of this study we adopt the definition of social 
capital as developed by Smylie and Evans. The authors define social capital an “intangible and 
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abstract resource...[that can act as an agent] to promote certain behaviors within social structures 
and it can be accumulated and drawn on to achieve otherwise hard to attain objectives.” (Smylie 
& Evans, 2006, p. 189). For Smylie and Evans, social capital contains three major components, 
including “social trust, channels of communication, and norms, expectations, and sanctions” (p. 
189-190). Trust can determine the extent to which individuals in organization want to collaborate 
with one another, based on their confidence in their colleagues, in order to achieve policy goals. 
The flow of communication is essential as successfully reaching any goal requires access to new 
information and furthermore requires individuals to communicate with one another. Finally, 
norms, expectations and sanctions can influence the extent to which individuals are praised or 
reprimanded for their actions based on intangible predetermined community standards. Within 
these confines, Smylie and Evans argue that social capital can greatly impact policy 
implementation and the attainment of policy goals. 
At the onset the authors note that implementation research has long known that the will 
and capacity of implementers and how they navigate the local context could negatively impact 
policy outcomes (p. 189). The authors argue that social capital can have a positive or negative 
impact on implementation. “Social capital is not social interaction per se. Social capital is 
‘produced’ through social interaction” (p. 189).  Furthermore, social capital can be divided into 
two components, “trust” and “channels of communication.” These components have implications 
on policy implementation because of the open or closed nature of relationships based on trust can 
impact whether or not an idea, program, or initiative will thrive. 
The authors note that while strong social capital can be key to policy implementation, it 
can also act as a conserving force, where entrenched philosophies developed through shared 
norms and experiences can impede policy implementation (Smylie & Evans, 2006). They 
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reviewed research conducted by the Chicago Annenberg Research Institute. The Chicago 
Annenberg Challenge was a five-year study of decentralized reform initiatives involving efforts 
between schools and external partners. Smylie and Evans (2006) note that this study was not 37 
necessarily on social capital itself, but that it can be used as a window through which to 
understand the role of social capital in the implementation of initiatives. Based on the outcomes 
of the Annenberg Challenge, they concluded that both the initial level of social resources and the 
nature of and ability to sustain relationships with external partners were two determining factors 
indicating strong social capital, which supported implementation. Schools that began with a 
stronger base of social resources valued teacher collaboration and had an orientation toward 
trust, innovation, and owning student success or failure. Some of the external partners in the 
Annenberg Challenge schools found it difficult to sustain relationships and communicate 
effectively with teachers in some schools, which led to groups of teachers using social capital to 
inhibit the success of reform efforts. The authors conclude their article by arguing that social 
capital is something that researchers should continue to pay attention to, as it can aid or inhibit 
the success of policy implementation. 
The above-mentioned components of policy sense-making each have a unique impact on 
how policy is implemented throughout school districts. Whether at the level of the school board, 
superintendent/central office, principal and leadership teams, or amongst school faculty, 
construction and cognition, the impact of politics, and the impact of social capital can all 
substantially affect policy outcomes. Understanding this is important and helpful for district and 
school leaders since time and resources are limited. The stakes are high and the impact of not 
carefully considering how all of these elements work together and how they shape policy 
implementation could be a determining factor in the attainment of policy goals. This could mean 
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that chronically underperforming schools fail to improve within the three-year timeframe as 
outlined within the State Legislation (2010). Moreover, as we outlined in the introduction to this 
study, for communities and cities that are relying on school and district leaders to produce 
educated and productive graduates, failure to turnaround schools has a large impact society. 
Therefore this study aimed to gain insight into what it takes to “get it right,” which is an essential 
concern of this state’s school and district leaders with level D schools. 
Theoretical Frame Synthesis 
The theory frames outlined above are represented in the graphic below. 
Figure 1.1 Theoretical Framework for how sense-making impacts Turnaround Policy 
implementation. 
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 The turnaround policy acts as the trigger that begins the process that may ultimately lead 
to the goal, improved student achievement. As the policy reaches the policy implementers, a 
number of factors influence how the implementers make sense of the policy. As outlined by 
Honig (2006), the implementers' beliefs, knowledge and perceptions of their own capacity to 
implement the policy come into play. This likely includes prior knowledge about effective 
practices to turn around underperforming schools. Karl Weick (1995) outlines the process policy 
implementers may go through in trying to understand a policy and maintains that this process is 
iterative. He argues that who, what, why, and a person’s past can impact their understanding of 
policy. Dervin (1998) explains the link between a subject’s understanding of a policy and their 
ability to construct meaning. Spillane et al. (2006) point out cognition is dependent upon one’s 
ability to understand a policy and alter their practice as a result. He and his colleagues argue that 
it's not enough to be able to grasp new ideas because learning new ideas using old schemas can 
be deleterious to success. Datnow (2006) argues that this knowledge is also “co-constructed” 
amongst implementers who are responsible for the policy. She further adds that implementer 
actions cannot be divorced from their context, and consequently the context is better understood 
by assessing the impact of implementer actions on the context. This means that the implementers 
actions continuously changes context and therefore context can be better understood through 
study of implementer cognition. Malen (2006) provides insight into the types of political 
exchanges that take place and the effect they might have on decisions around time and resource. 
Malen argues that actions and decisions can become high stakes and uses the concept of 
“political games” to describe the impact of politics on policy implementation. Smylie and Evans 
(2006) note that social capital has a significant impact on policy implementation. They add that 
social capital is not defined as simple human interaction, but instead intentional interactions 
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between implementers.  In this context, social capital can be divided into two categories, trust 
and communication. Externally the context in which the implementers operate, the influence of 
politics, and social processes they engage in make sense of the policy. The perception that there 
may or may not be external capacity to successfully implement the policy all converge and 
influence the eventual sense-making the policy implementers make of the original policy. Their 
understanding guides how the policy will be implemented in the day-to-day context of 
turnaround schools. Policy implementation then becomes an iterative process that is ongoing, 
constantly refined and modified by new knowledge, new emotions and new understanding or 
sense-making (Weick, 1995). 
Research Gap 
 Ample literature exists around efforts to turn around underperforming schools. This 
includes a wide range of research studies that look at how schools are able to raise the level of 
performance of their students in challenging contexts. Studies have shown how certain practices 
contribute to successful school turnaround. Yet, not all of these studies look at turnaround in 
terms of policies that dictate the turnaround process. In this state the legislation mandates that 
schools designated as turnaround schools need to comply with specific requirements to raise 
student academic achievement. This informs turnaround work in ways that have not yet been 
addressed in the literature. A critical part of this research is that turnaround policies dictate 
turnaround efforts to occur within a relatively short timeframe (e.g. 3 years). However, 
researchers’ descriptions of all the elements that go into making sense of any policy suggest this 
to be a complex and perhaps lengthy process.  This research study not only addressed the gap in 
the literature about making sense of turnaround policy and how it influences implementation, but 
also considered the fact that the policy only allows three years to turn around a school. The gap 
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in turnaround research exists at the intersection of practices that are shown to turn around an 
underperforming school and turnaround policy implementation. 
 Another body of literature looks at the role of policy sense-making in policy 
implementation. Focused on policy implementers, this sense-making includes internal or 
individual processes (e.g. reconstruction of knowledge) and external influences (e.g. co-
construction and politics). Research studies have examined how sense-making has worked with 
specific policies. In these studies, researchers were able to get a glimpse into the sense-making 
process in the context of actual policy implementation. However, research on sense-making with 
this specific turnaround policy is lacking. This is a matter of practical and urgent importance to 
school districts across the state as all stakeholders within the school community are concerned 
with improving chronically underperforming schools. With the high stakes nature of this 
turnaround school reform effort, the way in which district leaders understand the legislation will 
significantly impact the educational success for thousands of students throughout the state. 
Successful policy implementation may be dependent upon understanding the policy at 
face value and district leaders ensuring that the political context, shared values, capacity, and 
colleague sense-making do not negatively impact implementation. Getting it right could mean 
positive outcomes for students and schools that have chronically underperformed, which would 
ultimately lead to increased student achievement and a change in classification from level D to 
level C3 and beyond. The stakes are high as unsuccessful implementation could mean schools 
and districts become level F, and risk state take over. More importantly, unsuccessful 
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implementation results in inferior education, which is detrimental to individuals, families, the 
state, and the nation. 
Chapter 3 
Methodology4 
The Community Context 
The city, which is the site of this research study, is located in the Northeast and its history 
and development has followed a path similar to that of most beleaguered industrial mill towns—
intense growth and dramatic decline followed by fits and starts at resurgence. Geography and the 
immediate access to both a port of entry and water power from nearby rivers made the 
community a desirable location for bringing in raw materials, manufacturing them into goods, 
and redistributing them out via the port to other parts of the country. At the height of its power, 
the city employed more than 30,000 workers. Thousands of immigrants arrived during the boom 
period between 1865 and 1923, coming primarily from Ireland, England, Scotland and Italy as 
well as Canada, Portugal and the Azores. As each immigrant group arrived, they proudly claimed 
certain parts of the city as their own, most settling in triple decker units built by mill owners and 
usually under the spire of a Catholic church. Portuguese immigrants, settled in tight knit 
communities that allowed residents to maintain their language, culture and traditions. In 1920, 
the population of the community was 120,485, primarily of European descent. Not unlike many 
mill cities throughout the country, the city foresaw a bright and long future for its residents and 
its community. The city’s decline would be dramatic and difficult to reverse. It began with the 
Depression of the 1930s, followed by the closing of mills and manufacturing plants in the 1940s 
and 1950s. An attempt at urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s created housing and 
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 This chapter was jointly written by the authors listed and reflects the team approach of this project: Anna Carollo 
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 36 
 
infrastructure but demolished some close-knit communities in the process. Globalization, 
economic hardship, rising unemployment, crime, drugs and failing schools plagued the city 
through the 1980s, 1990s and into the 2000s. 
The city’s population has steadily declined from its peak in 1920 to 89,220. The vast 
majority (87 percent) continues to identify themselves as having European ancestry, but a 
growing percentage of the population (29.6 percent) report Latin America, Asia and Africa as 
their region of birth. Based on the 2010 Census data, 26 percent of the foreign-born population 
entered the United States in 2000 or later. About 34.2 percent of the households speak a language 
other than English in the home, and 21.4 percent of the residents live below the poverty level, 
double the poverty level for the state. According to a recent study, the poverty rate for children 
under 18 is 33.3 percent, which means that one in every three children in the city is currently 
living in poverty. Many live as renters in multi-unit structures, remnants of the housing stock 
created for mill workers. In terms of educational attainment, 32.5 percent of the adults over the 
age of 25 do not hold a high school diploma, a mere 14.1 percent of the adults over 25 hold a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. This is a city under stress, which has struggled to maintain its 
identity and its pride.  The school system is seen as a key ingredient to improve the quality of life 
for its residents and restore the economic future of the city. 
The LEA Context 
In recent years turning around the city has focused on turning around the public school 
system. The LEA has an enrollment of 10,138 students. Over the last ten years the demographics 
of the student population has changed both socio-economically and racially. This is significant in 
that the school system has had to respond to this rapidly shifting demographic as it has worked to 
turn around the schools. 
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Table 1: LEA Demographic Shifts from 2003 to 2013 
Population Category 2003 2013 
White 77.3% 63.3% 
Hispanic 9.0% 19.9% 
African American 8.1% 7.0% 
Native American 0.6% 0.3% 
Asian 5.1% 4.5% 
Low-Income 50.9% 77.9% 
English Language Learners 5.5% 7.1% 
Students w/ Disabilities 14.8% 22.4% 
 
 In 2003 the student population was 77.3 percent white, 9 percent Hispanic, 5.1 percent 
Asian, 8.1 percent African American, and .6 percent Native American. Since 2003, the Hispanic 
population has more than doubled to 19.9 percent, the white population has declined to 63.3 
percent, and the percent of African American, Asian and Native American students has remained 
relatively constant. The percentages of students who are considered selected populations under 
state indicators has also changed over the years. The percentages of students who qualify for free 
and reduced lunch increased from 60.5 in 2007 to 77.9 in 2013. Increases are also noted in the 
percentages of students whose first language is not English and of students with disabilities. In 
2013, the state added a new category to its annual statistics, the percentage of students in the 
LEA who qualify as “high needs,” who constitute 81.5 percent of the students who attend the 
public schools in this LEA. 
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Two other notable areas of demographics were the graduation and drop-out rates which 
exceed that of the state. Interestingly, the largest attrition rate between grades occurs at grade 8 
with 32.9 percent of the students choosing to leave the schools.  
Table 2: LEA and State 2012 4-Year Graduation and Drop-Out Rates 
 
LEA 
 
State 
 
Population 
Category 
% 
Graduated 
% Dropped 
Out 
% 
Graduated 
% Dropped 
Out 
All Students 69 17.9 84.7 6.9 
Male 61.5 23.1 81.8 8 
Female 76.8 12.5 87.7 5.7 
ELL 44.1 23.5 61.1 18.9 
Students w/ 
Disabilities 
35.7 34.3 68.6 12.8 
Low Income 64.2 20.6 72.4 13.2 
African American 70.1 14.9 73.4 11.3 
Asian 90.9 4.5 89.5 3.9 
Hispanic 60.8 25.5 65.5 18.1 
White 69.6 17 89.7 4.3 
 
 This table shows the 4-year high school graduation rate to be 69 percent. The high school 
dropout rate at 17.9 percent is almost double that of the state average of 6.9 percent. The largest 
groups to drop out of high school are English Language Learners (ELL) students, Hispanic and 
Latino students, and students with disabilities. Males drop out of high schools at more than 
double the rate of females. These are challenging statistics as they reflect a school system that 
struggles to serve a diverse student population. 
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Over the past several years, this LEA has been focused on turning around its 
underperforming schools. Schools have moved in and out of turnaround status, with some 
showing significant gains in student achievement and others not. 
Table 3: 2013 LEA Schools and Their Accountability and Assistance Levels 
School School Type Title I Status Accountability and 
Assistance Level 
School 1 Elementary Non-Title I School Level A 
School 2 Elementary Title I School Level C 
School 3 Elementary Title I School Level C 
School 4 Elementary Title I School Level C 
School 5 Elementary Title I School Insufficient data 
School 6 Elementary Title I School Level A 
School 7 Elementary Non-Title I School Level A 
School 8 Elementary Non-Title I School Level C 
School 9 Elementary Title I School Level D 
School 10 Elementary-
Middle 
Title I School Level B 
School 11 Middle Title I School Level C 
School 12 
(School was closed 
spring 2013) 
Middle Title I School Level D 
School 13 Middle Non-Title I School Level C 
School 14 Middle Title I School Level A 
School 15 Middle Title I School Insufficient data 
School 16 High Title I School Insufficient data 
School 17 High Non-Title I School Level C 
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 There are total of 16 schools in the LEA (with one school that closed in spring 2013). 
One of the high schools listed here is one of the top ten largest high schools in the state with an 
enrollment of 2276. In addition, there are nine elementary schools, three middle schools, one pre-
K through grade 7 school, one therapeutic high school, and one therapeutic middle school. The 
LEA is considered a level D system by the state, a designation that results from one or more 
schools in the LEA failing to meet student achievement goals relative to student performance on 
the state assessment system.  Presently, there are four level A schools, one level B school, seven 
level C schools and one level D school. 
State intervention under NCLB began in the LEA as far back as 2004 when two middle 
schools were the first in the state to be designated as “chronically underperforming” based on 
their state assessment data. Over the next several years, the achievement levels of the schools 
were in flux, moving between periods of growth and decline. When the 2010 state turnaround 
legislation was passed, those two schools, along with a third, the pre-k through grade 7 school, 
received level D designation, which threw them into a rigorous turnaround process. Growth 
occurred in two of these schools over the three-year turnaround process and both schools were 
exited out of turnaround status in 2013. Indeed, both schools showed such significant gains that 
one moved to level B and the other to level A. In the meantime, the third school that was 
originally designated a level D school in 2010, showed a decline in student achievement over the 
three year period. For that school, there was impending threat of level F designation, which 
would have meant state takeover. With that level F designation a possibility, the LEA decided to 
close that school in spring 2013 and transfer its staff and students to other schools in the system. 
While these schools were nearing the end of their turnaround process, another school was 
emerging on the horizon for turnaround status. That school was in level C when it declined to 
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level D status in 2013. At the time of this research study, that school had just embarked on the 
turnaround process.  
Research Design 
A qualitative design was chosen for this study because this methodology is best used to 
address a research problem in which the variables may be unknown, the literature may be limited 
and the researcher may need to develop a deeper understanding of the central phenomenon by 
exploring the research questions with participants (Creswell, 2012). Qualitative methodology 
allowed an in-depth exploration into the research questions:  How do implementers’ 
(superintendent/central office, building leaders, teachers, school board members) make sense of 
state turnaround policy? How does this sense-making influence policy implementation? What 
factors influence implementer sense-making? 
Case Study Design 
Case study design was used to explore the sense-making of various stakeholders 
implementing the turnaround process as mandated by the state turnaround legislation.  Merriam 
(2009) notes, “the case study offers a means of investigating complex social units consisting of 
multiple variables of potential importance in understanding the phenomenon” (p. 50). Yin (2009) 
explains that the case study approach to research is used “...to understand a real-life phenomenon 
in depth, but such understanding encompassed important contextual conditions—because they 
were highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study...” (p. 18). Given the complexity of sense-
making as outlined previously, the case study approach allowed the researchers to understand 
how implementation occurred in a specific LEA that was undergoing turnaround work as 
dictated by the policy. Yin (2009) discusses various applications of the case study research 
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design, one of which is a description of a real-life intervention and its context. As noted in the 
literature review, efforts to improve chronically underperforming schools have been chronicled 
in many research studies. This research offers a unique view of the role of sense-making by 
looking at this process through the lens of the implementation of turnaround policy with the aim 
to improve school performance. In this case, the intervention was the turnaround policy and the 
context was the LEA where implementers were required to put that policy into action. Here, the 
context became an important part of this research and, given this, we looked to the case study 
approach as one which would produce information that would lead to a deeper understanding of 
turnaround policy implementation. 
Single case study. Having established the case study as the overall design, this study 
investigated the research questions through a single case study method. The research focused on 
one LEA, which was identified through the process described in the Unit of Analysis section 
below. Yin (2009) points out that single case studies may be representative cases, or “typical” 
cases, of a given phenomenon. As a single case study, this research examined the 
implementation of turnaround policy in an LEA as representative of the process of 
implementation. We were interested in looking at these implementation questions in-depth in one 
LEA. A single case study allowed for a deeper understanding of how each stakeholder group 
made sense of the turnaround policy and how that sense-making influenced their decisions and 
actions around policy implementation. In addition, a single case study was more feasible for this 
study given limitations in access to turnaround LEA's and time allotted for data collection. 
Unit of analysis. Included in a single case study approach was the need to identify the 
unit of analysis as well as the theory development. Where the unit of analysis is defined by your 
“case,” the theory provides a potential explanation of the phenomenon that the researchers use to 
 43 
 
approach their data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009). This research examined how turnaround 
work was implemented according to the state turnaround legislation. This policy identifies 
turnaround schools through specific criteria and designates those schools as level D schools. 
Local education agencies (LEA) that have at least one of their schools designated as a level D 
school are then designated level D LEA's and are required to implement the turnaround policy. 
For this research, the unit of analysis was a specified level D LEA where the process of 
implementing turnaround policy was in process. 
Sampling 
There were two levels of sampling for this research study: LEA and implementer 
selection. 
LEA sampling. Because the unit of analysis was the LEA, the one selected for this study 
was a level D LEA that was in the process of implementing the turnaround policy. Therefore, 
purposeful sampling was used in order to intentionally select a site to learn about the central 
phenomenon of turnaround policy implementation (Creswell, 2012). At the time of selection, 
there were ten level D LEA’s in the state. Of the ten, two were eliminated due to researcher 
affiliation. Of the remaining eight, one level D LEA was chosen based on the following criteria: 
1) Access to implementers in the LEA was available. 
2) The superintendent was willing to participate in and support the research. 
3) The LEA was in the process of implementing the turnaround policy in a level D school. 
4) The LEA had active participation in policy implementation by all four of the stakeholder 
groups identified in this study (superintendent/central office, school leadership, teachers, school 
board members). 
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Participant sampling. Participants for interviews in this study were selected to provide 
data about the role of the implementers, which each of the researchers were researching in 
individual sections: superintendent/central office personnel, building leaders, teachers, and 
 school board members. (Interview methodology is discussed below in the data collection 
section.) Each of the individual studies had specific sampling approaches that were impacted by 
timing and logistics of data collection. In general, though, the participant sampling for this study 
included purposeful and snowball sampling. We went into data collection with a preference for 
random sampling because, as Creswell (2012) states, the benefit of random sampling is that those 
that participate are representative of the population under study. However, when we made initial 
contact with the LEA, we found that time constraints precluded our ability to use random 
sampling. We had limited time to conduct interviews and, therefore relied on purposeful and 
snowball sampling for the selection of interviewees. Purposeful sampling was used when certain 
implementers were chosen because their role gave them a specific perspective on turnaround 
implementation that might have been different from other implementers. Snowball sampling was 
used when educators in the LEA recommended implementers after data collection began. As 
Creswell (2012) notes, snowball sampling is often used when it is difficult to know at the outset 
of the study, which individuals should participate. In this study, it was difficult to know which 
implementers would be willing to participate and snowball sampling allowed the researchers to 
identify willing participants. 
For the umbrella group study, purposeful sampling was used to identify the LEA, which 
the researchers did jointly. For each of the individual studies, participant sampling may have 
involved either purposeful or snowball sampling. These sampling approaches are further 
described in each of the individual studies. 
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Data Collection 
A key part of data collection in this case study research involved the use of multiple 
sources of evidence. With multiple sources of data, triangulation can be applied, which in turn 
can bolster findings and lead to more convincing conclusions (Yin, 2009). For this case study 
research, evidence came from three sources of data: document analysis, interviews, and 
observations. 
Document analysis. The data collection methods began with document and video 
analysis. Creswell (2012) lauds the use of documents to provide valuable evidence in qualitative 
research. Yin (2009) echoes the benefit of documents in case studies, stating that they are 
unobtrusive in that they are not the result of the case study itself and that they contain exact 
details of an event. The document analysis in this research started with an analysis of the state 
turnaround legislation. The policy was outlined and dissected to frame the turnaround process 
that the LEA was implementing.  Further document analysis included some of the LEA’s own 
turnaround plans that were written in compliance with the policy as well as state monitoring 
documents. Historical documents, media reports, and LEA demographic and achievement data 
were included to help gain a deeper understanding of the context. Documents reviewed included 
meeting minutes of school board meetings. Because some of these minutes were in the form of a 
video recording, document review went beyond actual documents to include some review of 
recordings. Any document analysis that pertained to individual studies is also described in those 
sections. 
Interviews. Interviews were conducted to understand implementers’ interpretation of the 
turnaround policy. According to Yin (2009), interviews help to provide insight into human 
affairs or behavioral events as well as the opinions and attitudes to explain such behavioral 
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events. For this research, the behavioral event was the implementation of the policy and 
interviews aimed to understand those events and accompanying implementers’ attitudes and 
opinions. This allowed the researchers to analyze how implementer groups interpreted the policy 
and used that interpretation to inform their implementation decisions. 
This research study used semi-structured interviews. Patton (2002) discusses the various 
types of interviews, noting one structure where an interview guide may be used to provide 
guidance regarding the questions asked, while leaving room for probing. Interview guides 
provide the same basic lines of inquiry for all interviews; yet, interviewers may be spontaneous 
about how to word questions during the interview. A systematic approach for multiple 
interviews, the interview guide is a framework that outlines the questions to be asked, the 
sequence of questions and the questions to be explored further (Patton, 2002). An interview 
guide (See Appendix E) was used to allow us the flexibility to be more personal with our 
interviewees, which increased our likelihood of gathering valid data. For this research study, 
interviews were semi-structured, which focused on how subjects interpreted the policy and how 
that interpretation influenced how they implemented turnaround. 
Interviews were conducted by each of the researchers using the same interview process. 
We each conducted 6 to 10 interviews for each of our implementer groups, which lasted between 
30 and 90 minutes each. A total of 29 implementers were interviewed across the four groups—
central office personnel, school board members, school leaders, and teachers. The interview 
process began with a consent form signed by the participant (See Appendix C). The interviews 
were then conducted using a protocol (See Appendices D and F). Interviews were recorded for 
participants who granted permission and then transcribed verbatim.  The research team was 
sensitive to the fact that the people working in this turnaround LEA were in a potentially 
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vulnerable situation, both professionally and personally, as there is often a stigma associated 
with working in a LEA with a level D designation. The consent form for participants in the study 
included language that allowed individuals to opt out of the study or end the interview at any 
time without loss or penalty. The consent form also gave flexibility for the participant to choose 
not to answer any individual question. The researchers attempted to craft the interview questions 
to be sensitive to the vulnerability of participants. 
Field test. The methodology also addressed the need to ensure the interview questions 
would yield information needed to respond to the overall research questions. As we constructed 
the interview questions, we considered the different domains of our research questions and the 
kinds of language within each question that would allow significant and pertinent data to emerge. 
Yet, one of the concerns was whether the questions would allow this to happen. Weiss (1994) 
discusses the benefits of piloting interviews as a field test, which may indicate where the 
interview questions are redundant or over weighted in one area and lacking in another. It can also 
show where questions are confusing. With this in mind, we tested the interview questions once 
with a teacher who was working in a level D school in a LEA that was not a part of this study. 
We then convened to determine if such redundancy or lacking existed and, from there, made any 
needed revisions. We went into data collection with a set of interview questions we believed 
would yield the data we needed to address the research questions. However, when we began the 
interviews, we found that we needed to adjust questions to better elicit information related to the 
research questions. Some of the adjustments depended on the implementer groups and are 
described in the individual studies where pertinent. 
Observations. Another data collection tool we used were observations. Observations are 
useful in research to document information as it occurs in a specific setting and analyzes actual 
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behavior (Creswell, 2012). For this research, observations helped the researchers gain insight 
into how people processed the ideas put forth by the policy around turnaround work and how 
they behaved in terms of implementing these policy ideas. Yin (2009) distinguishes between 
formal observations and casual data collection activities. Formal observations entail observing 
meetings or other school activities, whereas casual data collection may come from site visits in 
the context of conducting interviews. We used observation data obtained casually in the context 
of interviewing as well as data from formal observations. Formal observations took place at 
school board meetings and one local stakeholder group meeting. For these, we followed 
Creswell’s (2012) suggestion for observation protocol and used one that was designed to allow 
for a description of the chronological order of events along with a reflection about themes and 
quotes. We were non-participant observers and took field notes either during or after the 
observation. Creswell (2012) emphasizes the importance of descriptive and reflective field notes, 
which involve a description of events along with personal thoughts and insights of the observer. 
Our field notes included both descriptive and reflective elements. Field notes were then analyzed 
alongside the transcriptions from interviews. The role of observations in data collection differed 
for each of the individual studies and is described in more detail in those sections where 
applicable. 
 
Data Analysis 
When analyzing the data, the focus was on extracting data that pertained to the role of 
each of the implementers of the turnaround policy. For this, we used a coding process that 
allowed key themes to emerge from the data. 
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Coding. Coding was the first step in our analysis of the data. We coded the interviews 
once they were transcribed by an outside agency. Creswell (2012) outlines a coding process for 
interview data that includes reading through transcriptions, identifying codes, and collapsing 
codes into themes. The analysis of interview data in this research used this coding process in 
order to center on key themes, which emerged across the interviews. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
discuss the benefits of using a “start list” for coding, which is created prior to fieldwork. The 
“start list” contains a list of codes that is devised from the conceptual framework, research 
questions, hypotheses, problem areas and any other important variables. Our “start list” included 
codes such as collaboration, making sense, communication, student impact, and reflection, 
among others, and we used this “start list” (See Appendix B) to begin the coding process. 
Once interviews were transcribed, the coding process began by looking at the transcriptions with 
the “start list” as a backdrop. That is, we began our analysis according to which information was 
consistent with the codes on the start list. We quickly realized that while some of the codes on 
the start list were useful, there were several concepts that were not represented on our list. 
Therefore, we made adjustments to the list of codes, adding codes and deleting others. As a 
group, we established a list of parent codes at the beginning. As individual researchers proceeded 
through their coding, they added child codes to the parent codes where needed. We used the 
qualitative research software, Dedoose, to code transcripts and to organize our codes. 
Collaborative coding. The group process utilized in the analysis was key in this research 
study. Hill, Thompson, and Williams (1997) describe the process of consensual qualitative 
research (CQR) where a team of researchers engages in the process of co-analyzing data. CQR 
“...highlights the use of multiple researchers, the process of reaching consensus, and a systematic 
way of examining the representativeness of results across cases” (p. 519). It occurs in three main 
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steps where researchers divide the data into domains, then construct core ideas within the 
domains and finally cross analyze to identify consistencies across cases. While the analysis 
portion of this research study did not necessarily follow these steps verbatim, the underlying 
tenet that informs CQR was pertinent here. 
Team members first examine the data independently and then come together to present 
and discuss their ideas until they reach a single unified version that all team members 
endorse as the best representation of the data. Using several researchers provides a 
variety of opinions and perspectives, helps to circumvent the biases of any one person, 
and is helpful for capturing the complexity of the data (Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 
1997, p. 523). 
 The group process for this research followed a modified version of CQR, which provided 
a structure for the group to code the data together, then to analyze the data individually. As a 
collaborative research study, we analyzed one transcript together to determine how to use the 
codes from the coding list. From there, we made further adjustments to the list of codes and 
established the use of parent and child codes. We agreed that it was possible for individual 
researchers to use some codes and not others, depending on their implementer group. Once we 
calibrated our coding practices, we coded our interviews individually, and then convened to 
compare our coding and to check our calibration. Once all interview transcriptions were coded 
and individual sections analyzed, we joined together to identify overarching themes that cut 
across implementer groups and drew conclusions and potential implications for turnaround 
LEA's. Because there were four researchers looking at the data, interrater reliability was 
significant. This process of calibrating through co-analyzing the data assisted with interrater 
reliability. 
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Document analysis. As Yin (2009) points out, information from documents should be 
corroborated and augmented by evidence from other sources. Documents were examined for 
specific details that were not obtained through other sources. The state turnaround legislation had 
already been analyzed prior to data collection to gain an understanding of the requirements of 
level D schools. Beyond the policy, other documents that were analyzed were documents related 
to turnaround work, including the LEA Accelerated Improvement Plan, LEA Recovery Plan, and 
a level D school’s School Redesign Grant (SRG) Monitoring Site Visit. We also reviewed media 
material as well as LEA performance data to understand the context within which the turnaround 
occurred. Consistent with Yin’s (2009) description, document analysis in this research was not 
intended to provide definitive findings, but rather to allow for inferences to be made that could 
lead to further investigation via other sources of evidence. In this study, document analysis 
served to develop further understanding of the LEA, which provided context for the findings. 
Document analysis beyond the policy itself involved different roles in each of the individual 
studies and is described where applicable. 
Drawing conclusions. As we analyzed the data, one way we tested our conclusions was 
through structural corroboration. Eisner (1976) highlights the importance of structural 
corroboration in his discussion about educational criticism. 
Structural corroboration is a process that seeks to validate or support one's conclusions 
about a set of phenomena by demonstrating how a variety of facts or conditions within 
the phenomena support the conclusions drawn. It is a process of demonstrating that the 
story hangs together, that the pieces fit. (p. 148) 
Although Eisner refers to the process of validating the evaluation of educational practice, this 
concept applies to the analysis of data in this study. Because we were intent on ensuring 
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conclusions were substantiated through the data, we compared what interviewees said about the 
various issues within the research topic, with each other, and with observational and document 
data. Through this comparison of data, we were able to understand how individual pieces of data 
fit together in order to lead to coherent conclusions, particularly relative to the overall 
recommendations. 
Limitations 
The major limitations of this qualitative research were researcher bias, generalizability, 
and reliability. We discuss below how these limitations were addressed through the 
methodology. 
Researcher bias. The role of researcher bias was a consideration in this study, 
particularly since all of the researchers currently hold positions as practicing educators 
responsible for the implementation of education policy. In at least two cases, researchers were 
specifically responsible for the implementation of school turnaround policy. A key component of 
qualitative research is that it values direct observation and data gathered from interactions 
between the researcher and the research subject. The researcher becomes a research instrument 
and therefore brings their own lens to the data collection and analysis. Yin (2011) argues that, 
“No lens is free of bias; every lens has subjective and objective qualities” (p. 270). Researchers 
must maintain a high degree of awareness and self-reflection about the qualities of any “lens” 
that might influence either the collection or analysis of the data. In particular, use of interviews 
as a source of evidence in qualitative research can strengthen the data collection process as it 
allows for targeted questioning. However, it also has inherent weaknesses of bias in self-
reporting, recalling inaccuracies due to time-lapse, and reflexivity, where the participants report 
what the interviewer wants to hear (Yin, 2009). 
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Miles and Huberman (1994) identify two additional sources of researcher bias: (a) the 
effects of the researcher on the case and (b) the effects of the case on the researcher. In the first 
case, the presence of the researcher can serve as a disruption to the relationships and dynamics 
that exist in an institution. In the second instance, the researcher can be seduced by the 
environment or the participants. As a result, they might draw conclusions or inferences that may 
be influenced by the bias they have developed rather than the facts and data they have collected. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend several strategies to mitigate the effects of bias (a) and 
bias (b) such as: seeking feedback from colleagues on potential areas of bias by sharing field 
notes and observations, purposefully selecting participants who represent dissident voices, 
maintaining a focus on the research questions to avoid becoming distracted by other leads, and 
paying attention to the possible effects the interview location or the interview process itself may 
have on data collection. With these recommendations in mind, through the collaborative coding 
process, we discussed at length the themes we were identifying and where our bias may have 
filtered in. This helped us to keep our analysis as close to the data as possible, without being 
heavily influenced by our biases. In addition, we had dissident voices in our selection of 
participants, which we incorporated into our analysis. Similar to the data collection methods, bias 
is addressed more specifically in each of the individual sections. 
Generalizability. One criticism of a single case study approach is that external validity is 
weak because the findings may not be generalizable. In comparing single and multiple case 
studies, Yin (2009) cautions that using a single case study could have less weight than multiple 
case studies and perhaps offer less theoretical replication. As we began to design this single LEA 
case study, we knew that generalizability could have been an issue in that the findings may not 
have been clearly applicable to other LEA's going through the turnaround process as required by 
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policy, because conditions between LEA’s vary. This dissertation-in-practice research brought in 
the use of theory to help address this limitation of external validity. 
The theory centered on the relationship between policy sense-making and implementation 
in the context of turning around an underperforming school. That is, the complexity of the 
process of policy sense-making, as previously outlined in the theoretical frame of this research, 
along with the inherent difficulties of chronically underperforming schools, challenges 
implementation of that policy by implementers. With this research design, we aimed to 
understand what it meant to be a school going through the turnaround process through the lens of 
policy sense-making and implementation. The theory helped to address external validity because 
the findings might be generalizable to a broader theory that in turn may be applied to other 
contexts. Yin’s (2011) explanation of analytic generalization highlights the importance of the 
role of theory in the study in terms of generalizing the findings. 
The argument needs to be cast in relation to existing research literature, not the specific 
conditions in the actual study. In other words, the goal is to pose the proposition and hypotheses 
at a conceptual level higher than that of the specific findings (Typically, this higher level might 
have been needed to justify the research importance to study the chosen topic in the first place) 
(p. 101). 
Also helpful to the validity question was how the researchers describe the case. Merriam (1998) 
discusses ways of addressing validity, including providing a rich, thick description that shows 
that conclusions are reasonable and make sense. In other words, the more thorough the 
description of the LEA, the more accurate conclusions would be. The aim of the research was to 
provide a detailed description in order to support findings drawn from the data, to allow others to 
make their own connection to the study’s conclusions. In this way, the reader would determine to 
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what extent the findings can be transferred based on the thorough description of the context and 
its findings in the case under study (Merriam, 1998). Through a detailed depiction of the case, 
this study increased the likelihood the reader would be able to determine whether or not the 
findings are transferable to another situation where turnaround policy is being implemented. 
Reliability. For case study research, reliability is achieved through specific 
documentation of the research process. Yin (2009) points out that case studies that use a protocol 
and database have stronger reliability. The protocol is the data collection instrument along with a 
specified set of procedures to be followed. A database is developed from the data collection 
instruments. Both of these help make it possible for another investigator to replicate the research 
procedures. This research study used a protocol that outlined the procedures of all data collection 
instruments, including the interviews, observations and document analysis. We also used the 
qualitative research software, Dedoose, as our database for interviews, where we were able to 
code and analysis transcripts. 
In addition we ensured our data quality through a rigorous assessment of our analysis and 
conclusions. Miles and Huberman (1994) offer a model that involves thirteen tactics that will 
help address this need for a demanding approach to drawing conclusions from the data. These 
tactics involve a process of checking the quality of the data, analyzing exceptions to patterns, and 
checking with skepticism emerging explanations.  For this study, the researchers focused on the 
following four tactics: 
1) Checking for representativeness - Ensuring that the data coming from your sources is 
representative of both confirming and dissident voices; 
2) Weighting the evidence - Accounting for the fact that some sources provide stronger data in 
the analysis based on the participants’ roles, knowledge about the turnaround policy, and their 
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level of involvement in the work of turning around the school. This weighting of evidence may 
differ in the analysis of each individual section because we each focused on a different 
implementer group. 
3) Checking the meaning of outliers - Scrutinizing outlying data to make sure that analyses to 
test the generality of the finding and protect against self-selecting biases; 
4) Checking out rival explanations - Keeping in mind a few possible explanations until one 
emerges as more compelling as a result of stronger evidence derived from additional data 
collection. 
These tactics provided a guide for us to analyze the data, identify themes and draw 
conclusions. Using all of these tactics, along with the CQR collaborative data analysis approach, 
helped us to ensure the validity of our conclusions and alleviate the biases that may have arisen 
in our analyses. It also helped us ensure that the narrative we told in the end fit the data we 
found. 
Chapter 4 
School Board Members as Policy Implementers5 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this individual study was to examine the role of school board members in the 
implementation of turnaround legislation. The law outlines a policy for turning around schools 
that are chronically underperforming, particularly those designated as level D6.  The school 
board is empowered through legislation with four basic responsibilities; select, appoint and 
evaluate the superintendent, review and approve budgets, establish educational goals and policies 
                                                 
5
 Author: Anna Carollo Cross 
6
 See Appendix A for explanation of level designations 
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for the district that align with statewide educational goals, and approve performance standards 
for employees. Because of their legislative authority and combined with their role as agents of 
the community’s interests, the school board can influence the ways in which policies are 
implemented (Rice et al., 2001; Hess, 2010).Emerging research has begun to examine how 
policy implementation is impacted by the actions of local policy actors (Spillane, 1998; 
Feuerstein & Dietrich, 2003; Malen, 2003) however little research exists that looks specifically 
at the role of these actors in the implementation of the state’s turnaround legislation. In addition, 
a significant research gap exists in the area of how school board members, as a specific 
stakeholder group, make sense of state turnaround policy in light of their legislative authority. 
The purpose of this individual study centers on the following research questions: 
1. How do school board members make sense of turnaround policy implementation? 
2. What factors influence their sense-making? 
Understanding the ways in which specific actors, in this case school board members, 
interpret and create meaning of the policies they are required to act on and what factors either 
inhibit or support their sense-making can potentially lead to more effective implementation of 
policies. This understanding can also ultimately achieve the stated goal of the policy, which is 
increased student achievement. 
A qualitative single case study method as described in Chapter Three was used to collect 
data about the school board as the unit of analysis. Data was gathered through document 
analysis, interviews and observations both in person and through online-recorded school board 
meetings. Subcommittee meetings specifically relating to school board interactions were also 
reviewed. Sense-making, as described in the literature review in Chapter Two, was used as the 
overall theory frame for analysis of the data, with a specific focus on its influence on policy 
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implementation by specific actors (Weick,1995; Honig, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
2005; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Coburn, 2001). 
Literature Review 
This section provides a historical context for the changing structure and role of school 
boards and lays the foundation for understanding why the role has become confusing and 
ambiguous. It also includes a review of the current literature on the conditions of effective school 
boards and superintendent-school board relationships, both important characteristics of 
successful turnaround policy implementation. Chapter Two contains an extensive review of the 
research literature regarding turnaround schools, federal and state policy analysis and conditions 
of effective schools. 
School Board Role 
The role of the school board has evolved from one that was focused primarily on “books, 
buses and budgets” to one that now focuses on establishing educational policies that support 
increased student achievement and effective district leadership. Historically, the creation of 
school boards can be traced to the first town meetings established in Massachusetts in the late 
1700s. During this period, part-time and unpaid members of the community oversaw the local 
school, but by the 1830s, as demographics changed and populations and the number of schools 
increased, selectmen in each of the individual towns began to divide local governance from 
school governance and began appointing local school boards to oversee community schools. By 
the 1860s, many school boards had turned to hiring full-time superintendents to provide the day-
to-day oversight of running schools. This represented an important shift in school governance in 
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that it transitioned the base of power from the hands of a group of town meeting members, to the 
hands of one individual; the superintendent (Hess, 2010; Tyack & Cuban,1995). 
By the start of the 20th century, many communities were still operating under this model 
but with two distinctions; school board members were democratically elected and 
superintendents were professionally trained to handle their roles which expanded from simply 
one of instructional leader to one that also encompassed managerial and operational duties 
(Land, 2002).  Throughout the 1950s, school boards were comprised of members of the 
community who were considered “professionals” such as doctors, business people and lawyers. 
They believed their role was to represent the interests of the greater community. By the 1960s 
and 1970s, the composition of school boards had changed to include more members whose focus 
was on their own specific agendas and interests. Ultimately, this school board profile would 
prove problematic during the 1980s as calls for comprehensive school reforms began to emerge 
(Marzano & Waters, 2009).  
In the current context, school board governance structures can vary between school 
districts and communities. The majority of the communities in the state in which this study was 
conducted operate under a structure in which members are elected by a majority vote of the 
community and serve on the school board for periods ranging from one to four years. The 
composition of school board memberships can range from five to seven members. In some of the 
larger level D turnaround districts, the Mayor is an active participant on the school board, and in 
some cases has the authority to appoint members of the board. In a level F school district, the 
Commissioner of Education has authority over the public school system resulting in the school 
board's role being severely curtailed. At the time of this study, nine of the ten districts, which had 
been designated as level D by the State Education Agency (SEA), were comprised of elected 
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members and included the Mayor of the community serving either as the chair or as a board 
member. 
 School board role in education reform. The release of the 1983 publication of a Nation 
at Risk launched what Hess (1999) refers to as the “The Three Waves of Reform,” each focused 
on three different reform approaches. The first wave focused on improving the delivery of 
education by improving the curriculum. The second wave focused on school level changes, 
accountability, school restructuring, and teacher empowerment. The third wave, which began in 
the 1990s and included the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2001, focused on 
“systemic school reform.” During that period it was believed that district level changes were 
necessary to improve student learning. The resulting changes included decentralizing power, 
offering of alternative assessments, changing teacher roles and addressing the needs of students 
by differentiating instruction (Hess, 1999). Each of these waves of reform required different 
responses, levels of understanding and action on the part of school board members. The tension 
and ambiguity between who is ultimately responsible for establishing school governance policy 
and who is responsible for implementing the policy continues to be a source of debate between 
some school boards and superintendents (Marzano & Waters, 2009; Land, 2002; Glass, Bjork, & 
Brunner, 2000; McCloud & McKenzie, 1994). 
School board role in local governance. Today there are approximately 53 million 
students attending US public schools in 15,000 school districts. These districts are governed by 
95,000 board members and overseen by 12,600 school superintendents (Land, 2002). The sheer 
number of citizens who play a role in the governance of the public schools and the potential 
impact they have on school reform warrants a detailed comprehensive look. While there is an 
ongoing and vigorous debate regarding the effectiveness and relevance of school boards, it is 
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unlikely that school boards, which have been referred to as a “uniquely American institution,” 
will disappear any time soon (Hess, 2010 ; Danzberger, Cunningham, Kirst, McCloud, & 
Usdan,1987).  
A number of factors compel us to reexamine the role of school boards. These factors 
include a growing federal emphasis on accountability, the pressure to increase student 
achievement in the lowest performing districts, and the reauthorization of federal legislation such 
as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 2002. The infusion of over $14.5 billion 
dollars in federal funds through Race to the Top (RTTT), school Improvement Grants, and 
Investing in Innovation Funds, have all created an opportunity to examine the factors that 
contribute to successful school reform and the role of school boards in the turnaround context 
(Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahn, & Tallant, 2010).  
Educational historian Diane Ravitch argues that local school boards are the “first line of 
defense for public education” and that there is no evidence to suggest that student achievement 
will be raised by eliminating a democratic governance of public schools (Ravitch, 2010, p. 
25). The National School Boards Association believes local school boards are the nation’s 
preeminent expression of grassroots democracy and that this form of governance of the public 
schools is fundamental to the continued success of public education (National School Board 
Association Beliefs and Policies, 2013, p.9). School boards can be powerful allies in education 
reform efforts and have an important role to play as representatives of the community’s values 
and beliefs about the education of its children (Campbell & Greene, 1994).  
Perhaps now, more than ever, school boards have an increasingly important role to play as 
the federal government becomes more involved in directing and shaping state and local education 
reform initiatives through the distribution of federal funds to districts engaged in turnaround 
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work. Many of these districts are characterized by scant resources, high poverty levels and low 
student success. In some communities state and federal intervention has created a perception that 
local school boards are no longer effective in meeting the needs of the community (Murphy & 
Meyers, 2008; Malen, 2003).  
School boards can affect a rise in student achievement if they engage in actions that focus 
on aligning goals and beliefs with a sense of urgency and equity. If they do not restructure, 
refocus and redefine their roles in the context of the changing policy environment they risk 
becoming overlooked as important contributors to the education reform movement). If they are to 
remain relevant in reform movement, literature suggests that two critical elements are necessary; 
school boards must commit to becoming highly effective governing bodies and there must be an 
effective, collaborative, trusting relationship with the superintendent  (Kowal & Ayscue, 2005; 
Danzberger & Usdan, 1994; Dervarics & O’Brien, 2011).   
Conditions of effective school boards 
Chapter Two provided an overview of the literature, which identifies conditions of 
effective schools that lead to student success. A parallel body of research has also begun to 
identify indicators of school board effectiveness. School boards in high achieving districts 
exhibit specific behaviors and habits of mind that are significantly different from those of school 
boards in low performing districts. Effective school boards are committed to setting a vision and 
defining goals that support high student achievement. They are guided by a strong belief that all 
children can learn. They focus on policy that supports achievement rather than operations. They 
are knowledgeable about how data can be used to drive forward the work of improving the 
district. They maintain and nurture strong communication networks with both internal and 
external stakeholders. They understand the importance of focusing resources on building and 
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sustaining strong professional development structures for staff even in times of challenging 
budgets. They work collaboratively and respectfully with the superintendent, trusting in one 
another’s expertise, and continuously monitor, evaluate and improve their own governance skills 
through targeted professional development. The work of the school board, however, cannot be 
accomplished without an effective relationship between the board and the superintendent 
(Devarics & O’Brien, 2011; Togneri & Anderson, 2003; Goodman, & Zimmerman, 2000; Rice 
et al., 2001; Hess, 2010).  
Conditions of effective school board-superintendent relationships 
Understanding and defining what constitutes an effective school board-superintendent 
relationship can contribute to the success of school reform efforts, particularly in turnaround 
districts where student achievement is at stake. The superintendent’s perception of the school 
board’s willingness to practice their proper roles and the board’s perception of the 
superintendent’s leadership actions and behaviors can lead to either an effective relationship of 
collaboration or one that is fraught with tension and mistrust. Research has identified several 
characteristics that contribute to effective school board-superintendent relationships, including, 
but not limited to: whether superintendents were able to communicate in a timely, consistent and 
responsive manner; whether their information was viewed as credible and honest; and whether 
this information was shared freely and broadly with stakeholders. In addition, superintendents 
who included board members in decision making, by encouraging engagement and focusing on 
building the collaborative and trusting relationships, had more success in creating the kinds of 
environments needed to drive district improvement (Rice et al., 2001; Richard & Kruse 2008; 
McCloud & McKenzie, 1994; Land, 2002; Crowson & Morris, 1992; Glass et al., 2000). 
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In summary, the literature suggests that the role of school boards is undergoing a period 
of re-structuring and re-evaluation as members negotiate increased demands for accountability 
and equity for all students. School boards have an elected duty to represent their constituents, 
and in so doing, they must develop the skills and habits of mind to serve effectively. They have 
the authority to engage in numerous activities that will affect student achievement. These include 
policy development, resource allocation, engaging effective leadership, designing creative 
collective bargaining agreements, establishing a comprehensive district-wide vision, and 
developing effective district goals that support change efforts and the successful implementation 
of turnaround policy. 
Research has also identified specific characteristics that are shared by school boards and 
superintendents who are successfully turning around districts and moving them from low to high 
performance status. Creating a common vision, setting clear goals, using data effectively, 
strengthening communication channels, and focusing on creating collaborative environments 
built on trust and respect are all conditions for ensuring effective school board leadership. If 
school turnaround is to succeed, school boards must understand and perform their roles 
effectively, collaboratively and consistently with an eye on a common goal: the success of all 
students. 
Methodology 
Sample 
The interview sample was comprised of four members, three incumbents (all retired 
males) and one newly elected member - the sole female. In addition, the head of the district’s 
teachers union and the superintendent were also interviewed. Additional data was gathered 
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through interviews conducted by cohort members with central staff, teachers and principals. 
Three school board members declined to be interviewed.   
 Demographic Data. The school governance model in the community under study 
consists of a democratically elected board of seven members. The mayor serves as the chair and 
is a voting member of the board. Elections for the school board are held in conjunction with 
Mayoral and City Council elections. School board positions are considered part-time jobs and 
members are paid a stipend of $7,197 per year. Each member is elected to serve a term of two 
years. The most senior member of the board has been re-elected four consecutive times. One 
member has served on the board on and off for 16 years.  
The superintendent participates in all school board meetings as a nonvoting member and 
has an advisory and consultative role. At the time of data collection, the demographics of the 
sitting board members were as follows. All of the board members were White males. Six 
members hold graduate degrees, four in the field of education. Two members were former 
superintendents in the district. All members are self-identified as registered Democrats and are 
lifelong residents of the community. All but one member attended district schools from grades 
K-12. Four members are 60+ years of age and retired, and two are in their forties and are 
currently employed in social service capacities. One, who is the Mayor, is in his thirties. During 
the data collection phase of this research, six of the seven members, including the mayor, were 
involved in contested re-election campaigns. One member, a former superintendent of the 
district, chose not to seek re-election. Four candidates were vying for his open seat. Ultimately, 
the community returned six incumbents to the board and elected one new member. The newest 
member is a White female in her forties, who holds an advanced degree in business 
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administration and whose children attend district schools. She is also a lifelong member of the 
community, and she and her husband are graduates of the district.  
Data collection 
 Interviews. Following the interview protocol outlined in Chapter Three, interviews were 
conducted with four school board members out of a potential pool of seven members. This 
interview data was analyzed and triangulated with interviews conducted with members of other 
implementer groups including teachers, principals and central office staff to identify common 
themes or elements. 
Interview questions. The interview questions that were developed by the cohort group 
were designed to cull information from interviewees as to how they went about making sense of 
turnaround policy and what factors influenced their sense-making. With respect to school board 
members, questions were modified, when necessary, to reflect the fact that they were not 
building-based implementers of policy per se, but rather overseers of policy at a more macro 
level. All interviews were transcribed by an external resource and coded using Dedoose. The 
codes utilized were initially developed by the group and additional "child codes" were generated 
to capture specific data related to school board roles or interactions. 
 
Data Analysis 
Document analysis. In addition, a document analysis review of the Leadership and 
Governance section of the LEA’s Accelerated Improvement Plan (AIP) was conducted. 
Documents relating to the state-mandated turnaround requirement were also reviewed. 
Document analysis was also conducted on public documents pertaining to school board members 
as public officials. Public comments reported in the local news by school board members and 
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official re-election websites were also reviewed. The local newspaper has a dedicated reporter 
who covers education issues for the community and attends most school board meetings. 
Online video analysis. Public access to board meetings is extensive. All school board 
meetings are held in the evening and are open to the public. Meetings are broadcast live as well 
as recorded and posted on the district’s educational television station. Previously recorded shows 
are readily accessible to the public through an online archive system. Subcommittee meetings 
such as finance, policy and facilities are also recorded and available for viewing by the public. 
Online video recordings of seventeen public school board meetings held between December 14, 
2009 to December 9, 2013 were also analyzed. Meetings were selected with agenda items which 
specifically referred to issues involving turnaround. These included presentations by SEA 
monitors, discussions regarding the development of the LEA’s Accelerated Improvement Plan, 
and discussions regarding the potential naming of a level F school, which would precipitate state 
takeover of the district. In addition, meetings that cited specific issues of board leadership and 
governance development for the board were also selected. Two subcommitee meetings 
pertaining to budget development and policy were also reviewed. Recordings were analyzed 
using a modified version of the framework suggested by Yin (2011). Yin describes two phases of 
analysis. The first ensures the quality of recordings, and the second phase develops a specific 
protocol for reviewing the tapes. All of the recordings were produced by the district’s in-house 
professional educational television station, thus ensuring excellent quality. The analysis of the 
recordings was limited to specific sections addressing the topics listed above. Saldaña (2013) 
cites Heath, Hindmarsh and Luff (2010) in suggesting that rather than specific coding and 
categorizing, an analytic inductive approach be used which supports “the ways in which social 
action and interaction involve the interplay of talk, visible and material conduct” (Saldaña, 2013, 
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p. 56). The intent of this videotape analysis was to augment and triangulate data collected from 
individual interviews rather than provide an in-depth analysis of school board interactions. 
Specific dialogue was transcribed by the researcher, and field notes were recorded to capture 
observable context or social interactions. 
Limitations 
The sample size of interviewees was limited to four board members. The chair and vice 
chair were unable to participate. Their perspectives would have provided a richer description of 
the role of the school board in a turnaround district, particularly the views of the chair who also 
serves as the mayor. To provide some triangulation of the information being provided by school 
board members, interviews with other stakeholders, such as the superintendent and the president 
of the teachers association, were also conducted. In addition, perceptions of school board roles 
were gathered from teacher, principal and central office interviews conducted for other parts of 
the study. 
It is possible that the pending school board election was a factor in whether members were 
willing to participate in a study specifically looking at their roles in turnaround. Interviews with 
school board members were all arranged through the administrative assistant to the school board, 
with the oversight and approval of the superintendent. This researcher did not have direct contact 
with school board members prior to the interviews. There were no student representatives serving 
on the school board. This was unfortunate since one of the areas we had hoped to include in this 
study was the perspective of students who are experiencing the district’s turnaround efforts.  
Researcher bias must also be considered. As a central office administrator with over 
twenty years of experience, most spent interacting with school board members, the possibility 
that assumptions and perceptions have been formed must be taken into account. As Yin states, 
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“No lens is free of bias: every lens has subjective and objective qualities” (Yin, 2011, p. 270). As 
a result I have tried to be maintain a reflective awareness of the ways in which my lens may 
affect the data collection and analysis. 
Findings 
A study of the data, document analysis, and interviews resulted in several findings related 
to how school board members make sense of their role in turnaround policy implementation. The 
following section will outline the findings and the factors that have been identified. 
The first finding is that the role of the school board in this turnaround district is 
ambiguous and misunderstood by other policy implementers. It is influenced by both internal and 
external factors, some of which extend beyond the local context. Perceptions and expectations of 
constituent groups, including school board members themselves, legislative changes, and 
tensions between local and state authority all contribute to how members make sense of their 
turnaround roles. 
The second finding is that school board members in this district tend to make sense of 
turnaround policy through their budget and resource role rather than through their policy and 
goal setting role. One of the key responsibilities of school board members is to oversee and 
approve budget allocations. In turnaround districts with limited access to internal resources, this 
becomes an especially critical role. School board members must understand not only how to 
acquire and allocate resources, but must also understand the challenges of distributing resources 
equitably and sustaining progress with limited resources. Relationships, alliances and a clear 
understanding of the political landscape all become important levers in solving this resource 
puzzle. 
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A number of influencing factors were found that also affect school board turnaround 
sense-making by school board members. Communication, both internal via the superintendent 
and external via state representatives, influences school board sense-making. School board 
members rely on communication from the superintendent as the central conduit for distributing 
and interpreting information and for clarifying and making sense of turnaround policies. The use 
of data as a sense-making tool was specifically explored since it emerged as a key factor in 
turnaround sense-making for other implementer groups. Communication from external agents 
such as the State Education Agency (SEA) also played a role in supporting school board sense-
making regarding turnaround policy. In some cases, the influence of state representatives 
extended beyond clarifying the requirements of turnaround policies and reached into local 
governance issues.  
An unexpected finding which also emerged as an influencing factor was the role of the 
“dissenting voice” in sense-making. School board members who are viewed as dissenters appear 
to have a valuable role to play in policy sense-making. In general, school board members 
function as a single governing body; however, they are comprised of individuals who also serve 
as representatives of the democratic ideal. As elected officials, school board members answer 
only to the electorate. As a result, they are uniquely positioned to contribute to policy sense-
making by clarifying and embracing their roles as representatives of a democratic process that 
includes informed debate, dissent, and argument. 
The school board’s turnaround role: Ambiguous and misunderstood  
Defining the role of the school board in an era of increased accountability has become a 
challenging exercise for many school boards. Members are attempting to negotiate an 
environment where their role is shifting, the expectations of their constituent groups vary and the 
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policy messages they receive are at times in conflict with their legislative responsibilities. The 
challenge becomes how the school board defines its role and how it adapts or adjusts to a 
changing policy and governance environment. In this turnaround district, school board members 
are balancing their political roles as elected officials and agents of state policy with their social 
roles as education advocates and community members. One of the reasons the balance 
sometimes tips to one side or the other is because school board members must also negotiate 
legislative changes, which add even more confusion regarding their authority and 
responsibilities. 
Sense-making of school board role: Influence of education reform 
The role of the school board has been evolving and changing since its inception, but the 
most dramatic change came twenty years ago with the passage of the state’s education reform 
legislation. Members in this district were cognizant of the fact that legislation had reduced the 
authority of the school board and increased the authority of the superintendent. They made sense 
of the shift in power in different ways, some by acknowledging what they perceived to be the 
need for “quiet diplomacy”; others by trying to reconcile the loss of authority with what they felt 
were their legislative responsibilities. Some made sense by simply placing all their trust in the 
superintendent and still others by being proactive in educating themselves about their roles as 
defined by education reform. In the end, they all agreed that education reform had definitely 
resulted in one key change: the role of the superintendent had increased in power and authority 
while the role of the school board had decreased. As one member said, 
You realize that the powers of the school board, since Education Reform, are 
quite a bit diminished. So, there’s a little bit in the sense that you might have 
some quiet influence. You might be able to, let’s say in a conversation with the 
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superintendent, you might say, “Hey, look, you might want to consider this,” and 
maybe (they) will or maybe (they) won’t. So there is a little influence. I wouldn’t 
say a great deal. If someone doesn’t want to listen, then…So I think we have to be 
a little more diplomatic and a little bit, how should I put it, well, diplomatic.  
Other members were more direct in their concerns,  
I think ed. reform has taken too much power away from the school boards and put 
it into the hands of the Superintendent… I think the Education Reform Law has 
gone a little bit too far in the legal authority of the superintendent versus the legal 
authority of the school board. 
The increase in the authority of the superintendent and the decrease in school board 
authority was seen by some to create an imbalance that made it more challenging for 
members to identify the boundaries of their own authority. Some members were keenly 
aware that they walked a fine line between “macro” and “micro” managing and were 
conscious of the possible conflicts that might result if perceived boundaries were 
overstepped. One member addressed this by stating, 
I don’t have the authority to say, hey, this is what you’re (superintendent) going to 
do as a result of this data. I don’t have that authority in here because it would be 
very quickly said to me, wait a minute, you’re overstepping your legal 
requirements of being a school board person, that’s for the superintendent to do.  
The resulting tension between legislative theory and daily practice created an opportunity for 
role confusion. The school board has organizational oversight of the district while the 
superintendent has operational oversight. Developing and aligning goals for the district fall under 
the authority of the school board, so while it may true that the school board members cannot 
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order the superintendent to “do” something, members do have the legal authority to set a vision 
for the district and work collaboratively with the superintendent to develop specific goals and 
objectives.  
Members were clearer on what they believed to be their moral responsibilities as school 
board members and defined their roles in terms of their beliefs, their values and their sense of 
responsibility as contributing members of the community. Members talked about their strong 
commitment to making a positive contribution to the district’s success primarily by supporting 
the improvement of the school system. They believed that improving the system would lead to 
improving the lives of children and families in the community. Members often mentioned that 
they chose to serve on the school board in hopes that it would benefit their children or 
grandchildren. Members who had been educators in the districts talked about “giving back” and 
“contributing to the community.” Every member interviewed expressed a sincere desire to do the 
very best they could for the children of the community. 
When members were asked to describe their roles as school board members, most tended 
to take a broad view. Many could recite the four areas of authority: hiring and firing the 
superintendent, reviewing and approving the budget, establishing educational goals, and 
developing policies. However, for many of the members, the areas that held the most sway were 
the ones they were most familiar with and could influence directly. A longtime member of the 
board stated,  
Oh, I know what the legal sense of my role is. I, basically the only thing that we have (as 
a responsibility) is to hire and fire the superintendent. ... And we have to set the budget. 
So, in reality, we have two legal responsibilities: hire and fire the superintendent and set 
the budget. 
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In reality, as stated above, members have four distinct responsibilities, but the policy and 
goal-setting aspects of their authority appear to be unclear and confusing. For some members 
trying to make sense of the dissonance between their stated, versus expected roles, was 
something they were left to decipher on their own. The most recently elected member tried to 
make sense of her perceived role by weighing all the variables in stating, “…I want to respect the 
role the school board is supposed to have and I want to be an advocate for the people too, and I 
want to do it in an appropriate respectful way so just trying to figure that out.”  “Figuring it out” 
and “on the job training” seemed to be the primary way most members learned about the extent 
of their roles and responsibilities.  
In-house training to help board members make sense of their roles was inconsistent. 
Legislation does exist which requires that all newly elected school board members complete a 
minimum of eight hours of training within their first year of service. Although this training 
covers the core competency areas, there does not appear to be any specific training provided for 
school board members who are operating in turnaround districts. Given this situation, several 
members in this study reported that they tried to learn as much as they could from reading the 
materials they were provided, or by consulting with the superintendent. Others relied on the 
personal relationships they had with fellow board members. One member described his training 
in the following exchange, “I didn’t really get that much training. You just kind of … You just 
joined in, it was like joining a club and you just follow them and listen…” Another responded, 
“No, I don’t think there is enough (training for board members). I think there should be more. 
But I also think there should be some minimum qualifications for being a school board person.” 
In general, there seemed to be little evidence to suggest that consistent training was used as a 
vehicle to help members make sense of their roles and responsibilities.  
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In summary, education reform has played a significant role in re-defining the traditional 
role of school board members. In this district, the increase in superintendent authority and the 
decrease in school board authority has created a lack of clarity for members trying to make sense 
of their roles and responsibilities. Training to help them define their roles is more informal than 
formal, leaving members to either “figure it out” for themselves, or depend on the other actors to 
interpret their roles for them. While school boards have been vested by legislation with the 
authority to oversee four key areas, hiring and firing the superintendent, reviewing and 
approving the budget, establishing educational goals and developing policies, members generally 
cited only two areas, hiring and firing the superintendent and setting the budget. There was 
limited mention of their responsibilities around goal setting or policy implementation.  
School board members were not alone in trying to make sense of their roles. Teachers 
and principals, many of whom were both employees of the district as well as voting constituents, 
were also struggling trying to define the school board’s role and responsibilities. 
Sense-making of school board role: Teacher-principal perceptions 
 
School board members clearly identified a central purpose of their work as 
providing the resources necessary for principals, students, and teachers to succeed in the 
their schools. Teachers, and to a certain degree even principals, had little understanding 
of the role of the school board. In one or two cases, teachers and principals who were 
interviewed seemed to understand that board members could serve as potential allies in 
the ongoing quest for resources and support. Some actively campaigned for certain 
members to be elected, hoping that they would represent the needs of teachers once they 
sat on the board. One teacher who had been politically active and had been encouraging a 
particular candidate stated, “I said you know what, I could talk about you. I could talk 
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behind your back but unless I talk to you nothing is going to get done.  So…we got him 
elected.  The firefighters and teachers in this district got him elected. ”   
However, this level of direct interaction between staff and school board members 
was uncommon, with most interactions taking place through formal structures such as 
school board meetings during the citizen input portion of the meeting. Teacher, central 
office, and principal interviews were notable primarily because of the absence of any 
mention of the role of school board. Most of the interviewees were completely unaware 
of how closely the school board’s resource allocation role was tied to direct classroom 
and school support. The following interview was typical of a teacher response, 
I don’t even really know what the school board does. I don’t know if they work on 
curriculum, if they work on attendance, if they work, I don’t know. I’m not a part of the 
school board. I don’t know who’s on the school board. I don’t know what they meet 
about. I don’t know when they meet….  
This lack of clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the school board was a 
common sentiment expressed in several teacher and principal interviews. In many cases, 
teachers and principals were completely unaware of whether the school board had any 
impact on their daily activities at all. One principal stated, “…has my world been rocked 
by the school board this year? No.” Opportunities for direct sharing of information or 
creating understanding of the school board’s role between members, teachers and 
principals appeared to be limited. As one member stated, “It’s catch as catch can. You 
may get some information from a principal. You may get some information from 
teachers. But it’s not a formal process.” One limiting factor may be the district’s own 
policy regarding school board-staff communications. According to district policy BHC, 
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all communications between staff members and the school board are to be submitted 
through the superintendent. All communications from school board members to staff are 
to be facilitated through the superintendent. Finally, any school board member wishing to 
visit an individual school is required to first inform the superintendent. 
In summary, the general role and responsibilities of the school board were not 
clearly understood by teachers and principals. If considered at all, teachers and principals 
viewed school board members as vehicles for delivering messages to the superintendent 
or the community regarding staff needs for support or resources. Weick (1995) suggests 
that sense-making is a social process that involves ongoing talk and conversation which 
leads to a shared construction of meaning. In terms of interactions between board 
members, teachers, and principals, it appears that opportunities for sense-making are 
limited to formal meetings or those interactions facilitated through the superintendent.  
Sense-making of school board role: Turnaround legislation 
For school board members in this study, the 2010 passage of emergency turnaround 
legislation to improve underperforming schools created another layer of complexity as they 
attempted to define their roles. Members who were already trying to make sense of their roles, 
post education reform, were now being asked to decipher and untangle the new expectations and 
policy requirements required by turnaround legislation. As mentioned previously, none of their 
training, either informal or formal, was designed to address the challenges or clarify the role of 
serving as a school board member in a turnaround district. 
Turnaround legislation focuses on policy changes that increase the authority of the 
superintendent and principals, redefines and redistributes resources, and creates conditions for 
teachers and students to achieve rapid gains in student achievement. Typically these gains 
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require changing the teacher contract, modifying and/or extending the school day, and dedicating 
resources to intensive staff development - all areas that fall under the school board’s policy or 
fiduciary responsibilities. Although the state department of education website on assistance and 
guidance for turnaround districts includes documents on accountability measures, roles and 
responsibilities of turnaround stakeholders, best practices, and guidance for implementing 
turnaround plans, it does not mention the school board as having any significant role in the 
turnaround process. In the comprehensive section of the legislation that describes the process for 
designating level D districts, the school board is mentioned five times. The responsibilities of the 
school board are limited to; assigning one member as a representative on the Local Stakeholders 
Group, approving the turnaround plan developed by the superintendent, serving as the lead 
agents for appeals to the Commissioner if modifications to the plan are requested, facilitating 
collective bargaining agreements for the purposes of amending contracts, and serving on a panel 
to review issues that cannot be resolved through other means. Even though the duties are 
outlined in policy as well as in the SEA guidance, members were still unclear about their roles. 
Members were asked to describe what they perceived to be their roles in the turnaround 
process. One member who was serving as the school board representative on the Local 
Stakeholder group stated, 
I was involved in the stakeholders group, which … I don’t think is quite the same thing 
(as involved in developing the turnaround plan)…And I believe that’s it for the time 
being. I’m not sure I’m involved beyond what my regular duties of a school board man 
beyond that. 
Members were asked whether they felt their role was different because they were serving in a 
turnaround district. The newly elected member of the board answered,  
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In general, I think there’s a lot of gray areas so I’m reading these binders that they’ve 
given me setting policy and setting budgets, so I'm thinking a turnaround, maybe you 
have to put in for extra grant resources, for extended learning times and things like that, 
and extra positions, budgetary to try to close the achievement gap. I think a lot of it is 
probably fiscal, approving of those kinds of fiscal managements that the turnaround team 
brings to you. I know there’s someone from the school board on the turnaround team, and 
then that team brings these, what they want to do to the school board, who has to approve 
a lot of the monetary parts of that, and policies that they’re going to put into place, 
different policies.  
The turnaround plan, referred to above, is the document that guides the work of the 
school level teams. There is also a turnaround document, which guides the work of the entire 
district. The complexity of the actual mechanics and process for developing and approving the 
turnaround documents and a lack of understanding about common definitions created confusion 
for members and staff. Turnaround vocabulary varied in its meaning for different stakeholders. 
Although, words like “policy” and “goals” even “turnaround plans” which are frequently cited in 
turnaround legislation seemed to be used frequently in meetings and documents, it was not 
always clear that members had a clear understanding of how those words were being defined. 
The ability to understand or make sense of the situation through a shared and common language 
was not always evident. One was left with the impression that those involved were doing their 
best to “figure it out” and “make sense” of it as much as they could within their own context.   
Each member seemed to approach the task of sense-making from a different perspective. 
The member quoted below seemed to have an intuitive sense that it was important to 
“understand” something before acting on it, and knew that as an individual board member it was 
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important that she understand what was being asked of the board as a whole. What seemed less 
obvious was what kinds of mechanisms the board had in place to go about creating the needed 
understanding. 
Well, you have to understand it before you approve it, but I think it is the superintendent's 
job to work with the turnaround team to come up with the policy, and then clearly you 
can't approve it if you don't understand it, but I think it is the school board's job is to 
understand what is happening and then approve it and approve the funds necessary to 
carry out what the goals are. They should have goals that they want to meet and ways 
they're going to do that, and then the school board should understand and approve it, or 
not approve it I guess.  
Another member who had served on the board off and on for sixteen years was less concerned 
about defining his role in the turnaround process and placed his trust completely in the 
superintendent. In his opinion, his role in the turnaround process was to support whatever the 
superintendent brought before them. 
I like to do whatever the superintendent suggests to us. (They're) the boss. (They’ve) got 
good ideas, a good plan. I figure they're the superintendent and they should know what 
they are doing.…we’re paying (them) big bucks to do the good job. I give (them) the 
benefit of the doubt…I put my trust in (the superintendent). 
And for the member quoted below, who served as representative in the local stakeholder group, 
turnaround was less a function of individual members or a single group as it was one that 
required “unity of purpose” by multiple actors. When asked to describe the key factors needed to 
support district turnaround he stated, 
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I think people have to be together. There can’t be any, probably more than anything else, 
there’s got to be a unity of purpose. I think people have to have the feeling that they 
count, what they think matters, so one person doesn’t work miracles but it’s shared 
respect of a number of people who are involved number one, you probably have a better 
plan, a better strategy, and number two, you get more buy-in from all of these people so 
because a lot of this is coming from them, they’re going to make sure they have a stake in 
it, they’re going to make sure those work. So I think you need the unity and you need 
some kind of independence in a sense that people are free to say and do what they feel is 
best. 
School board members appeared to understand in varying degrees that they had a general 
role to play in turnaround, but what did not seem to emerge in any of the interviews was an 
explicit understanding of a specific turnaround role for the school board. There was little 
conversation about whether the responsibilities they had been given through education reform 
legislation complemented or conflicted with the expectations of turnaround legislation. 
In summary, the role of school board members in the context of this turnaround district 
appears to be misunderstood and ambiguous. School board members are left to interpret and 
make sense of their roles by weighing multiple viewpoints as well as their own beliefs and 
values. The role of school boards described in turnaround legislation versus education reform 
legislation is inconsistent and contributes to the lack of clarity. The absence of a common 
understanding and definition of key vocabulary used to guide turnaround work is an obstacle to 
sense-making. According to Weick (1995), “words matter” and the importance of how words 
come together to create meaning cannot be underestimated (p. 107). The school board’s ability to 
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serve as an effective turnaround partner is at a distinct disadvantage if they are unable to make 
sense of their role. 
Sense-making of school board role: State influence 
State intervention in the district, which began in 2003, has steadily increased since the 
passage of the most recent turnaround legislation and the district’s designation as a Level D 
district.  The ongoing expansion of state intervention has increased state control over areas that 
had previously been under the control of the school board. For the most part, board members 
recognized that the infusion of resources from the state were necessary if the district was to 
achieve its turnaround goals. Nonetheless, many were wary of the potential loss of local control 
and the impact increased state intervention would have on the role of the school board. When 
asked how they felt about having the district named level D, most members vacillated between 
whether they felt being designated by the state was a blessing or a curse. One member echoed 
what several of the members had expressed,  
It opens up the doors to all kinds of things like taking ineffective personnel and sending 
them elsewhere, and grant funding and different things, and extended learning time and 
things like that. So yeah, I don't know this, I wasn’t on there, but I had a sense (the 
school) could have not been designated D earlier than it was designated D, but (the 
district) liked the designation of level D because of the things, the extras that are brought 
to the table, so yes, I think being designated level D does help. I don't think anyone wants 
to go from C to D just because of that label and the stigma and all of that, but I think once 
they're there, I do think there are a whole host of things that come along with that, that 
will help, that the schools at level C don't get.  
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But, members also recognized that access to state resources resulting from the district’s 
designation as underperforming had possible ramifications that extended beyond the school 
system. As elected officials and residents of the community members tried to make sense of what 
the perception of failing schools might mean to the entire city. One member in particular was 
very aware of this issue and struggled to make sense of the situation from his vantage point as a 
school board member and as a citizen.  
 It’s not just what you feel here in terms of your confidence to deal with the situation, but 
also what people’s perceptions, not only internally but externally. We could get a state 
takeover of a school or more than one school. It’s certainly, it’s potentially disastrous 
because you have that, as I said, not only the internal perceptions that we failed, but you 
have the external perceptions that we failed. I think that means it could damage the 
economy, the local economy. You’re not going to get any companies thinking of moving 
in if the school department is that much of a failure. I think the board for the most part 
would like to avoid that.  
While members understood that, they had a particular bird’s eye view of the situation, they also 
understood that their view was not universally accepted. The community had a different 
viewpoint that also needed to be considered.   
 There are people out there who don’t feel that way. They feel that, I’ve heard this 
expressed by a number of people, so what if the state takes over, if, let them run it, 
because if they know what they’re doing. Part of it is a resentment, if they can do the job, 
well let them show us that they can do the job. And, part of it is if they are successful, 
then maybe there’s something that we can learn from it. So there is a prevailing attitude 
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out there that you can do that. But the downside is a lot of the public relations 
ramifications where it doesn’t help the city at all. It may not help the city at all. 
However, in the end most members agreed they had no choice. In order to improve the 
school system they had to accept state intervention. School board members recognized that the 
assistance of the state brought important resources to the table, but they also recognized that it 
brought higher demands for accountability, oversight, and less local control over educational 
decisions. They were also keenly aware that one day the additional influx of state funds meant to 
support turnaround efforts would come to an end, and board members would be left to find the 
resources to sustain turnaround efforts on their own.  Each board member who was interviewed 
expressed this looming sense of dread that improving the system might eventually result in 
losing the very funding that made the improvement possible in the first place. 
I’m still waiting for the day the SEA comes in and moves (a school) out of level D 
funding knowing that that will probably mean a loss of funding at some point…. how are 
we going to sustain some of things that are cited as so great by the parents of this building 
when it seems every year we’re up against it and we’re robbing from Peter to  pay 
Paul to keep a level service budget and we can’t pursue innovative programs?    
In summary, increased state intervention caused school board members to try to make 
sense of their roles as the legal agents of the state charged with fulfilling state and federal 
mandates as well as their roles as locally elected members of their own community. Members 
viewed their roles within the local context. A failed school system could lead to the perception 
that the community, and by extension, the school board were incapable of providing the 
leadership necessary to effectively resolve their own issues. The challenge for board members 
was how to make sense of the fact that while state demands for increased accountability rose, 
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their own sense of their roles and what they could actually control remained uncertain. School 
board sense-making about their role in turnaround was influenced by their own understanding 
and community perceptions as well as state and federal legislation and intervention. However, 
there was also another key actor who contributed to school board sense-making: the 
superintendent. 
Sense-making of school board role: Superintendent perspective  
School board members rely on the superintendent to help them make sense of their 
turnaround roles. The superintendent plays a dual role with the school board. She serves as an 
employee but also serves as “the school board's chief executive officer and educational advisor” 
(SEA, Advisory on School Governance, 1995). As the professional educator, the superintendent 
serves as the primary conduit for sense-making to board members many of whom lack formal 
educational backgrounds7. Each member comes to the board with good will and good intentions 
but little background knowledge other than their own experience. The superintendents 
understanding of the role of the school board is key if an effective, collaborative, productive 
relationship is to result. The following exchange highlights the tension that exists as policy 
implementers begin to unravel the ways in which they understand their roles. The exchange also 
highlights another tension, one that is in the subtext rather than the spoken words. 
Superintendents understand the tenuous and potentially politically charged nature of their 
relationship with the school board. School board members serve at the will of the people not the 
will of the superintendent. In terms of high-risk gains and losses, the job of the superintendent is 
surely more precarious than that of school board members. When asked to describe the role of 
                                                 
7
 This district is somewhat unique in that three of the members are retired educators with over 90 years of combined 
experience. 
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the school board the superintendent responded by taking a deep breath and then slowly 
answering, in a way that was markedly unlike the firm and confident way she had explained her 
turnaround philosophy and personal commitment to the difficult work of turning around a school 
district. 
Well…I think in some respects…I mean…I think a big part of their work is to make sure 
the resources are in place for the turnaround work to take hold. So I think their role is to 
stay current on what needs to be happening in schools that are involved in turnaround 
efforts and prioritize those schools in a way that they’re getting the resources they need in 
order to accelerate student achievement. My….my first response was going to… I mean, 
say to you, would be they kind of need to stay out of the way but that’s…. you know, I 
think that sort of staying out of the way is not to diminish their role but it is to really to 
help them understand that their role is really in policy and budgeting and help them see, 
ok in policy and budgeting how can you support turnaround efforts .…but that’s always a 
work in progress.  
The perspective of the superintendent, while lengthy, is worth noting in its entirety because it 
speaks to the crux of the issue when trying to define how school board members make sense of 
their role in turnaround policy implementation. School board members identified the 
superintendent as the primary conduit of information, communication, context and expertise. As 
such, they have a significant amount of power and influence on school board sense-making. 
When asked whether the turnaround legislation influenced the turnaround role of school board 
members, the superintendent responded, 
 I don’t know if they are influenced… I mean they know there’s a law, we obviously 
reference it, we talk about it… I think they are not directly involved in that law in other 
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words, I mean they aren’t negotiating with the union around what needs to take place in 
turnaround schools. I think the law doesn’t even afford the school board an opportunity to 
vote on it (turnaround plan), although I have them vote on it just to get the buy-in, … 
they have an opportunity to review it but not to vote on it, so I think the law has really 
limited their sort of their involvement in that kind of turnaround work . So I kind have 
found my board to be sort of, not stand offish, but sort of take the stance that okay, this is 
the superintendent's, now they’re going to hold me accountable whether the schools 
turnaround or not in the end, but they have I would say, they aren’t directly involved. I 
don’t think they see what their role is in that act. 
In summary, the superintendent and the school board are in agreement on one point: 
neither sees a specific role for the school board in the implementation of turnaround policy. Yet, 
in spite of this lack of understanding, the school board is still held accountable for and has 
legislative authority over areas that significantly affect turnaround and fall under their authority. 
These include budget, policy, identifying and hiring a superintendent who has the skills needed 
to turnaround a district, supporting collective bargaining agreements that support the turnaround 
infrastructure, and setting district goals. The superintendent as the main communicator and 
translator of turnaround policy has significant influence over how members make sense of their 
roles. In this district, the lack of clarity around the board's role, the limiting of their influence on 
policy, and their dependence on the superintendent for translation and guidance, pushed 
members to focus their efforts on the one area they knew they could understand; the budget. In 
order to be effective resource navigators for the district they leveraged their relationships, their 
alliances, and their own political capital.  
School board members' primary role:  Budget and resources  
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School board members viewed budget oversight and accessing resources to achieve 
district goals as one of their primary responsibilities. Members made sense of their roles in the 
turnaround process chiefly through the lens of “resource facilitators, bridge builders and 
navigators.” Turnaround policy implementation was viewed as the responsibility of the 
superintendent and school level leaders. In order to effectively allocate turnaround resources, 
members participated in a number of activities. First and foremost, they had to make sense of the 
budget process, try to understand what was needed for turnaround, and identify and access 
sources of revenue. Once resources had been identified, members in this study were concerned 
that the inequitable distribution of resources would create a situation where the pendulum would 
constantly swing back and forth between “turned around” and “not turned round.”  In order to 
avoid this scenario, school board members wrestled with the question of whether turnaround 
could be sustained if external resources were no longer available. Once members understood the 
internal demands, they then had to understand the external political and social structures that 
affected their ability to fulfill their resource responsibilities. Their first task, however, was to 
understand the process for determining budget needs and priorities.  
Budget process 
Observations of seventeen school board meetings in person or through video recordings 
revealed that a significant amount of time in every meeting was devoted to discussions about 
how funds should be expended and how to determine funding priorities. In every case, the 
recommendation for an expenditure was presented or supported by the superintendent. Every 
school board agenda outlined in detail, requests for new positions, travel requests, a list of 
donations, and a number of grants and contracts that were being presented for approval by the 
board. For the most part, the approval process was treated as a perfunctory duty for the board 
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which the chair tried to accomplish as quickly as possible. The process of approving general 
requests was usually completed in less than five minutes. Requests for funding of positions were 
scrutinized a bit more, particularly by one specific school board member who always asked for 
supporting data from the superintendent to justify the request. He usually voted “no” on any 
position that was not directly classroom related, not supported by teachers, or which  he felt the 
superintendent had not made a compelling argument.  Staffing positions that were directly 
related to turnaround activities were rarely linked explicitly to the turnaround goal but generally 
fell under “additional staffing” requests made by the superintendent. The assumption seemed to 
be that school board members understood that the funds were needed to support turnaround 
work. It was not always clear that members connected or knew that there were certain issues that 
state law required to be included in the development of school turnaround plans. For instance, 
legislation requires that the social service and health needs of students and their families be 
addressed in the school turnaround plan, yet the expense of providing wraparound services in 
Level D schools was often discussed. The board supported the creation and funding of parent 
coordinators primarily because the superintendent made a compelling argument, but some 
members were concerned that funding wraparound was no more effective than lowering class 
size. One member asked, “how many students are you actually so-called 'saving' because of this 
(wraparound) versus how many students can you save if you had it, that money, spent inside the 
classroom?” The superintendent, on the other hand, felt that one of the reasons the district had 
been able to turn schools around was precisely because of the wraparound services that were 
provided.  This disconnect between funding versus purpose served only to weaken the policy 
implementation chain and create tension around determining priorities.  
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As elected officials, members were cognizant of the fact that the community held them 
accountable for managing the school budget. They viewed the district’s accelerated improvement 
plan as one way for them to make sense of the needed resources for turnaround. However, they 
relied on the superintendent to provide the rationale and data to support the need so that they 
could then explain their decisions to the community. Members who had prior experience or 
knowledge about school budgeting tended to dominate discussions and were the most 
challenging in their questions to the superintendent or the chief financial officer. In some cases, 
their questioning caused additional information to be revealed that helped clarify and make sense 
of the issue for other board members. School board members viewed the distribution of funding 
as one of the few remaining levers within their authority and took oversight of the budget very 
seriously. One member, a former superintendent, was clear on his budgeting role, but questioned 
whether the district leadership had a handle on how to budget properly. It was not clear whether 
other members shared his concerns. However, his apprehension led him to continually question 
whether funds were being spent on the budget items he had approved, sometimes much to the 
chagrin of his colleagues on the board. Another board member had a more pragmatic view of his 
own role in turnaround policy work: “Money, Money, Money.” 
Determining budget priorities was a challenge for some members because their  
understanding of how the budgeting process related to turnaround work was not always explicit. 
Members certainly understood that resources were necessary and they understood that the budget 
was one way of making sure resources were applied to the right places. In some cases, however, 
the complexity of trying to turn around schools that do not necessarily follow a linear 
progression from need to result was lost in translation. From the superintendent’s perspective, 
the district needed some level of flexibility in the overall budget to meet and adapt to the 
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changing turnaround context, but for some school board members this was viewed as poor 
planning. 
In addition to budgeting resources, members tried to make sense of how resources were 
distributed. This was even more challenging in an environment where school board members 
were faced with requirements to fund Level D schools while Level C schools “hung on for dear 
life.” For several school board members, this came down to trying to reconcile how to meet 
multiple needs across the district. As one member stated, “I suppose every district struggles with 
this to some degree, even districts that are considered affluent. But I think it’s a question of 
prioritizing and just moving the money around to where it’s going to give you the most 
advantage.”  
Equity of resources 
Other than the superintendent, school board members had the most global perspective on 
how resources were being distributed district-wide. They expressed concerns about not only how 
to distribute resources but also whether they were identifying the right priorities. Members 
worried about the potential inequities that might result from differentiating how resources were 
allocated. Several mentioned that they feared that concentrating resources to remove a Level D 
designation in one school would result in creating a disproportionate need in another. One 
member referred to this as “the roller coaster” of turning around schools that could result in a 
constant churn as schools entered and exited turnaround status. "Raising the boat for all schools" 
versus "saving one school from drowning" clearly weighed heavily on how board members made 
decisions.  One member questioned whether devoting funds to prevention rather than reaction 
might be a more effective strategy. Several members repeated this sentiment as they tried to 
make sense of how to meet all the needs in the district. On member stated, 
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A school goes down to Level D, now all of a sudden there’s a great deal of activity to try 
to bring the school up. But, I think it’s more important to prevent the school from getting 
there that low. And at some point, you can actually hurt yourself because you can take 
care of one school, maybe two schools, that drop to Level D. However, if you don’t 
prevent schools from going that low, and I would imagine that with all of the data that’s 
around that you can see the symptoms that a school is slipping. If you don’t catch it early 
it’s just like not catching a disease early. At some point, you may not be able to recover. 
The context of the turnaround process comes into play here. School board members 
viewed the turnaround of schools through the lens of the resources and context. There was a 
sense that schools were constantly teetering on the edge and it was difficult for members to make 
sense of how to “react” and “prevent” at the same time. Weick (1995) describes the process of 
organizing and sense-making as one in which people take input, try to make sense of it, and then 
release it to make the world more orderly. School board members appeared to have difficulty 
making sense of the turnaround process because the constant state of churn belied any sense of 
order. When faced with this dissonance, some members tried to make sense of it by questioning 
whether the process used by the state to designate schools was equitable or had any validity at all 
if it was so easy to rise and fall from one level to another. As one member stated, 
“Well, it’s strange that you're designated Level D if just one of your schools is a Level D, 
so that, it doesn’t seem entirely fair…” Making sense of a situation in which members 
felt they did not understand all the moving parts created a sense of instability, particularly 
for members who felt that resources were at a premium. I find that a lot of schools stay at 
Level C and we get one out of Level D and the Level C drops to Level D. I think a lot of 
resources and time and energy go into turning around Level D schools, which has to 
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happen, but Level C is not great either, and most of our schools are there. What concerns 
me, is in the back of my mind, is which one is going next? It's not only thinking we're 
going to turn around (the school), but when we turn (it) around, what school is going to 
be next? 
“Resources, time and energy,” the three components identified by this member as critical 
ingredients in turning around Level D schools, are identified in the literature as precious 
commodities in underperforming schools (Hess, 1999; Leithwood, Harris & Strauss, 2010). The 
distribution of resources was an important component of how the school board viewed their 
work. School board members viewed the impact of resource allocation from two perspectives: 
impact on individual schools as well as impact on the district as a whole. In some ways, the 
designation of schools as Level D provided members with a structure for prioritizing the 
resources because of the directives of the state rather than having to decide themselves. Level C 
schools were more challenging for members because there was no external agent forcing their 
hand. Board members had to agree to make some of the hard decisions needed to focus resources 
on one school at the expense of another. Members depended on the superintendent to make 
recommendations about where resources should be directed. In some cases, the way the 
superintendent and the school board made sense of what was equitable was perceived differently 
at the school level. From one teacher’s perspective, the unequal distribution of resources was the 
direct cause of her school being designated as underperforming. She noted, 
I don’t know how they didn’t maintain us. And I really truly feel, like am I angry? A little 
bit. And I think rightfully so, because now they’re going to hitch up their britches and 
come in and tell us you’ve got to do this and you’ve got to do that. And, excuse me, but 
you haven’t been here and now you’re going to come in and you’re going to tell me what 
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you think I need?... I wish that it could have been circumvented by appropriately 
maintaining relationships with every single school. And I don’t think they do. 
In summary, school board members struggled with how to make sense of distributing 
resources equitably in an environment that was in a constant state of flux, and where resources 
were limited or out of their control. The sense of urgency to “fix” the situation or suffer the 
possible consequences loomed large. Members depended on the superintendent or defaulted to 
the mandated state designations to determine the highest priorities. Sense-making was 
contextual. The way in which the superintendent and the school board allocated resources was 
not always seen as equitable by staff on the front lines. Being designated as a Level D school 
was sometimes perceived by staff as helpful because it forced resources into schools that had 
been preciously underfunded.   
Sustaining turnaround 
Sustaining student achievement gains and maintaining school turnaround long after the 
resources had been shifted to other underperforming schools was a question members struggled 
with every time they were asked to vote on a budget. Board members viewed sustainability as 
being at the heart of the turnaround issue and found it particularly challenging in a district so 
heavily dependent on supplemental funding from the state. When asked if turnaround was 
sustainable without state funding one member stated emphatically,  
 No…. in order to sustain it, we’re going to have to come up with the money to be able to 
do that, which will greatly increase the school’s budget, and we have other schools that 
require an equal amount of money… Now, where do we get the biggest bang for the 
buck? 
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The concerns expressed by this member were echoed by others in interviews obtained during this 
study and is representative of a general undercurrent of concern that was verbalized repeatedly at 
many school board meetings. These concerns were most acute during the budget preparation 
process when members were faced with the immediacy of determining how resources would be 
allocated. During the FY 13 budget deliberations, for instance, one member expressed his 
frustration, clearly feeling the weight of the burden placed on him by all the competing demands 
of his constituents. 
 I don’t understand how everything is going to be sustained. At some point we're going to 
hit a level of achievement and then it’s going to be time to pay the piper and I don’t 
understand how the level of money is going to sustain itself. RTTT (Race To The Top) 
will be gone, wraparound will be gone.  … it’s the one thing that keeps me up at night. It 
stinks, it’s boring, to talk about the delivery of education and (always go) back to money. 
People don’t want to hear it, they want us to provide everything we can to each and every 
child and (we’re)  not even getting into the fact that many of our special groups are 
growing… I guess this is something we have to do…I guess what I’m trying to say is that 
I can support this, but I don’t know that I can look a parent in the eyes tomorrow morning 
and say that I am going to be able to fund it all. 
Part of his frustration stems from the fact that while school board members are being asked to 
meet the increasing demands of a complex district, they have little control over the resource pool 
itself. For the most part they are at the mercy of policy and funding decisions made by external 
agents far outside the boundaries of the local community (Malen, 2003). 
Identifying and accessing the resources needed to sustain improvement in this turnaround 
district involves a complex commingling of local, state, and federal resources. The district 
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budget is comprised of local property taxes, state aid funds, and targeted federal and state grants. 
The school board was often viewed as serving both a liaison as well as a buffering role between 
all of those entities. School board members in this study used internal and external structures as 
well as their own political and social relationships to leverage their understanding of how to 
access or explain the need for resources on behalf of the district.  
In summary, school board members viewed their role in turnaround through the lens of 
budget and resources. The majority of their work focused on trying to make sense of the process 
for allocating resources, determining whether resources were being distributed equitably, and 
grappling with concerns about how to sustain progress when faced with the inevitable loss of 
resources. The school board identified itself as a budgetary body and this identity contributed to 
how they made sense of their role. Weick, Sutcliff and Obstfeld (2005) argue that identity 
construction is key to sense-making and that how we think of ourselves influences what we 
choose to do, which ultimately affects what others think of us. For school board members, this 
identity construct drove both what they focused on and how they chose to focus on it. Depending 
on the context, members made sense of their resource roles by serving as facilitators, bridge 
builders, or resource navigators.   
Sense-making of resource role 
Sense-making as internal facilitators. Internally, members served a facilitative role 
between board members and direct implementers. One of the ways school board members 
enhanced their sense-making of the resource needs within the district was through direct contact 
with school-based implementers. This was done internally through the school board 
subcommittee structure. These subcommittees met to discuss topic areas such as policy, finances, 
and facilities prior to the issues being presented to the full school board. For instance, the 
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Finance Subcommittee's role is to oversee approval of expenditures, monitor the budget, and 
participate in the budget development process. In this district, the board is comprised of the vice 
chair of the school board serving as the chair and two other members. In preparation for the 
FY14 budget, the chair had instituted a new practice in which principals and directors from 
throughout the district were invited to present their staffing and resource needs to the 
subcommittee. From the chair’s perspective, it was “an opportunity to just have a conversation.”  
He stated,  
This meeting gives the finance board a great opportunity to exchange and dialogue with 
you as building leaders as to what your needs are in terms of staffing and other resources 
… the exchange we were able to have with building leaders and building principals, at 
least in this form, was very productive, which led to a lot of extra resources we were able 
to provide schools this year. Without that dialogue, we really shortchange the pupils and 
the community who are obviously very interested in where the funding is going, and this 
gives the board and the public a chance to say where they would like the resources 
expended for their schools. 
 The opportunity to hear directly from internal implementers about their resource needs 
contributed to members' sense-making. Knowing that they had a role as “stewards of the public’s 
tax money,” they were anxious to be able to explain and support the goals of the district to the 
public. It was also clear that in order to do this, they needed information and data that was 
manageable, understandable and defensible. With this in mind, principals in the meeting were 
able to explain first-hand what their needs were, but even more importantly, the consequences of 
not having the needs filled. The chair was also able to reinforce to principals that the board was 
in agreement with the superintendent’s goal to decrease the per pupil disparity in resources 
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between the secondary and elementary levels. The members emphasized several times that it was 
important for them to understand the needs so that when they were in the community they could 
respond to concerns that might be raised by the public, and know  “…what we need to focus on 
to make things happen.” Information, knowledge, and firsthand experience with direct 
implementers appeared to be critical for school board members in their role as resource 
facilitators, particularly as their focus shifted from internal understanding to serving as sense-
making bridge builders to the community. 
Sense-making as bridge builders to the community. As elected officials, some 
members viewed their role as one in which they communicated the district’s needs to the 
community while also garnering support for the school budget.  In many cases they were the 
primary communicators responsible for explaining, decoding, and making sense of the needs of 
the district to the community. One school board member who regularly hosts meetings with 
constituent groups recalled, 
I had a neighborhood meeting last night and people were asking me questions. And one 
man got up, (and said) well, that’s going to raise taxes, right? How much more money? 
Well, let me tell you something, if you want a Cadillac you’re going to have to pay for a 
Cadillac. If you want a clunker then you pay less. But if you have a clunker of students 
then you’re not going to have a very good city here. You need to educate these kids so 
that they can become Cadillacs (and be) the best they possibly can.  
In this case, the school board member was able to leverage his knowledge of the resource needs 
of the district with his role as a community member. All school board members are lifelong 
residents of the city. They have deep ties to the social fabric of the community, and are able to 
count on the relationships and bonds they have formed over this time. School board members 
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serve as bridge builders and sense makers for the community. They are able to communicate 
with constituents in terms they understand. Because they are elected officials voted into office by 
the people, they are perceived to have a different level of credibility than school department 
employees. Some are seen as a “straight talkers” who “make sense.” 
Campaign elections were cited by members as one of the ways in which they maintained 
communication with the community. One member stated, “I did a lot of campaigning to get 
elected. I knocked on a lot of doors and I made a lot of phone calls.” Members also served on a 
number of organizations, and many listed their community volunteer efforts in their election 
campaign literature. The president of the teachers union stated, “…it’s a very political office, 
they are not appointed by the mayor so they are in the community all the time.” This degree of 
credibility becomes important in a community where resources are thin, and competition for how 
those resources will be distributed is influenced by politics, relationships, and external agents.   
Sense-making as resource navigators. The MacMillan Dictionary defines the word 
navigate as: “to deal effectively with a complicated situation.” In the context of this study, 
school board members who are trying to identify and access resources for turnaround policy 
implementation find themselves in the midst of a very complicated resource situation. Their 
ability to maneuver or navigate the situation effectively can impact the district’s ability to 
successfully fund turnaround initiatives. Over the last twenty years, the state has developed a 
very complex formula for determining what percentage of local and state aid funds should be 
used to provide an “adequate education” for students. Under previous legislation, a foundation 
budget was established for all districts that outlined the minimum amount of spending needed to 
provide what would be considered adequate for the community. In a community with limited 
local resources, the tension of balancing the needs of the community with the funds available is a 
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source of concern for board members. One member, when discussing the issue of sustainability, 
addressed this issue directly,   
...we’re so beholden to outside funds, we’re never going to be a system that can operate 
without state and federal support. It’s just not feasible in a poorer urban community like 
(ours). We can’t sustain a tax base to run a public school system on our own. 
The district’s FY14 Foundation Budget was projected at $124,016,066.  The amount 
calculated by the state to provide every student with an “adequate education” was projected at 
$100,883,872.  Therefore, the FY14 Required Local Contribution was calculated at $23,132,194. 
According to the superintendent’s FY14 budget documents, the district's initial FY14 budget 
request was $92,009,059, a 4.4% increase over the  FY13 budget. The final budget, approved by 
the City Council was $91,000,000, a 3.3% increase, 18.65% of which would be provided through 
local funds. The remaining 81.35% of the budget gap would be filled by state and federal funds, 
leaving the city dependent on external funders, who are far from the local context, to fill the 
educational needs of their own community. 
School board members, perhaps more than most community members, understand 
the challenges that result when the majority of the resources needed for improving the quality of  
the school system are beyond the control of the local community. In the same way that the 
superintendent becomes the navigator and interpreter of turnaround policy to the school board, 
school board members become navigators and interpreters of the district’s resource needs  to the 
city council and the community. In some cases, this navigator role extended to helping clarify the 
advocacy roles of each governing body. Members understood that they were part of a larger 
structure and were keen on making sure that the distinct needs of the schools were not 
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overshadowed by the needs of the city. During one meeting in which members debated whether 
to hold joint meetings with city council members one member stated,  
I feel communication with the city council is important but we each have to respect each 
other’s roles. I’m not going to tell the city council which streets to pave, but by the same token I 
would not want the city council questioning why the special ed budget is so high. It’s high 
because those children are entitled to a free and appropriate education, that’s why, and the 
appropriateness for one child is not necessarily appropriateness for another. But we should 
engage in some dialogue… 
In the case of this district, an additional layer of political complexity and navigation is 
added because the Mayor of the city also serves as the chair of the school board. The Mayor is 
ultimately responsible for the finances of the entire city. From a technical standpoint, the school 
board budget is submitted to the Mayor, who then prepares the total city budget for submission 
to the City Council for approval. In FY13, 42% of the city’s budget was dedicated to supporting 
education, 14% to public safety, 6% to local government, 29% to employee benefits, 5% to debt 
service, 3% to community maintenance and 1% to veterans. The mayor's ability to navigate his 
responsibilities as school board chair and leader of the city are seen as critical to the school 
department.  The Mayor’s social and political connections are also important assets to the 
success of the school district. During his first campaign for office he had promised to remove 
himself from the school board chair position, perhaps responding to critics who questioned 
whether serving in both roles created a conflict of interest. Instead, after assuming office, he was 
persuaded, by a variety of community members including a number of teachers, to remain in the 
position. Members who were interviewed agreed that having the Mayor knowledgeable and 
committed to the needs of the district far outweighed any potential political pitfalls. His ability to 
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navigate the political waters of resource allocation in a city where multiple stakeholders are 
vying for attention is very important in the turnaround context.  The quote below captured the 
sense of those school board members who were interviewed,  
I think he (the mayor) holds the purse strings with what the school budget is really going 
to be, so to have the person who generally is going to decide generally how much money 
is going to be funded to the school's part of the process, I think invests him more into the 
process. He has to face the community every month, when people are giving their 
comments, concerns, or whatever. I think if he wasn’t involved in that process it would 
be a lot easier for him to not see the need as much. He's got police fighting for money, 
fire fighting for money, so I think, I do think that's a benefit that he's part of that process 
more and more engaged in what the schools need than if he wasn’t the chair of the school 
board. 
In general, members felt that having the mayor on the board strengthened the board’s ability to 
access the resources needed for the school district. They also felt that he could fulfill a bridge 
building role with other departments in the city where the school board had no authority or 
oversight. In this district, the Mayor is viewed as a strong supporter of education and sees it as 
the main economic driver for the future of the community. He regularly cites education as a key 
issue and in a recent meeting stated,   
There is no more important issue in this city than education. If we want to improve job 
creation, if we want to improve public safety, and if we want to continue to improve the 
quality of life here in our community, it’s going to be through education. The better our 
children are educated, the better the quality of life they are going to lead as successful 
adults. 
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The Mayor’s support in concert with the school board’s advocacy becomes one more link in a 
resource chain that stretches all the way to back to the original work of the finance board. 
 In summary, school board members play a key role in resource allocation. They must 
facilitate the process of bringing together direct implementers and school board members so that 
the district’s needs can be understood. They also serve as bridge builders who can use their 
political standing to advocate within the community and city government for the resources 
needed to address issues of sustainability and equity. Finally, school board members make sense 
of their resource role by navigating the political and social relationships in the community. Their 
ability to navigate those relationships successfully can effect whether the school district’s budget 
includes the resources needed to turn the district around and keep it turned around. Maintaining 
turnaround requires that the district continue to provide the level of support needed to continue to 
meet the conditions of effective schools outlined in Chapter Two. Some examples include 
professional development for teachers and school leaders, and the wraparound services for 
students and families that were cited as key to school turnaround. Honig (2006) states that 
current contemporary policy implementation research concerns itself with the interdependence of 
interactions between people, places, and policies, and that policy implementation is a “highly 
contingent and situated process” (p. 19).  For school board members in this study who viewed 
their primary role as one of budgets and resources, turnaround policy implementation was 
viewed through a resource prism. This prism depended on a complex web of interactions 
between multiple actors including members, the administration, the community, and the 
requirements of the policy itself. 
Factors that influence school board sense-making 
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In addition to the findings outlined above, two specific factors emerged as influencing 
school board member sense-making; communication and dissenting voice. Two key 
stakeholders, the superintendent and the SEA monitors who oversee the implementation of the 
turnaround plan, had a significant influence on how board members made sense of their 
turnaround role. The dynamic between state monitors and board members in particular 
highlighted the tension that Cuban (2004) refers to when he suggests that context shapes 
implementation. This is particularly true when school board members have greater knowledge of 
the local context than do the state monitors. 
The role of the dissenting voice was also an unanticipated factor that emerged during the 
course of this study. While this may be an area for further research, in this study the dissenting 
voice of one school board member, in particular, appeared to have an impact on the way in 
which the board defined its role.   
Sense-making through communication: Superintendent 
As stated previously, school board members unanimously identified the superintendent as 
the primary conduit for interpreting and communicating turnaround policy. They relied on the 
superintendent to develop the implementation strategy and justify the resources needed for 
turnaround. When asked to identify who was primarily responsible for communicating the 
requirements of the turnaround policy, all members interviewed immediately identified the 
superintendent. Typical responses were: “If you had to name one single person, you’d probably 
have to say the superintendent,” and “Yes, that’s the main communication....through the 
superintendent.” Most members were keenly aware of their “place” and were very conscious of 
not overstepping their authority. When members mentioned that they might seek out information 
from others in the central office, they still identified the superintendent as the primary conduit for 
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access to these resources. As one member stated, “I would ask the superintendent, and then if she 
thought I should speak to someone else, a principal of the school, (or others) then I would follow 
up on that in an appropriate manner. But I would start there, with her and go from there.” 
Another stated,  
She’s always got an open door for us. We call, she says come right down, you’ve got a 
problem, she’s right on the ball with that. She doesn’t let anybody out. That, I know for a 
fact because I’m the one that calls her quite often. 
The superintendent was also counted on to make sense of state directives and policy 
requirements, particularly in terms of turnaround. For example, in 2012-2013 the Commissioner 
of Education notified the district that he was considering naming one of the district’s middle 
schools as a Level F school. This action could have opened the door to a state takeover of the 
local school system by an external partner. Members looked to the superintendent to deliver and 
explain the news and provide the requisite background knowledge needed for them to understand 
what it might mean for the community. Members may have had an inconsistent understanding 
regarding the actual policy requirements of the state’s turnaround legislation, but they knew 
enough to realize that being designated a Level D and possibly Level F district could have drastic 
consequences for their community. In this case, school board members depended on the direction 
and guidance of the superintendent and followed her recommendation to close the school and 
reassign students rather than risk a possible takeover.  
Communication between school boards members was also challenging. One reason 
members depended on the superintendent for clarity, rather than each other, was that they were 
concerned about violating open meeting laws, which prohibited them from engaging in private 
discussions or deliberations outside of formal meetings. Members were very aware of the 
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protocols and policies that guided communications with the public, staff, and each other. None of 
the members felt that they were prevented or limited in any way from voicing their concerns and 
opinions, however, opportunities for them to discuss issues directly with their colleagues outside 
of publically recorded meetings appeared limited.  
In a community as complex and multidimensional as the one in this study, finding ways 
to communicate complex information to school board members, particularly about the 
requirements of state and federal mandates, was also challenging for the superintendent. 
Members had limited access to each other because of open meeting laws, and they relied on the 
superintendent as the single point of contact for information. The superintendent supplemented 
verbal communications with other sources of information and data.  
The use of data as a sense-making tool was examined specifically because it has been 
cited as a critical element in improving underperforming schools (Clubine et al., 2001; Corallo & 
McDonald, 2001; Leithwood et al. (2010). As indicated by other implementer interviews in this 
study, analyzing and interpreting data about student learning, growth, and achievement gaps 
emerged as a key factor in turn around decision making. School board members were mixed in 
their opinions regarding whether data was helpful in supporting the superintendent’s explanation 
of the turnaround policy. Each school board member reported receiving a packet of 
documentation prior to each school board meeting which supported action items on the agenda. 
Members were invited to meet with the Superintendent one-on-one if necessary prior to a school 
board meeting to discuss any questions or concerns they might have. The superintendent reported 
that she felt it was important for there to be transparency if members were to understand the 
needs of the district. This naturally led to a great deal of data being shared with members. 
Members received data from multiple sources; at school board meetings, from the 
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superintendent, from state officials, and from community agencies. While members agreed that it 
was important to have data, they also questioned its usefulness if their understanding was limited 
or if they did not know how it connected to turnaround policy. One member, when asked if 
having more data was useful in helping him make sense of the turnaround policy, stated “I 
suppose we could say, look, we want more data. But then we get the data, now what? So we have 
all the reams of data.” Training for school board members on how to interpret or use data 
effectively was minimally evident in school board meetings. Most of the time data was presented 
with the assumption that members understood its importance and how it connected to policy 
implementation, or that it was sufficient for them to accept it on face value. There did not appear 
to be a robust system in place for collecting and displaying data to school board members in a 
clear or concise way. Data presented at school board meetings was usually done through Power 
Point presentations and the quality of presentations varied. Interpreting data and using it to 
leverage change in low performing schools has been referred to as an essential ingredient in 
school turnaround. School board members, especially those for whom the use of achievement 
data is not a part of their daily experience, appear to be on the periphery of these discussions 
because of their limited knowledge base. This gap in understanding is significant because the 
District Standards and Indicators for Leadership and Governance document prepared by the SEA 
specifically cites the use of “student achievement data and other educationally relevant data” as 
an important indicator to inform the policy making and decision making responsibilities of the 
board (SEA, February 15, 2011, p. 1).   
Coburn (2001) and Wieck (1995) describe sense-making as a social rather than individual 
activity. Coburn further defines it as collective because it is fixed in the interactions, 
conversations and negotiations that people engage in as a group to create shared understanding. 
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Furthermore, she describes “in-facing” conversations between colleagues as critical for the deep 
engagement necessary to create opportunities for sense-making to occur (Coburn, 2001, p. 158). 
In the context of this study, it appeared that the school board had little opportunity to engage 
deeply with each other. This is an interesting dichotomy since they are essentially perceived to 
be a group that functions like a “collective.” Once again the superintendent played a significant 
role as the interpreter and navigator of turnaround policy for school board members.  
The superintendent has the ability to shape the information the board receives in such a 
way that it may influence their sense-making. Coburn (2001) describes this as “bringing in and 
privileging messages from the environment” (p. 160). The superintendent acts as a gatekeeper 
with the power to make decisions about how and what information is presented. In this district, 
the superintendent seemed to be committed to open dialogue and transparency with board 
members by providing opportunities to meet and creating weekly packets of information. 
However, the piece that was missing was an ongoing opportunity for the members to engage in 
sense-making amongst themselves. Communication is a key ingredient if the school board and 
the superintendent are to develop an effective collaboration built on trust and respect (Dervarics 
& O’Brien, 2011). 
In summary, the superintendent in this district serves as the primary conduit for 
communication about turnaround policy. School board members rely heavily on the 
superintendent’s interpretation and recommendations for policy implementation. Opportunities 
for board members to make sense of policy amongst themselves by meeting informally as a 
group is limited due to the requirements of open meetings laws and school board policy. The 
superintendent’s use of data to inform school board decision-making was viewed as mixed in its 
effectiveness by board members. School board members had little opportunity to develop their 
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capacity to use data, depending instead on the superintendent to present the data that was 
pertinent. The superintendent served as a gatekeeper by being in a position to filter the 
information that is brought before the board, which can be viewed both positively and 
negatively. A collaborative, trusting, and respectful relationship between board members and the 
superintendent is a key element in creating an effective partnership. 
Sense-making through communication: State Intervention 
As a result of the Level D designation the LEA was required to submit a Recovery Plan 
outlining the strategies and interventions the district would undertake to turnaround its lowest 
performing schools. The Recovery Plan, as directed by the Commissioner of Education, required 
that the district address four areas of concern: Leadership and Governance, Teaching and 
Learning, Human Resource Management and Financial Management. In reviewing the October 
12, 2011 progress report which was publically presented at a school board meeting, the SEA 
appointed state monitor noted that marked improvement had been made in most areas since the 
implementation began, except in the areas of leadership and governance. 
The school board has not sufficiently built its capacity to function as a responsible 
governance team so that it can perform the functions granted under education  reform and 
for which it has the legal authority and responsibility to carry out. The leadership role of 
the school board is a critical one – it hires and fires the Superintendent, oversees the 
budget and sets policy. The school board’s overall reliability effectiveness and efficiency 
either create a productive and stable working environment for staff or undermine it. The 
school board has not fulfilled its own legal responsibility to follow the policies it has set. 
Furthermore, the school board has not demonstrated the capacity for continuous 
improvement on its own through self-evaluation and improvement process. Overall, the 
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work of the governing body has been tenuous, and its inaction an indication that external 
support and monitoring remains necessary at this time.  
As a result of the monitoring report, external resources were provided by the SEA to 
work specifically with the school board on developing and meeting objectives identified as 
deficient in the monitoring report. These areas included policy, meeting structure, school board-
superintendent relations, and adhering to the responsibilities of the school board and 
superintendent as defined under education reform. In addition, the SEA monitors were charged 
with developing an effective evaluation of the superintendent and implementing a system of self-
monitoring for the board. At the time of this study, the development process had been underway 
for five years. Some of the monitoring reports that were analyzed for that time period showed 
that while the State Education Department was progressively satisfied with the progress of the 
district, as a whole, they did not think the school board had made as much progress as they 
expected. Much of the discontent centered on the idea that the board was not functioning as a 
unified team but rather as a collection of individuals. In many ways, the deficits cited by the state 
monitors crystallize the growing tensions that exist when issues of policy implementation in the 
local context run headlong into the mandates of policy implementation at the state and federal 
level. 
Two specific events highlighted the tension that results when issues of local control and 
state intervention conflict. These were: the district’s decision to close a school rather than risk a 
Level F designation and the possible takeover of the district, and the SEA’s continued insistence 
that the board improve its own governance to align with SEA expectations. The resulting strain 
over who is actually responsible for governing the city’s schools was articulated by the teacher’s 
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union president in a presentation to the school board after the decision was made to close a 
school. 
 My fear is that this move will contribute to the flawed belief that scores alone will 
accurately reflect a child’s ability or a school's value. Yet we seek to appease the 
Department of Education people who do not appear to care about our challenges or the 
human beings behind the scores. But we care, we all care, that’s why we are here tonight. 
And we have a responsibility to speak out for what is fair and what is just and what is 
humane and I am not alone in this belief. There are teachers and parents and 
administrators and school boards all across the country who are speaking up to say that 
we have crossed the line between the reasonable and the ridiculous. They are waking up 
to say that the status quo of test and punish does not work….This is our community, these 
are our schools, these are our kids, when do we say enough is enough?" 
Some school board members viewed the intervention of the state as a challenge to their own 
local authority and reacted to the insinuation that the community was viewed as unable to govern 
itself. “I’ve got a feeling they’re just picking on us. That’s the way I’ve been feeling lately. 
Every time they say, 'the state’s coming down,' or 'the state said this.'  Hey, can’t we handle 
something ourselves without the state getting involved?” 
In one report, the SEA cited the school board’s reluctance to alter their view about 
participation in SEA activities as “compliance exercises rather than as a behavior change 
commitment.” An increasing focus on managing the behavior of the board rather than the results 
of the board’s work was evident when the SEA required that each board member complete a 
scorecard after every meeting. The SEA intended the scorecard to be a vehicle for board 
members to evaluate the overall effectiveness of each meeting as well as their own specific 
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participation as individuals. The results were to be collated and scored and a public discussion 
about the results was to occur at the next school board’s meeting. The stated goal was to identify 
areas of possible growth for the board as a whole. The board had initially agreed to the concept 
of the scorecards but over time questions arose as to the validity of the information collected and 
whether the scorecards were an accurate evaluation of the board’s work. The subsequent state 
monitoring report chastised the board, stating that the members had not been consistently filling 
out the scorecards and there had been no evidence of public discussion about the results. In this 
instance it was the chair (the mayor) and the vice chair who led the discussion with the SEA 
monitor and expressed their disagreement with the SEA’s characterization of the board’s 
progress.  
The resulting exchange illustrates the inherent tension that exists when the local context 
is lost in the policy implementation. For the SEA, the scorecards were meant to serve as a tool 
for holding all members accountable. For board members who live and work in the local context, 
the scorecards were seen as threatening, capricious and not very helpful as a way to drive the 
board’s work forward. Three school board members (including the Chair and Vice Chair) and the 
state monitor engaged in an exchange in a public meeting. The SEA monitor reiterated that the 
point of the scorecard was to evaluate areas such as preparedness, character, and whether 
members had participated for the good of the district. The monitor noted that once the scores 
where compiled the board could identify action steps for the entire membership. The Chair and 
the Vice Chair questioned whether an open public meeting was the appropriate venue for this 
discussion. The Chair stated, 
 C: Aren’t those issues usually addressed in executive session? 
 SEA: The evaluation is of the board, not of each other individually. 
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 VC: Although I understand the importance, what is the purpose of the public review? 
Airing that dirty laundry creates animosity. Our fundamental role is to do the work of the 
public. The public wants the work to be done, not hear about how we worked with each 
other. 
 SEA: The work of the board is to evaluate the work of the board not as individuals. This 
is my 5th year coming here and for some reason the board is having difficulty reflecting 
on how you are doing. 
 VC: Because we haven’t reported publicly we haven’t made changes? 
 SEA: You have not made progress in this area.  
 VC:  You are not going to find evidence. Just because you don’t see it in minutes, 
operation protocols have been evidenced. I can tell you that this board functions much 
better than it did in 2009, even before that. We have made that commitment. I don’t know 
how helpful it is to air our dirty laundry. 
 SEA: What has been missing is a very short read out of the last meeting. It needs to be an 
item on the agenda. It needs to be done. 
 VC: The way you have evaluated the progress of the board is through a very narrow lens. 
You have not reviewed how the board has worked to implement policies and work with 
the superintendent. It’s up to each member to decide what to do with the scorecard. The 
board has been working better together than they have in the last 5 years. If that’s what 
we need to do to capture evidence then we’ll do that. Tying up our meeting to discuss 
how we felt about the work we did versus actually doing the work is why you didn’t see 
it.  
 SEA: Hopefully we’ll see it in the next monitoring report. 
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VC: Do we have times when we disagree, yes, and I don’t see a problem with that. It 
doesn’t distract from the work we’ve done. I know the conversations I have had 
personally and I guess it can be formalized, but I just don’t see the point of spending time 
in open meetings discussing how great we did, seems crazy. The public will say we are 
wasting time talking about meetings when my son or daughter needs this or that. A 
number of concerns we deal with, it’s something that is here and it’s just not captured. 
It seemed that members were constantly weighing their need to comply with the state 
mandates against their roles as elected officials and members of the community. They struggled 
to make sense of what the SEA was demanding and what they felt was acceptable in their 
community. Board members knew very well that they had work to do as a board, but were also 
concerned that the full extent of what they had been able to achieve within their local context 
was not recognized or appreciated by state officials. After one monitoring report one member 
stated,  
What I thought was missing in the report was some acknowledgement that that progress 
did not happen in a vacuum, and although I agree there are some issues, my colleagues 
know that there are, what I didn’t see of this board's efforts to work collaboratively with 
the superintendent, with the community to make the improvement you outline. This board 
went on record and supported the appropriation for a HR director. We kept the needs of 
the students as our top priority. It was this board that got the community to support the 
budget that supported these efforts. We are aware of our deficiencies. We have some 
concerns we need to address. We acknowledge that. I know that each member on this 
board has nothing but the best intent, the way we get to that sometimes is 6 or 7 ways, but 
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I can tell you I’ve spoken to my colleagues and I know that it is in the best interest of the 
children. We just need to work together to portray that.  
In summary, in both of these instances members tried to shift the direction of sense-
making from uni-directional (state to members) to multi-directional (state to members, members 
to state, members to community, members to member).  The pull between meeting their local 
needs and what they were required to do was influenced by the school board's sense that the 
balance of power tilted heavily in the direction of the state. In observing several meetings, it was 
evident that members felt they were left with few options but to comply with the state 
interventions and assume that the external agents had more expertise and/or knowledge than they 
did. For the most part, the board acted as a unit in trying to make sense of how to respond to 
policy directives. The SEA would often reiterate that they were interested in serving in a 
supportive role and they were investing resources and time in the development of the school 
board to strengthen its role as a governing body. However, it was also clear that they had certain 
expectations that the board would function and behave in a certain way, and that if those 
expectations were not met, the level of accountability and intervention would increase. 
Out of this tumult emerged an unexpected finding, the role of the “dissenting voice” in 
sense-making. The dissenting voice in this district, and for this individual study, was 
characterized by one individual on the school board who tried to make sense of his role and the 
turnaround role of the board by contributing to the collective’s understanding through “sense-
making as arguing” (Weick, 1995, p. 135).  
Sense-making through dissenting voice 
State monitoring reports which were intended to assess the board’s progress towards 
becoming an effective governing body usually included veiled references to “school board 
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members who refuse to function as members of a board rather than as individuals” by ignoring 
agreed upon protocols or policies. These individuals were seen as obstacles to the board’s 
becoming a “high performance governing body.” In fact, most of the references pointed toward 
one specific board member. Observations of school board meetings, review of recordings of SEA 
monitor reports, as well as data collected from interviews, revealed that this school board 
member, who will be referred to in this section as "the dissenter," was perceived to be a 
polarizing force by the administration and SEA representatives, as well as some of the other 
fellow board members.   
Upon observation, it appeared that the dissenter did at times dominate meetings, was 
argumentative and abrasive in his questioning, often challenged the superintendent or district 
administrators, and stubbornly focused on a single issue. He could be overbearing, contradictory 
to the point of annoyance, and could turn what appeared to be a quick discussion into an hour-
long debate. In spite of all these perceived hindrances, analysis of the data also revealed another 
more nuanced side to his behavior. The dissenter was usually the most thoroughly prepared, the 
most well-versed in all aspects of the agenda, and the one who arrived at meetings with a full 
briefcase of highlighted documents and binders of school board materials. The dissenter was also 
well prepared to ask questions that directly impacted student learning, monitored every penny of 
the budget, and generally spoke out on issues that he felt would support teaching and learning. 
Many times the dissenter’s requests for clarification or more data uncovered important 
information other board members needed to make a decision about the issues before them.  
The use of arguing in sense-making is central to organizational sense-making. Beliefs and 
actions provide the structure through which sense-making occurs (Weick, 1995). In the case of 
this school board member, beliefs and expectations played a significant role in how he made 
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sense of the information. Weick cites Huff who wrote that arguing is part of the “natural 
dialectic” and that “when people challenge one another,… they clarify new strategic ideas” 
(Weick, 1995, p. 136).  During the dissenter’s interview it was clear that he considered his 
allegiance to be primarily to members of the community, including students, and not to the 
administration. The dissenter has been elected by the community to serve on the school board 
four times, always receiving the highest number of votes. He made sense of his role on the 
school board through two lenses, as an elected official sent to do the people’s work and as a 
long-term educator. His beliefs and values drove many of his decisions. He believes that 
resources should be devoted to classrooms, teachers, and students.  He has a very strong 
community ethic and believes that his job on the board is to speak up and make sure that the 
interests of the constituents who elected him are represented. He believes all students should be 
provided with an education that prepares them with an employable skill, whether they are going 
on to college or not. He believes that the district budget should be managed with a high degree of 
fidelity to the purposes for which it was written. He believes that debate is healthy and he is 
more than willing to engage anyone, including SEA state monitors, the mayor, the 
superintendent, or other board members. During his interview, he recalled that the mayor had 
been a student in his system when he was superintendent. “I don’t mind arguing with him. I had 
him as a student. …So I don’t have any problem arguing with him. I don’t have a problem 
arguing with any of the administration.” He then quickly corrected himself and said, “Let me 
take the argue back. Erase that part. Discuss.”  
The language correction was intentional on his part. As stated earlier, he has been 
chastised a number of times by SEA monitors, other board members, and by community 
representatives as being argumentative and an obstructionist to the meeting process or school 
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board votes that other members consider pro forma. While he saw arguing as a positive way to 
make sense of the information before him, his fellow board members saw it as “grandstanding.” 
Weick’s (1995) perspective is that “Individual reasoning is embedded in social controversy. And 
the unfolding of the controversy is what we mean by arguing as a vehicle for sense-making” 
(p.137). It did not appear that other school board members valued this approach. 
Over the course of the monitoring period, there have been a number of passionate 
exchanges between the dissenter and state monitors. In one exchange, an SEA representative was 
cautioning the board that it was important that it work collectively as a group and speak as a 
unified voice. This prompted the dissenter to ask, “Do I have a right to disagree with you?” “If I 
am not happy with those results (MCAS results presented by the superintendent) is the SEA 
asking me to just be a yes man? You didn’t elect me. The citizens of the community did.” In a 
later exchange in which the SEA monitor cited the school board for not having settled the 
contract with the teachers association, the dissenter, acting in his role as a “steward of the 
public’s tax money,” argued, 
D: I’d like to push back if I may. You have pointed arbitrary fingers at us and I would 
like you to be a little specific…If you have something that you can prove that I have 
done, you have permission right now to say so…Please do.  Has this board committed 
any crimes in or out of these meetings? Is there an answer to that question? 
SEA: I don’t think anyone is accusing you of any crimes. 
D: We have not. When you are talking about the teacher contract, we could have the 
teacher contract settled right now but it will take 9% to do it…are you willing to help us 
get that 3% increase over three years? 
SEA: …respectfully that is not the department’s role. 
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D: I understand, but yet you accuse us of not having a contract and we don’t, but we need 
money to do so and we don’t have it, so now what? You continue pounding us for not 
having a contract, you can continue pounding the teachers who are working their hearts 
out but there’s no money. And you haven’t provided any for us. Have you taken the time 
to talk to any faculty and (say) tell your point of view of what we need to increase the 
MCAS scores? Have you taken the time? 
SEA: No, we have not done that but that would not be an appropriate activity of 
monitoring the recovery plan.  
In this case, the dissenter is challenging the way the SEA is interpreting or understanding 
the local context. School board members, as has been described previously, understand the 
tenuous nature of how resources are distributed in the community. The dissenter is verbalizing 
the community’s values to an external agent using, as Weick (1995) suggests, his own beliefs as 
a way to make sense of the situation. The issue of debate and dialogue arose as a theme in many 
of the state monitoring meetings. In one instance, the SEA monitor attempted to explain the 
department’s sense of how the school board should operate and do its work, which resulted in the 
following exchange. 
SEA: The SB operates as a group. It’s like a group project. We are just calling to the 
district when it works and when it isn’t. At this point what the department expects… is a 
school board operating where there are strong practices in place, that can sustain healthy 
debate, that can rely on policies that will be followed, and move forward in the same 
rapid manner as the rest of the school system. 
D: I’m glad you said that there was strong debate because there is not an individual up 
here that does not have the sincere interest of the students at heart. And yes, we do get 
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into some lively debates, and that in my opinion is a good thing because of the fact that 
the students benefit by it, by the collective minds of seven people plus the superintendent, 
making it eight.  
SEA: So to your point about lively debate, I totally agree with you that lively debate is 
important and healthy. Its democratic, but at the end of the day when one is a member of 
a board, resolution has to be found. A yes place has to be found, and then everyone on the 
board has to go with the voice of the majority. In no way are we saying that healthy 
debate is not a good thing, and to the degree that you as a board decide how long you 
want to debate any issue that’s up to all of you. But at the end, you’re going to use your 
best thinking to make decisions on behalf of the children whom we all serve, and then 
everyone goes with the will of the majority. That’s how democracy works. 
The SEA felt that it had the authority to intervene on the inner workings of the board 
because they equated a well-functioning board with increased student achievement and 
accountability. This increased activism in areas that were traditionally under the purview of the 
local boards was described by Malen (2003) as a process begun in the last decade in which the 
states began “tightening their grip” on public schools, becoming more “directive in their tone and 
more comprehensive in their scope” (Malen, 2003, p. 198). The SEA viewed an unwillingness to 
go with the majority as an obstacle to a well-functioning board, but the dissenter viewed dialogue 
and debate as a way to make sense of the issues before the board.  
This board member also sometimes served as the communities’ voice or sense-making 
navigator particularly when it came to ensuring their participation. His ready access to the 
community, however, was a cause of SEA concern, usually stated as his unwillingness to follow 
the chain of command or the agreed upon policy that board members speak with “one voice.” In 
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fact, in several instances the dissenter was functioning exactly as policy required him to act. In 
policy BBA, entitled “School Board Power and Duties,” members are authorized to consider 
their role in public relations. The policy states, “The board is responsible for providing adequate 
and direct means for keeping the local citizenry informed about the schools and for keeping itself 
and the school staff informed about the needs and wishes of the public.” In one exchange in 
which the dissenter had been chastised for speaking directly to community members, he replied, 
I have read the material and I would like to have open and public dialogue because I have 
some concerns. Let me be blunt. I don’t intend to change my ways if I feel strongly that 
something is wrong. I feel that I am elected to make that presentation. I will certainly 
congratulate the administration for things that go well and praise them to high heaven, 
but by the same token I will not be stifled by a policy or an interpretation of a policy that 
says I can’t help someone. We’ve had this discussion with the SEA, and I admitted that 
when people call me I help them. Now if that rubs people the wrong way then I’m sorry, 
but I’m not going to change. I wanted to just have a discussion because I want to know 
what the issues really mean. They mean one thing to me, and one thing to someone else. 
For this dissenter creating meaning came from dialogue and debate and occasions to understand 
and make sense of the information before him, all elements described by Weick (1995) as 
important components of sense-making.  
Huff argues (as cited in Weick, 1995) that setting and context also have an important role 
to play in sense-making and the setting where most arguments take place is in meetings. The 
dissenter's own belief was that meetings were a way to create shared understating. During the 
course of his interview, he described his view of his role and the role of meetings in sense-
making. The context of the conversation stemmed from an observation that the SEA had 
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assigned an outside evaluator to do a study of the functioning of the board because, …“I guess 
they thought we were being a little hostile with each other” but the dissenter disagreed and 
stated, 
If I have something to say, I’m going to say it…I don’t consider the efficiency of school 
board operation to be time limited in there. And .. I’m told frequently, well take this up 
directly with the superintendent. Wait a minute. I go to the superintendent? Then that 
means that I’m having closed door discussion with the superintendent? Why can’t we 
have this in open session where everybody’s hearing it? I’m a firm believer in having 
open sessions.  
Currently the school board meets once per month, with a number of subcommitee meetings in 
between. For this dissenter meetings provided opportunities for sense-making. He explained why 
he felt it was important to attend as many meetings as he could. 
I don’t particularly care for subcommittee meetings, except for the grievance 
subcommitee….I try to get to every single one of them because I’m not going to make 
my decision on and my vote based on the three people that are on the subcommitee, say 
well this is what we recommend. Wait a minute, there are seven people on the school 
board. I want to hear what the person has to say. I want to see the body language that the 
person has to say. I want to see the expression on the face of the person making the 
presentation, because that tells me a lot on here versus just three people coming up and 
saying well we recommend…I want to hear all of that.  
The dissenter viewed his role as one in which he extended opportunities for sense-making 
to the community as well and considered it his duty as an elected official to advocate for his 
constituents in this regard. At one point, the board, upon the recommendation of a fellow board 
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member, voted to establish an Education Oversight Board. The purpose of the Oversight Board 
was that it would serve as the eyes and ears of the community and report back to the school 
board any areas that would help them improve their performance and make sure that they were 
meeting the needs of the community. The dissenter welcomed the public participation, but was 
vocal in his concern that the board represent the voices of all the members of the community, “I 
welcome the public to participate. Not just the upper economic level. Parents from lower 
economics, parents of SpEd, parents of English Language Learners, lots of people in the general 
public have good ideas that can come forward but it needs to be meaningful in the process of 
improving the educational process…” He advocated for a board where the work would be “real” 
and that the community not be asked to create a report that then “sits on a shelf gathering dust.” 
His attempt at creating occasions for collective meaning through a social sense-making process 
is supported in sense-making literature. Schwartzman puts it simply as “meetings are 
sensemakers” (as cited in Weick, 1995, p.143). 
While this dissenter was sometimes seen as expressing a minority view, in many cases 
his suggestions were actually aligned with the stated values of the superintendent; transparency, 
collaboration, inclusion, and facilitating positive change. After reviewing a document that was to 
be released to the public, the dissenter requested that there be a list of definitions clarifying all 
the acronyms used in the document for those who might be unfamiliar. He also reinforced the 
notion that,   
 …there has to be teacher involvement. It’s always better to have buy-in than to have 
where there is conflict in there. Once there is buy-in then everyone owns a piece of the 
success and as a result then you can’t turn around and say that doesn’t apply to me. 
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You’ve had input and you’ve have an opportunity to state your concerns  …without that 
we will not achieve the results we wish to have. 
Regardless of how the dissenter may have contributed to sense-making, his role was not 
always welcomed or understood by others. Members sometimes viewed the dissenter as a 
challenge to their own sense-making and their own expectations of how they viewed the board’s 
role. Their reactions to the dissenter ran the gamut from angry to perplexed. In one instance the 
dissenter publically reproached his fellow board members for not being alarmed that the district 
only had a graduation rate of only 66.2%, saying, “teaching of yesteryear is a different era, it’s 
long gone by. The students want different things and we are still providing the same old, same 
old.” A fellow board member took issue and stated, “ I object to this kind of display of criticism 
time and time again on the floor of these meetings. I resent completely knocking our schools 
down constantly. I find this appalling. I feel ripping it apart is just public relations for some 
certain people.”  Others saw the dissenter as “a really tough person on the board,” while others 
tried to reconcile how he was viewed internally with how he was viewed externally.  
I don’t know how much you know, but there is one particular person who kind of does 
everything the SEA says that he shouldn’t’ do, yet the public thinks he is the best, best, 
best thing. Not only do you see that in the votes, because he is the number one vote 
getter, but I did a lot of campaigning to get elected. I knocked on a lot of doors and I 
made a lot of phone calls and the one name that people would say to me, "I’m voting 
for," and it was that person. When you read the notes of the meetings with the SEA (he) 
is the one person they do not think, he is acting in the role he is supposed to be acting in. 
But the people love him, so I don’t know what to make of that. They think he’s fighting 
for them and is really a watchdog, and he is fighting for them and they don’t care what 
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the state says. They elect him and they elect him to do what he does, and they want him 
to do what he does, and they don’t care what the state says…. 
Finally, in another instance of reconciling the dissenter's role as a “maverick”(as he was 
referred to by a community member), with his role as a board member, the mayor took a more 
conciliatory approach (and one might argue a more political approach) and tried to make sense of 
the situation by saying, 
I don’t blame you for any of the ills this district has or any of the ills this city has, in fact 
I find you to be a passionate advocate for education and I find you and your intentions to 
be good. You come prepared…you know the agenda in and out, you have a life-long 
career in public service, and every two years the people of our city elect you with more 
votes than any other member on this board and they want you in that seat. In fact, I’ll go 
a step further and say I want you in that seat, because of your passion. However, we’re a 
board, we’re not seven superintendents. We are a board and in order to move policy 
forward it has to be by a majority vote… 
In summary, board members and the dissenting member each reflect the role of majority 
and minority voice in sense-making. The dissenter can provide a valuable sense-making service 
to the board because they force the majority to consider views that are outside of their traditional 
thinking. According to Weick, “minorities stimulate a greater consideration of other alternatives, 
many of which were not even proposed.” (Weick, 1995, p. 141), If school boards, as a 
democratically elected governance body, are to make sense of turnaround policy, dissent and 
dialogue are critical. The environment they are operating in is highly complex and complexity 
affects what people choose to notice and what they choose to ignore as they try to make sense of 
the cues around them. Weick argues that, “with greater complexity goes greater search for and 
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reliance on habitual, routine cues that can increasingly mislead” (Weick, 1995, p. 86). The value 
of having a minority voice is that it causes divergent thinking to occur and a deeper level of 
analysis on the part of the majority. Rather than view the board member in this district as an 
obstacle to sense-making, perhaps he should be considered as a valuable contributor to 
strengthening the board’s overall sense-making ability.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the combined results of data analysis, document review, and interviews 
yielded evidence of two significant findings regarding how school board members make sense of 
their roles in turnaround policy implementation. The first is that their role is generally undefined 
and ambiguous in the turnaround context. For example, education reform legislation empowers 
school boards with four key responsibilities: select and appoint a superintendent; review and 
approve budgets; establish educational goals and policies for the district that align with statewide 
educational goals; and approve performance standards for employees. Turnaround legislation, on 
the other hand, does not define a specific role for the school board. As state intervention 
increases, their roles become even less defined and more reliant on the direct guidance and 
intervention of state agents outside of the local context. The second is that in light of this 
prevailing ambiguity, school boards bring clarity to their roles by defaulting to what they know 
best. In most cases this is budget and resource experience. They do this mostly by leveraging 
their social and political capital either individually or as a group. In addition to the significant 
findings stated above, there are two factors that also appear to influence how school board 
members make sense of their roles. The first is through the influence of communications from 
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other implementers such as the superintendent and/or state agents, and the second is the 
influence of a dissenting voice on the school board.  We now turn to a more comprehensive 
discussion of the specific implications these findings may have for current theory and practice.  
Discussion 
“The why is huge, but it never comes out through policy language.” 
     Teachers Union President 
At the heart of this study is a fundamental question about whether local school board 
members have a role to play in the implementation of education policy. Local boards continue to 
be the most grass level roots example of participation by the local citizenry in the education of 
the community’s children. The challenge will be whether they can adjust and reinvent 
themselves in such a way that they continue to serve as “bridging agents” between the state and 
local schools (Conley, 2003, p.151). How that reinvention takes place will depend a great deal on 
their ability to make sense of it all. The school board in this study represents a small microcosm 
of the issues that face school boards across the country. Even more specifically, this community 
represents the issues that face school boards in urban districts with high levels of 
underperforming schools that are desperately trying to turnaround their districts. 
Local school boards in turnaround districts are under siege and the school board in this 
study is no different. The role of the school board is changing as federal and state intervention in 
local decision-making increases and standards-based reforms and accountability measures are 
implemented. Changes in school funding formulas are also shifting from local to state coffers, 
particularly in communities that do not have a local tax base that can fully support their schools. 
These shifts in funding have resulted in shifts in power. (Malen, 2003; Epstein, 2004; Conley, 
2003; Feuerstein, 2002). Determining who is ultimately responsible for governing local schools 
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has evolved into a “spider's web” of competing interests rather than an obvious straight line of 
authority and responsibility (Epstein, 2004, p.1). The tension inherent in policy implementation 
comes down to an age-old dilemma: the role of the local actor versus the policymaker. 
Policymakers see local control as the root of policy implementation failures, but also 
know that they cannot sustain prolonged school improvement if they do not have the expertise 
and commitment of the local actors. Conversely, local actors view the intervention of policy 
makers as an assault on their right to govern their own schools (Cuban, 2004). In the local 
context studied here the implementation of turnaround policy, how school board members make 
sense of their role in turnaround, and what influences their decision-making can offer key 
insights for communities and superintendents who are actively engaged in the work of turning 
around their schools. Policy implementation in this district seemed to mirror what Honig (2006) 
most recently categorized as a “highly contingent and situated process”(p 19). Her assertion is 
that it is the how and why of interactions between policy, place, and people that ultimately affect 
policy implementation. In this study we were also able to link the way in which school board 
members made sense of those interactions and what contributed to their understanding.   
Sense-making provides a framework for understanding how the findings in this study 
relate to turnaround policy implementation. Weick sums up the central theme, “…we mean that 
sense-making is, importantly, an issue of language, talk and communication. Situations, 
organizations and environments are talked into existence” (Weick et. al., 2005, p. 409). 
In this district, “language, talk and communication” play a central role in school board 
members making sense of not only their role, but their place in the community and as state 
agents. As Weick et al., (2005) suggests, members in this district organized and made sense of 
the information and knowledge that was communicated to them through the social structures 
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they were part of, including meetings and interactions with the community. This activity of 
making sense through conversation and communication also speaks to the ideas put forth by 
Datnow (2006) that implementers co-construct meaning across contexts and in more than one 
direction. The school board in this study relied heavily on formal communications provided by 
the superintendent about the meaning of the policy itself. The superintendent’s ability to translate 
and make data, information or policy requirements clear to the board were key in contributing to 
their sense-making. What was less obvious was whether there were opportunities for members to 
make sense through “conversations and events” that went beyond the one-way communication 
from the superintendent to a more multidirectional model which forms the basis for the theory of 
co-construction. (Datnow, 2006, p.107)   
One way in which members tried to leverage their need for additional communication 
was by developing what Smylie & Evans (2006) describe as their own social capital, 
acquired through the social relationships they maintained in the community. One 
component of social capital, establishing channels of communication, was particularly 
evident in this district. Since sense-making is essentially a social activity, school board 
members in this study seemed to understand intuitively that “talking to people” was one 
of the ways in which they tried to make sense. However, the boundaries about when, 
how, and who to communicate with often became confusing. Sometimes this 
overstepping resulted in being seen as unwilling to follow protocol. The school board 
meeting structure certainly provided a social structure for members to make sense of 
information they were hearing, but the quality of the conversations was definitely 
impacted by the public, and one might assume, political nature of their meetings. 
Meetings are subject to the open meeting law and are public record. They are recorded 
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by the district's local cable access television, archived and available for on-line viewing 
at any time. The local newspaper reporter assigned to cover education attends every 
school board meeting. A permanent record exists of every member’s “sense-making 
moment.”  The formal and public nature of the school board meeting structure seems to 
constrain the free and open exchange of information. 
If sense-making occurs, as Datnow (2006) suggests, when actors “co-construct”  
knowledge together by sharing information, interpreting it, and building on it to create a shared 
experience, school board members may feel inhibited by the public nature of their role. As a 
result, co-construction of knowledge may also be compromised, especially if it forces members 
to make sense of information alone.  
School board members in this study operated across a number of contexts which 
influenced their actions. One context that appeared to hold the most sway and contribute to 
school board sense-making was politics and the accompanying residual of the influence of 
power. Iannacconne (1991) describes politics as “…the process by which society’s persistent 
social values are translated into policy” (p. 467). The political nature of the school board role 
added a layer of complexity to how they made sense of policy information and how they then 
acted upon it to reflect the community's values. Because the school board in this community is 
elected by voters, members increase or decrease their political capital within the community each 
time they make a comment or decision.  They operate in a social context in which every word 
can be immediately texted, tweeted, recorded or broadcast.  By virtue of how they become board 
members, as elected officials via a political process, they automatically play the role of political 
actors in the policy implementation chain. 
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Malen (2006) describes policy implementation as “a dynamic political process that 
affects and reflects the relative power of diverse actors” (p. 85). The influence of state 
legislation, by definition a political event, and the resulting state intervention coupled with the 
convergence of school and city governance, further combined with the relative political acumen 
of individual school board members to create a power environment. This shifted depending on 
who was perceived to hold more political power for the given context. Formal communication 
structures, such as public meetings, presented a certain degree of perceived political “risk” which 
sometimes resulted in members using informal ways to bridge the gap (i.e, neighborhood 
meetings, coffee with teachers, direct interactions with parents). The superintendent had an open 
door policy and members were welcome to discuss any issues or concerns they might have with 
her, but this created a heavy dependence on the superintendent as the primary communicator. 
Subcommittee meetings provided one way for members to receive information in a less formal 
way from other sources. Other than finance board meetings, however, which had just recently 
introduced the idea of inviting district administrators, subcommittee meetings were mostly 
attended by school board members, thus limiting their ability to gain outside knowledge.  
In their earliest form, school boards were guardians of the public trust and provided direct 
local control over the education of the community’s children. The premise was that the people in 
the community were best suited to create the solutions and hence the power for decision-making 
resided at the local level. Communities supported their own schools with their own resources and 
were not beholden to any external support. Over the last twenty years, the balance of power has 
shifted, especially in poor urban communities, where the need for funding and resources has 
outstripped the community’s capacity to fill the need. Increased outside funding has also led to 
increased accountability, leading to increased intervention and oversight which has ultimately 
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resulted in a decrease in local control. The pressures on school boards to rise to the occasion are 
enormous. (Lutz, 1980; Feuerstein, 2002; Malen, 2003; Villegas, 2003)  
How does a school board define its role when the bulk of the issues it is authorized to 
oversee, budgets and policy for instance, are decided for them in places outside of the local 
context? In this district, school board members all had a general sense for what their roles and 
responsibilities were. Within the context of turnaround, however, what they discovered is that 
their roles were being defined for them by a number of outside agents, including the state, the 
community, the superintendent, the federal government and their own professional school board 
association – each with a different set of expectations. Power shifts decidedly in the direction of 
who holds the purse strings, and in a community with limited resources and dependent on outside 
funding, school board members felt they had little recourse but to comply with the directives of 
the state monitors. The board in this district recognized that they needed support in some areas, 
but they were also very invested in being seen as able to solve their own issues because they were 
the community context experts. However, the community’s challenges demanded more than 
technical solutions. As Malen (2003) suggests, finding the balance between state authority and 
local control is not an either/or issue. It goes beyond finding a technical solution, it also involves 
taking into consideration the values and beliefs of the community, areas that only those who 
operate in the local context can truly know. In this district school board members understand the 
local context much better than external agents. The community too shows that it understands its 
own context by continually re-electing board members who they feel will advocate for the needs 
of the community. Whether outside state agents agree with the election results or not is of little 
consequence to the community.  
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How do school board members engage with each other, the community and external 
agents when it comes to making sense of policies when they are so closely tied to values, beliefs, 
and individual sense-making? In this district, the influence of the dissenter voice emerged as a 
factor in sense-making. Stitzlein (2011) argues that a healthy democracy cannot be sustained 
without democratic dissent. Her premise is that intelligent dissent brings about an opportunity to 
hear and discuss a wide range of different perspectives. To be effective dissent must be well 
informed and knowledgeable. “Dissenting views can promote critical reflection upon and 
revision of public policy generating wider discussion, and ideally rendering policy better 
informed and supported by citizens” (Stitzlein, 2011, p. 75).  Dissent is sometimes seen as 
negative and considered counter to the majority view or beliefs, but suppression of dissent can 
limit the expression of diverse beliefs, customs, and alternative views of the world (Holmes, 
1995; Kayes & Kayes, 2012). 
Based on the findings from other implementer group interviews, dissent in a turnaround 
school is not viewed positively and can have consequences for the dissenter such as termination 
or reassignment. This is unfortunate since sense-making in organizations is a social process that 
can be improved through social controversy and is seen as an important way to “enhance the 
quality of information available to organizations” (Weick, 1995, p. 136).  
The school board member in this district who was seen as argumentative could also be 
viewed as using dissent to foster a more nuanced understanding of the policies before the board. If 
we accept the notion that school boards are one of the few remaining institutions of grass roots 
democracy within the local control debate, perhaps the role of dissent should be considered as 
strengthening sense-making rather than detracting from it. Sense-making as arguing is one way in 
which people try to make sense of a complex environment. If both majority and minority voices 
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are not represented in the sense-making process, organizations run the risk of defaulting to 
majority thinking, which requires little processing of information and offers little room for 
divergent thinking. Minority voice, on the other hand, creates a situation in which arguments are 
confronted and challenged. If they cannot be disproved, then the credibility of the argument 
stands and it is strengthened. Weick argues that the majority influence “may make sense but only 
in a narrow way” and that eventually the sense-making that results is subject to the possibility of 
turning into something that is difficult to understand and confusing because the argument was 
flawed to begin with. (Weick, 1995, p. 142) 
It may be that education reform is about to enter a fourth wave of change, particularly in 
the area of school governance. If Americans continue to hold on to the ideal that local citizens can 
and should govern schools, it will be incumbent on local school boards and local communities to 
prepare themselves to govern effectively. Models of a coming wave of reform have already 
begun. On July 1, 2013 Governor Jerry Brown of California signed into law the Local Control 
Funding Formula. The formula is based on the theory of “subsidiarity,” that “central authority 
should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed 
effectively at a more immediate or local level.” One of the primary reasons for enacting the 
legislation was the idea that those who reside in the local context are the best equipped to make 
decisions for their community while still maintaining a role for the federal government to ensure 
that issues of equity and access are guaranteed. If school boards, like the one studied in this LEA, 
are to remain integral parts of the education dialogue, they need to be equipped with as many 
skills as possible to understand and make sense of their roles and responsibilities as the governing 
body of a turnaround district.  
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The school board in this LEA is an example of why it matters. A recent newspaper 
editorial, commenting on the school board’s ability to vote cooperatively on two major issues 
impacting students in this LEA, stated,  
It was good to witness the more supportive approach replace the sometimes strained 
relations between some board members and the administration. Let’s hope an atmosphere 
of mutual respect continues into the next term so that the committee can effectively 
address the important educational policies that can affect our city for years to come. 
There is hope. School boards have a role to play as the democratically elected representatives of 
the local community’s voice in the education of their children. In order to be successful, however, 
they must be willing to adapt and adjust to a changing policy environment. They can and should 
be engaged as effective links in the policy implementation chain.  
 
 
Recommendations 
There are specific actions that can be taken to build the capacity of school board 
members, particularly those who are serving in turnaround districts. Successful policy 
implementation happens at the ground level and is done by the agents who understand the local 
context best, but they need support, training and a place at the policy table that strengthens their 
ability to meet all four of their areas of responsibility. The following recommendations are made 
with these goals in mind. 
Explicitly clarify the role of school board members in turnaround districts. 
School board members have four areas of authority; budget, policy, evaluation of the 
superintendent, and collective bargaining. Turnaround legislation has clouded the board’s 
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responsibilities. Making sense of the board’s current role requires direct and explicit 
conversation. Clarifying expectations by examining the language of school board policies, state 
turnaround requirements, and education reform legislation would provide an opportunity to 
identify areas of similarity or areas of potential dissonance. 
Differentiate training for school board members in turnaround districts. 
Teachers, principals and central office administrators in turnaround districts recognize that in 
order for effective turnaround to occur there must be a cohesive vision, the capacity to use data 
effectively to drive decision-making, and a constant process for evaluating progress. Professional 
development for school board members in turnaround districts should be explicit, ongoing, and 
focus on how to support turnaround efforts in the local context. This recommendation aligns with 
the research reported in The Lighthouse Inquiry Study I conducted by the Iowa Association of 
Schools Boards that examined behaviors in districts that were able to make significant gains in 
student achievement. (Rice et al., 2000) 
Create ongoing opportunities for interaction with direct implementers. 
School board members cannot support what they do not understand. Allow them more 
opportunities to interact with direct implementers so they can see and understand what 
turnaround looks like and what it takes to achieve. As noted, finance subcommittee meetings 
provided a limited opportunity for principals to describe their program needs and goals, but there 
were few opportunities beyond formal school board meetings for staff and school board 
members to interact. Reframing the purpose of meetings as opportunities for sense-making aligns 
with the view that Schwartzman (as cited in Weick, 1995) suggests when she states that 
“meetings are a major setting for displaying the cultural value put on the use of reason and logic 
in the development of decisions and policies” (Weick, 1995, p. 143). 
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Actively educate the community about the role of the school board. 
Superintendents and school board members can play a critical role in building the community's 
social capital and understanding of the role of the school board. Sharing the conditions of 
effective school boards as outlined in the literature can create shared understanding between all 
stakeholder groups. (Dervarics & O’Brien, 2011) 
Embrace the dissenter. 
School turnaround work is complex. School board members may be the only agents in the 
turnaround context who can speak out and ask questions without risking their livelihoods. The 
electorate will be the final arbiters of whether they are representing the interests of the 
community. Democratic dissent is a necessary ingredient in a healthy democracy. School board 
members and administrators should be given the tools to recognize that sense-making as arguing 
is an important social process that can only strengthen rather than weaken the school boards 
collective understanding of its role (Weick, 1995).  
Chapter 5 
Discussion8 
 
Our study looked at sense-making of policy implementation from the perspective of four 
different implementer groups in a single LEA’s chronically underperforming schools. Sense-
making involves the understanding and interpretation of policies and their intended meanings 
and it can influence the success or failure of reform initiatives (Honig, 2006). We wanted to 
understand the role sense-making played in what the implementers actually did and what they 
thought was effective as a result. Each of the four implementer groups (School Board, 
                                                 
8
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superintendent/central office, school leadership, and teachers) identified the goal of turnaround 
as sustainable improvement in the LEA's chronically underperforming schools. Each of the four 
researchers in this study examined a different group of implementers and produced individual 
findings for the group studied. By looking across our findings from the different levels of 
implementation within the same local education agency (LEA) we were able to come up with 
important recommendations about communication, the importance of data, and the use of 
resources to support turnaround. 
        In this chapter, we present the following three broad recommendations to help the LEA 
reach its stated goal of sustainable improvement from its turnaround policy implementation. 
First, there needs to be a focus on improved communication between implementers. By 
researching four different implementation levels we were able to identify areas where increased 
communication could aid this process. Our second recommendation involves the need for the 
LEA to specify a process for resource allocation. The implementers we studied experienced 
frustration over what they perceived as inconsistencies in how resources were distributed across 
the LEA. Building a consistent and transparent system of resource allocation would increase trust 
and effectiveness. Our third recommendation involves developing the capacity of implementers 
to work with data. Over and over again our findings pointed to the value of data to communicate 
progress of the school and to inform instruction in the classroom, however the capacity to 
understand and work with this valuable tool was inconsistent across implementers. An increased 
focus on professional development for all levels of implementers in the area of data use would 
aid the process of turning around the failing schools of the LEA. 
Recommendations 
Recommendation One: Communication Between Implementers 
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Communication is a broad term that encompasses many important findings from our 
individual studies. Because increased communication helps to facilitate sense-making (Datnow, 
2006; Honig, 2006), we looked at how facilitating communication between all parties increased 
their capacity to make sense of what they were being asked to do. We also examined the 
importance of adaptive communication to promote sense-making (Heifitz, Grashaw, Linskey, 
2009). Adaptive communication leads to adaptive behaviors and centers more on implementer 
beliefs and behaviors rather than merely on the technical requirements of the policy. Finally, the 
four of us identified some specific areas where communication can be strengthened. 
A finding in each of our four studies involved the need for the turnaround policy to be 
communicated on a continual basis throughout the implementer chain from the school board, 
superintendent, school leaders, on to teachers and back again. Some of this communication 
involved the requirements of the plan and what it meant for a school to be named as chronically 
underperforming. There were simply things that had to be done for compliance and the 
superintendent needed to disseminate that information up to the school board and then down to 
principals and teachers. We found traditional structures such as school board and principal 
meetings and staff meetings in local schools were in place where this communication might 
happen. In the early part of the turnaround implementation this took on a very directive flavor. 
Teachers and principals who feared for their jobs were not in a position to debate the merits of 
the turnaround plan. Their perceived job at the introduction of this crisis of designation was to 
hear the directive communication from their bosses and to perform the task they were being told 
to do. This was also true in the case of the superintendent’s communication of the plan to the 
school board, even though the board was clearly tasked with hiring and firing the superintendent. 
According to the turnaround legislation, the superintendent of the education agency is the person 
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responsible for writing and communicating the plans to everyone else in the system. Oddly 
enough, the superintendent’s communication to the school board in this LEA was also directive. 
 Members of the committee understood their role in the turnaround process to be merely doing 
what the state and the superintendent told them they needed to do. This was clearly efficient in 
the early stages of the process. With the need for local education agencies to complete their 
turnaround in under three years, the pressure to begin the action phase of any plan is immense 
and pushes leaders to spend less time discussing and more time trying to make gains in student 
achievement. Directive communication appears to be the most effective way to enter the process 
quickly. 
Our research suggested that the communication became more complicated during the 
next steps of the implementation process. Once the plan for turnaround was communicated, 
different implementers confronted the realities of putting that plan into action. Inevitably more 
communication became necessary. For example, the school board needed to reach out to the 
community and begin communicating with people about how they were responding to the new 
designation. The superintendent needed to hand off the work of implementation to the members 
of the central staff and the building principal in order to be able to attend to all her other tasks. 
Finally, building principals needed to enable teachers to change the work they had been doing in 
order to improve student results. In the action phase of implementation, communication needed 
to be multi-directional and sense made by each implementer (Datnow, 2006; Honig, 2006). 
Community members wanted their questions answered and their concerns heard. Principals 
needed access to resources from central office to train staff or purchase materials necessary to 
follow the plan. Teachers needed to be engaged in what Datnow calls "co-construction" as they 
discussed with each other their interpretation of the turnaround process. 
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The difference between the type of communication needed for an understanding of the 
turnaround designation and the communication necessary for an effective implementation of the 
plan are essentially the difference between technical and adaptive communication (Heifitz, 
Grashow, & Linsky, 2009). Heifitz et al. (2009) define adaptive leadership as, “the practice of 
mobilizing people to tackle tough challenges and thrive.” ( p. 2). Our studies found that technical 
communication between and among the implementers had already been accomplished. The LEA 
knew it was designated as chronically underperforming. From the school board to the teachers, 
implementers understood the need for raising test scores. Principals and central office staff 
helped to communicate the formal process of how teachers might opt out of working in a 
turnaround school. Staff at all levels had a functional understanding of what the turnaround 
designation meant and what the school needed to do in order to be successful. 
However, from our research we identified two areas of need involving adaptive communication. 
The first was the need to establish the new beliefs and culture of turnaround. The second was to 
answer two essential questions for the individual implementer engaged in turnaround work: 1) 
What is my role in turnaround?; and 2) What are the expectations of that role? 
During the beginning phase of turnaround the superintendent and building leadership 
drafted plans that became the shared vision of the work. This phase relied much more on the 
dissemination of information rather than discussion between implementers. The second phase of 
implementation relied more heavily on ideas involving co-construction, where implementers 
made sense of their role by talking to people in similar roles (Datnow, 2006). They came to a 
new understanding of their role in the turnaround process by contextualizing and interpreting 
directives by the superintendent or the building leadership through their own experience and 
prior knowledge (Spillane et al., 2006). When success was achieved in different places in the 
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LEA, we found that implementers next needed to create a culture with norms that internalized 
the wisdom of this newly formed knowledge. Communication at this stage became far more 
complicated because the people who were involved in the work of turnaround were now more 
knowledgeable. School Board members saw what worked and what didn’t and began to question 
where efficiencies could be found. Central office personnel began to understand patterns in data 
and behaviors as a result of their work. Principals spoke about removing themselves to the 
background as teachers began to lead improvement initiatives without being asked. 
From these findings the research team has derived three ways we believe communication 
can be strengthened in this LEA to improve the turnaround process and it's sustainability. Our 
recommendations focus on using existing structures and developing better communication 
processes that can take place within them. The first recommendation is the use of the building 
principal meetings with central office staff to develop a common language around what it means 
to turn around underperforming schools and to help schools change before they are designated as 
underperforming. The second has to do with use of the broad representation of implementors 
present in the original local stakeholders group to provide an ongoing planning board throughout 
implementation phases. A third way way communication can be strengthened is through an effort 
to ensure the school board understands the work of turnaround and their specific role in it. 
Within the local education agency we studied, since 2009 there have been four schools 
designated as chronically underperforming. Two of these schools have successfully exited and 
become a level A and level B school respectively. A third school was closed by the LEA rather 
than be allowed to fall to level F status, and a fourth school was newly designated as chronically 
underperforming in the fall prior to the beginning of our study. There are lessons to be learned 
from all of these cases. Both successful schools have stories to tell about what made a difference 
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in their turn around efforts. Principals at those schools should be used to offer wisdom to other 
schools in the LEA about how to succeed on an ongoing basis. Certainly all school turnaround 
contexts have unique elements to them, but within a single education agency there is wisdom to 
be shared across schools. 
Central Office Principal Meetings. The common language and wisdom gleaned through 
communication at these principal and central office meetings would be valuable for the 
principals of schools who are not yet designated as chronically underperforming. Principals of all 
schools we observed were tracking closely their student performance data and several of the 
schools designated as level C were working hard to find ways of avoiding an eventual level D 
designation. Explicit communication about how two schools succeeded and how a third failed 
would be invaluable for these level C principals. Central Office staff can develop an 
understanding about these different scenarios by looking across what happened at all three 
schools and sharing the information at these meetings. This data should form the basis of the 
agency’s plan to support not only the newly designated level D school, but also other schools 
who are struggling to avoid such a designation. 
Wisdom gained from these principal and central office meetings would also benefit 
implementers on the opposite ends of the chain (teachers and school board members) by 
communicating plans to improve student learning prior to a chronically underperforming 
designation. Opportunities could be created for teachers from turned around schools to share 
experiences with the staff in newly designated schools as well as schools that are in danger of 
falling to this designation. Principals at the level C schools could begin creating shared visions 
for student success and hopefully improve the academic experience of their current students 
before an intervention was demanded from the state. Communication should not only focus on 
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the best (and worst) practices but also on helping teachers and school board members to better 
understand the purpose of turnaround as well as the expectations of their role within the policy. 
Local Stakeholders Group. Another recommendation is that the composition of the 
Local Stakeholders Group (LSG) should be replicated on the school’s redesign team. The LSG is 
composed of members of the community at large, the school board, teachers, and administrators 
from the school and central office. Some LEA's also include students where developmentally 
appropriate. The purpose of the LSG is to come up with a list of recommendations for a 
superintendent as he or she develops the turnaround plan for the local education agency. Once 
the recommendations are made, however, this group is disbanded. All of the stakeholders on the 
group continue to be concerned about the well being of their school, but often the school’s 
redesign team does not include anyone from outside the school’s staff. Including a representative 
group of stakeholders similar to the LSG composition would help to increase communication 
between the different stakeholder groups. Consistent meetings about the progress of the school 
will help keep everyone informed and could possibly aid in the procurement of resources from 
the members of this group. Ongoing input and communication within a redesign team with this 
type of constitution could pose a challenge to the building principal’s authority and 
accountability without a clear understanding of norms, protocols, and expectations for how these 
meetings should be run. The central office representative and the building principal should be in 
constant communication over how the group is functioning and revisiting the norms and 
expectations whenever necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the team. 
Building School Board Capacity.  The need for clearer expectations about the role and 
responsibility of the school board in an agency's turnaround. This is a specific recommendation 
for this education agency despite the fact that there are multiple board members who have 
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witnessed the turnaround process in three schools in the LEA. School board members have four 
areas of authority: budget, policy, evaluation of the superintendent, and collective bargaining. 
Turnaround legislation has clouded the board’s responsibilities. Making sense of the committee’s 
current role requires direct and explicit conversation. We recommend there be dedicated time for 
a school board workshop on turnaround. Professional development for school board members in 
turnaround LEA's should be explicit, ongoing, and focus on how they support turnaround efforts 
in the local context. Not only does the board need to be clear on what the policy requires of the 
local education agency, but they also need a clearer understanding of what their role will be in 
the turnaround process moving forward. A lot of attention is provided to the other implementer 
groups to make certain they understand their roles and expectations. We believe giving similar 
attention to the school board would also help facilitate the process of turning around the agency’s 
underperforming schools. 
Support for Teacher Collaboration. Collaboration and teamwork are areas that 
research has shown to contribute to successful school improvement. Some studies have found 
that relationship building coupled with collaboration between stakeholders is key to raising the 
level of performance of an underperforming school (Corallo & McDonald, 2001; Duke et al., 
2005; Fullan, 2006; Harris, 2006; Mulford et al., 2008; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). A teacher at 
the turned around school described how teamwork contributed to school improvement this way, 
“There were horror stories at first, when we all first began… but then as the years went on, there 
were more success stories rather than horror stories. There were supportive conversations, I 
mean, we got a good laugh, no doubt about it, from all the craziness that did occur, but in the end 
it was supportive because it ended up making us a family.” This aligns with what literature on 
effective school leadership says about building teamwork as an essential element in any school 
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striving to improve (Marzano, Waters, & McNulty, 2005; Scribner et al., 2011). It is important to 
recognize that people are the most important resource in an LEA, and that they are not merely 
vessels to hold new information about data use or new student discipline programs. They need 
time together to get to know each other so that they can provide internal support for one another 
as things get hard and then continue to be hard in the turnaround process. We know a turned 
around school benefits any neighborhood it is in, but it cannot fix all the ills faced by today’s 
urban and rural poor. Problems will persist well beyond improved student results. The only way 
the people in these schools can also persist is as members of a committed team who continually 
communicate with each other. Staff must constantly be given time and opportunity to work 
together so they don’t feel isolated while working in this difficult environment. 
 
 
Recommendation Two: Specify a transparent process for allocating resources 
It is our hope that ensuring a transparent process for school resource allocation will result 
in increased equity and fairness and thereby increase trust between implementers. By building 
trust implementers can work together more cooperatively and effectively, further ensuring that 
the capacity and collective efficacy developed during the turnaround process can be sustained. 
Additionally, further development of resource support by pre-identifying struggling schools and 
perhaps preempting them, may prevent the number of level D schools in the LEA and the need 
for drastic interventions. 
Key Elements for Implementing Recommendations 
 
 As limited resources are available in the LEA, the criteria and priorities about how 
resources are distributed to specific programs and schools needs to be developed. By establishing 
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a baseline for best practices for school improvement, all implementer groups, including school 
board, superintendent/central office, principals, and teachers can self-assess the impact of their 
actions and decisions in relation to student achievement. The LEA should consider the individual 
needs of schools and school context to identify how each school implements these baseline 
practices using the school review partner process. After implementers come to a consensus about 
the needs of the school and the next steps for intervention, the LEA should consider a way to 
measure school resource usage after they are distributed, and how to incorporate a research 
function in the process of deciding how to allocate resources. 
Funding. The LEA, like many others throughout the state, is grappling with maintaining 
services for students in the face of dwindling tax revenues, increased student needs and services, 
and the funding cliff derived from the expiration of Race to the Top (RTTT) and other grant 
funds. All implementer groups interviewed acknowledged that they did not believe they had 
enough resources to meet the needs of students. To sustain student achievement gains and 
teacher efficacy, the LEA should develop a comprehensive plan that prioritizes programming 
and initiatives that will remain or be curtailed when current funding streams diminish. 
Additionally, multiple implementer groups interviewed discussed that funding support is only 
available to Level D schools, thereby unintentionally incentivizing Level D status. Define a 
framework for resource allocation based on school level, programming, and student needs. This 
framework should include details of funding streams for academic and extracurricular programs, 
additional pay for teachers, full-time equivalents, and other areas essential to effective 
implementation of turnaround policy. 
Human Resources. It is recommended that the LEA streamline and replicate the most 
successful process for teacher “opt-out” of level D schools to ensure consistency of 
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implementation across schools. This would include providing principals with explicit 
professional development on assessing the “fit” of instructional staff members utilizing pre-
determined LEA best practices from past “opt-out” rounds. Implementing a consistent process 
across schools that fosters trust, facilitates transparency, and diminishes misalignment between 
policy implementer groups may assist with the goal of keeping all implementer groups ultimately 
focused on achieving LEA and school goals. 
Time. We recommend that the LEA provide a plan for sustainability to ensure continuity 
of teacher common planning time and extended learning time services to students. Teachers in 
level D schools interviewed feel that they can successfully effectuate change and meet the needs 
of students due to the additional collaboration and extended learning time (ELT) opportunities. 
While complete replication and scalability may prove challenging, provide educators with 
opportunities to learn from ELT schools to develop best practices that can be adapted in schools 
lacking resources to pay all teachers for ELT. 
The LEA should assess the delivery of support and monitoring across high priority (level 
D, and C) schools by Central Office administration. A system to monitor school-level support 
from central office administrators will ensure clear and equitable support and monitoring. This 
would assuage the concerns of teachers and principals that level D schools receive the most 
attention and support and counter their stated view that they have to let their schools become 
“worse” before they receive attention and support. 
Recommendation Three: Increase the capacity of implementers to work with data 
An area identified in our findings across implementer groups was the use of data. How 
data was used (or not used) was one of the most talked-about areas for school improvement by 
teachers, school leaders, central office personnel, and school board members. In this LEA, data 
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use goes beyond merely examining assessment results to know what schools are eligible for 
turnaround support. Rather, educators used the data to tell them what areas of school 
improvement need focus and how to improve instruction. This is consistent with literature that 
says data is a key in school improvement efforts. Specifically, data is needed to guide instruction, 
which is essential to improving performance in underperforming schools. It allows educators to 
measure student progress towards goals, and it helps to pinpoint instructional strengths and 
weaknesses (Clubine et al., 2001). Indeed, the use of data to guide decisions is considered a 
condition for successful school improvement (Potter et al., 2002; Corallo & MacDonald, 2001) 
and this LEA makes data an integral part of their turnaround efforts. The data use in this LEA 
rests on implementers’ ability to make sense of, or analyze, it, and it is that analysis that guides 
improvement efforts. For teachers, improvement is about their instruction. For principals, it is 
about the school as a whole, and for central office personnel, it is about the LEA as a whole. The 
implementer group that is not directly involved with this level of data analysis is the school 
board. In fact, the school board seems to have significantly less interaction with the data, which 
eclipses their ability to engage in understanding improvement efforts in the LEA. 
Although data is a significant part of school and LEA improvement planning, findings 
point to inconsistencies with the level of comfort and ability of different implementers to analyze 
data. For example, whereas some teachers have facility with data analysis, others feel less 
comfortable working with it. This seemed to relate to the phase of the school's turnaround 
efforts. At the school that successfully went through the turnaround process, teachers typically 
were adept at using the data to inform their practice. On the other hand, in those schools that 
were at the beginning of turnaround, teachers tended to have less experience with data analysis. 
Similarly, school board members appeared to have minimal experience with looking at school 
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achievement data and often expressed the desire for better understanding. The implementer 
groups who worked the most with the data were school leaders and central office personnel. This 
is notable because it marks key leverage points for increasing capacity to use data across the 
LEA. Our recommendation is to increase capacity so that there is more consistency in terms of 
how implementers understand and use the data. 
Ways to Develop Capacity to Work with Data 
 
The LEA has strengths they can build on to increase the capacity of implementers to use 
data. Building and LEA leaders, along with numerous teachers, understand the importance of 
using data and prioritize its role in school improvement. There is at least one school in the LEA 
where data was made central to its improvement efforts and in the end, was successfully turned 
around. There is an understanding among school board members that data is relevant to school 
LEA improvement and recognition of the need to use it in their role as representatives of the 
community. While this LEA has already begun paying attention to data in its LEA improvement 
efforts, there are a few key actions that can help to increase the capacity of all implementers to 
use data that is consistent across schools and across implementer groups. Central office 
administrators would need to take the lead in providing opportunities for implementers of the 
turnaround process to engage in quality data analysis in order to lead to more informed and 
strategic decisions about school improvement. 
School leaders and teachers collaborating around data. One opportunity to build 
capacity for analyzing data among teachers is to bring them together to share data analysis 
practices. While teachers interact with other teachers in their own schools, and perhaps 
informally with teachers in other schools, more formal structures could allow this to occur more 
frequently. Collaboration is a key element in turnaround. That is, successful turnaround often 
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depends on the level of collaboration by teachers centered on instruction and problem solving 
(Harris, 2002; Picucci et al., 2002; Leithwood et al., 2010; Duke et al., 2005; Clubine et al., 
2001). Providing teachers with opportunities to collaborate across schools around data would 
increase their contact with other teachers around best practices and provide new ideas and ways 
of using data to inform their instruction. 
Sharing of best practices can also occur among school leaders. Currently, school leaders 
in the LEA meet with LEA personnel, along with members of their faculty, to analyze data in 
their data review meetings. In addition, there are LEA level meetings that occur with central 
office, including the superintendent, and principals of all the schools in the LEA. Findings 
suggest, however, that there is some inconsistency in how school leaders in this LEA lead data 
analysis with their staff and use that analysis to improve practice. There is an opportunity here 
for school leaders to work together to develop their own skills not only about data analysis for 
school improvement, but also about how to lead their staff through the turnaround process.  
    Increasing community understanding of the data. Developing better understanding of 
the data in this LEA also involves the community. This begins with the school board to promote 
their sense-making of the data. Findings suggest that school board members have little 
interaction with data and less experience than the educators in the schools with making sense of 
data in a way that helps them understand the turnaround work. School board members could be 
provided with more opportunities to examine the data to increase their understanding. These 
conversations do not need to be overly cumbersome in detail. Rather, they might give an 
overview of what the data is saying about the LEA and why designations occur. This would put 
school board members in a better position to communicate with their constituencies about the 
turnaround work that is happening in the LEA. With a greater understanding of the data, they can 
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dialogue with community members about why some schools are designated as turnaround 
schools based on their academic performance. Furthermore, the LEA can work in tandem with 
the school board on outreach to the community. Working together, they could provide settings 
for dialogues to take place between the LEA and the community about the data. While school 
board meetings is perhaps a likely place for this, and our research indicated that indeed 
discussions around data have occurred there, opportunities offered outside the context of a school 
board meeting may be beneficial. In the end, this may lead to a more informed community who 
understand what the data means in terms of the LEA’s performance. 
Recommendation Four: Communicate a clear vision of leadership for the LEA 
 As we listened to what each of the implementers were saying about turnaround, it became 
clear that they were looking at turnaround differently and focusing on different aspects of the 
turnaround process. They were also expressing different priorities about what needed to be done 
to improve the schools. At times, they noted their own lack of clarity about how to turn around 
their schools. There appeared to be a lack of interdependence among the different implementer 
groups. That is, they tended to operate in silos, distinct from each other, and often not in tune to 
what other implementers were thinking or doing with the turnaround work. 
 There were several places where this lack of interdependence was apparent. The 
interviews conducted brought out the most pressing questions and understandings of each of the 
implementer groups and at times showed little consistency or connection between each group. 
Central office directors spoke about the importance of their monitoring role and how they 
worked with school leaders to put practices in place to improve school performance. Yet, school 
leaders did not talk much about this and were more focused on how they were working with their 
staffs. Teachers described a style of leadership in their schools at the beginning phase of 
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turnaround that was directive, whereas, when school leaders described their approach, it 
resembled more of an instructional leadership approach. The school board was knowledgeable 
about the responsibilities given to them under education reform but they were less clear on their 
role in turnaround. The other three implementer groups rarely mentioned the school board, 
indicating that the school board leadership role was not prevalent in their view. These are 
examples of how the different implementer groups were operating within their own spheres of 
turnaround work with little connection to each other. 
This lack of interdependence may be attributed to the fact that a clear vision from the 
LEA about what implementers should be thinking and doing to raise school performance was 
absent. This became apparent when implementers expressed concern about their ability to sustain 
school success after the turnaround period ends. Their concern was twofold: that they would not 
be able to continue the work without the additional resources that came with turnaround status 
and that they did not know their next goal when their turnaround status ended. This suggests that 
at least some implementers were relying on the policy to set their vision for them. That is, upon 
designation, their vision was about doing what was necessary to exit turnaround status within a 
specific timeframe. Implementers did not speak about any kind of long range vision that the LEA 
set about turnaround. When asked to articulate the LEA’s turnaround philosophy many could not 
identify one with any specificity. Without that vision articulated by the LEA, the vision many 
implementers adopted seemed to be to reach the policy goals of higher student achievement 
within a 3-year period. Once that 3-year period ended, some implementers asked “what now?” 
This is consistent with the finding that the LEA leaders saw the work of turnaround as occurring 
at the school level, coming from the recognition that the heart of the work is where the students 
are. However, they did not talk about how they saw the schools as connected with each other as 
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part of a larger LEA network. They did not describe whether they saw the LEA as a system 
whose parts should be working together towards a common vision or how they envisioned the 
system supporting learning at the building level. 
For this LEA, a clear vision of leadership is needed to help guide and sustain school 
improvement. Although turnaround is a focus of some schools, non-turnaround schools are going 
through school improvement, some with the aim to avoid level D designation. Therefore, all 
schools throughout the LEA would benefit from a more clearly articulated vision of leadership. 
When talking about turnaround leadership at the school building level, Leithwood et al. (2010) 
emphasize the importance of vision when they recommend turnaround leaders engage their staffs 
in developing the vision of a school as a source of motivation to commit to the work of school 
turnaround. They also suggest using that vision to help guide planning and to ensure that all 
decisions align with school goals. In implementing this suggestion at the LEA level, this LEA 
would bring implementer groups more into alignment with each other and with the LEA in terms 
of how they implement turnaround. Fullan (2006) who also focuses on turnaround leadership at 
the building level, discusses the need to implement systemic reform by using a “trilevel 
development solution” that includes alignment between the state, LEA, and school. 
What has to happen at the school and community level? The [LEA] level? The level of 
the state...? the idea is to ‘cause’ developments, along lines of this book, within and across the 
three levels. It is not so much seeking alignment as it is experiencing permeable connectivity—
lots of two-way horizontal and vertical mutual influence (p. 74). Establishing this connectivity 
and alignment requires conversation, face to face interactions and the co-construction of meaning 
that are integral to the sense-making described by researchers (Weick, 1995; Datnow, 2006). 
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 This connectivity needs to happen between all three levels Fullan describes above and requires 
the state and the LEA to monitor progress on a case by case basis. 
This tri-level development solution aptly describes the importance of connecting the 
different levels of turnaround, school, community, LEA and state, in terms of how to approach 
turnaround work. For the purposes of this recommendation, the focus is on the relationship 
between the LEA, community and the school in that all three need to be working in concert with 
each other. A vision of leadership in this LEA would strengthen those relationships and help to 
create the interdependence needed for implementers of turnaround policy to be working in the 
same direction. Strengthening the interdependence between implementer groups can also be 
reinforced by making sure that all voices are represented including dissenting voices. Creating a 
common vision would not be about merely exiting or avoiding turnaround status. Rather, it 
would be about the kinds of educational experiences that leadership would create for students 
that transcend what the turnaround policy mandates. In fact, creating a common vision for the 
entire LEA would benefit schools at all levels of designation and not just those who have been 
deemed chronically underperforming.  A vision of leadership would help implementers speak the 
same language about what they need to focus on and what they need to do to increase the quality 
experiences that result in higher student learning in the entire system. 
Conclusion 
 
This research generated insights into what educators in this LEA think and do as they 
implement turnaround policy. Emerging from these insights are recommendations that are 
intended to enhance the turnaround work that is already happening across schools in this LEA. 
Because sense-making relies so heavily on communication, increasing communication is 
suggested here as a way to facilitate understanding of turnaround policy. Yet, this understanding 
 156 
 
goes beyond knowing the policy requirements. Communication can help educators in the LEA 
better understand their role and expectations, which are not necessarily outlined in the policy. 
This enhances the process of co-construction as implementers' communication with each other 
helps them to make meaning. Also recommended is to specify a transparent process for 
allocating resources. This LEA makes decisions about how resources are distributed across 
schools and programs. Yet, the findings from this research study suggest that there is some 
confusion as to how those decisions are made. Clarifying these decisions would help to alleviate 
confusion and increase trust in the process, which can then help to guide implementers' decisions 
about turnaround implementation. The third recommendation about data use comes from a major 
theme which emerged across the individual studies about the prevalence of data in school 
improvement planning and implementation. This LEA already uses data, but there are some 
inconsistencies in the capacity of implementers to analyze and use data. School leaders, central 
office personnel, and teachers, would benefit from collaborative opportunities for work with 
data. School board members may need more experience with data in order to communicate with 
their constituencies about what the data says about the schools in the LEA. Providing more 
opportunities for implementers to work with data would not only help with school improvement 
efforts, but it would also help the community of this LEA to better understand the data that 
informs turnaround work in their schools. 
These recommendations aim to outline how this LEA can increase its capacity to exercise 
successful turnaround of its chronically underperforming schools. Increased communication can 
lead to more sense-making, which can help to guide turnaround implementation decisions. More 
transparency about the way resources are distributed can offer guidance to implementers 
throughout the LEA about how to approach turnaround work. Increasing capacity to analyze and 
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use data would inform decisions that successfully leads to school improvement. As with most 
advice about school improvement, this is not offered as a universal remedy to this LEA's 
turnaround challenges. Rather, these recommendations are intended to enhance the thinking that 
goes into school improvement planning and implementation. That is, these suggestions can help 
implementers make sound decisions about what they should do when taking on the immense task 
of turning around a chronically underperforming school. 
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Appendix A: Definition of Terms 
 
 
NCLB - No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which is the reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
Blueprint for Reform - The Blueprint for Reform is President Obama’s 2010 reauthorization of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
RTTT - Race to the Top is a grant program designed to spur innovation and reform in the 
nation’s K-12 schools. It is funded by the Education Recovery Act, which is part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
SIG - School Improvement Grant. This is a federal grant program authorized under the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. They are grants to State Education Agencies 
(SEAs) used for competitive grants to Local Education Agencies (LEAs) that demonstrate the 
greatest need and the strongest commitment to use the funds to provide adequate resources in 
order to rapidly and dramatically improve student achievement in their lowest-performing 
schools. 
Turnaround legislation - State legislation from 2010 whose stated purpose is to provide 
innovation in schools and to turnaround underperforming schools. It was written in part to 
respond to the federal requirement that states wishing to qualify for RTTT funds needed to have 
their own legislation outlining school improvement requirements that was in line with President 
Obama’s Blueprint for Reform. 
SRG - School Redesign Grants is a SEA program from SIG that offers competitive grants to 
intervene in the lowest performing local LEA's in the state. 
Level C and D and F School Designation - State schools in the lowest 20% relative to other 
schools in their grade span are designated level C. Schools that are the lowest performing from 
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the level C group are those eligible to be designated as level D schools. Not more than 4% of the 
total number of public schools in (the state under study) can be designated as level D. Level F 
schools are designated for state takeover. 
Local Stakeholder group - Upon being designated a level D school the Superintendent has 30 
days within which they must convene a stakeholders group whose task it will be to make 
recommendations to the Superintendent for the Turnaround Plan. 
Turnaround plan - written by the Superintendent of the LEA based on the recommendations 
from the Local Stakeholders group, this plan must be submitted to the SEA for review by the 
Commissioner who may choose to approve the plan for up to three years. The plan must include 
specific steps and timelines outlined by the state. The plan is designed to be a template for 
applications for SRG application. 
School redesign team - the job of the school redesign team is to use the Superintendent’s 
turnaround plan to create a three-year redesign plan that will serve as the day-to-day roadmap for 
implementation. The redesign team is also tasked with overseeing the operation of the plan and 
making adjustments based on data and results as needed. 
School redesign plan - is the plan written by the school redesign team to serve as the actual 
implementation of the Superintendent’s Turnaround Plan. It may include applying for an SRG 
and serves in place of the School Improvement Plan (SIP). 
Policy implementers - for the purpose of this research study the policy implementers studied 
will be limited to members of the school board, central office, the building principal, and 
teachers. 
Four Models of the Federal Redesign Grants 
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1) Turnaround - Up to 50% of the staff is excised and a new principal is 
 brought on board to turn around the underperforming school.  
2) Restart - school composition is changed by the LEA and may be taken  over 
 by an External Management Organization (EMO), often a charter school. 
3) School Closure - the school is closed and the remaining students are 
 dispersed to other schools within the LEA. 
4) Transformation - the LEA attempts to meet the demands for improved student 
gains under its current staff and student configuration. 
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Appendix B: Code Lists 
 
Start List of Codes 
Assessments (ASM):  
Central Office (CO) 
Challenge (CHA) 
Collaboration (COL) 
Communication: (COM) 
Context: (CON) 
Equity (EQ) 
Factors: (FAC) 
Implementer Responsibility and Roles (IMRR) 
Making Sense (MS) 
Policy Implementation Results (PIRE) 
Political (POL) 
Principals (PR) 
Prior Knowledge: (PRK) 
Reflection (RFLC) 
Relationship (REL) 
Resistance (RES) 
School board (SC) 
Social (SOC) 
Student Impact (SIM) 
Support (SPT) 
Sustainability (SUS) 
Teachers (TCH) 
Trust (TRU) 
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Use of data (USD) 
 
 
List of Actual Codes (Parent and Child Codes Included) 
Communication between Implementers 
•     Superintendent to Central Office 
•     School Leader to Teacher 
•     School Committee to Superintendent 
•     Superintendent to School Leaders 
•     Between Implementers  
Culture/values and beliefs 
• Culture change 
• Trust 
Resources 
• Lack of resources 
• equity of distribution 
• use of resources 
• resources to support turnaround 
Leadership Behaviors 
• instructional leadership 
• distributed leadership 
• hiring/staffing 
• directive leadership 
• shared vision 
• support/guidance 
 
Collaboration  
Sense-making turnaround process 
sense-making of … 
• policy requirements 
• data 
• chronic of underperforming contributing factors 
• state intervention 
• expectations 
• directives 
• roles 
 
 
Attitude about turnaround 
• motivation 
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• perceived barriers to implementation  
• perceived support for implementation 
Policy Implementation Results 
Political  
Capacity 
• community 
• internal 
Co-construction 
Context 
Data use 
• data to inform PD 
• to assess educator performance 
• to initiate change 
• to inform instruction 
• to identify strengths and weaknesses 
• to understand designation 
Re-construction 
Social capital 
Implementer voice 
• dissenter voice 
Sustainability  
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Appendix C: Consent to Participate in Interview 
 
Boston College Lynch School of Education 
Informed Consent for Participation as a Subject in: Turning Around Schools: A View From the 
Stakeholders: A study that examines how stakeholder sense-making of turnaround policy 
influences the planning and implementation of turnaround goals. 
Investigators: Jamie B. Chisum, Anna Carollo Cross, Jill Geiser, and Charles Grandson. PSAP 
Ed.D. Class of 2014 
 
Introduction: 
You are being asked to participate in a research study of the process stakeholders in turnaround 
LEA's go through to make sense of how to implement turnaround policies. You are being asked 
to participate because you have a role in the LEA that is directly involved in the implementation 
of LEA policies in a turnaround LEA. Please read this and feel free to ask any questions you may 
have before agreeing to be a participant in the study. 
 
Type of Consent: Adult Consent 
 
Purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is to examine how stakeholders (school board members, central office 
personnel, principals and teachers) in turnaround LEA's understand and make sense of their roles 
in the implementation of turnaround policies. 
The total number of participants in the study is expected to be 10-20. 
Members of the research team do not have any financial interest in the study. 
 
Description of the Study Procedures 
If you agree to be a participant in this study, you will be agreeing to participate in a 1-1 ½ hour 
on site in-person interview or in a location that is mutually agreeable. In addition, if you choose 
to do so, you will be given the opportunity to review the interview transcript for accuracy; it is 
estimated that this will take approximately ½ hour. 
 
Risks/Discomforts, Benefits of Being in the Study 
There are no reasonably foreseeable risks to participation. There are no direct benefits to you 
from participating in the study. However, the findings may be useful to LEA personnel, school 
board members, and members of the State Departments of Education responsible for 
communicating or implementing turnaround policies. Understanding the factors that influence 
the implementation of turnaround policies may raise awareness about how different stakeholders 
view their roles in the process. You have been selected to participate in this study as an 
implementer of turnaround policy. 
 
Payments/Costs/Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. 
There are no payments to you, nor costs to you to participate in the study. 
 
Confidentiality 
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The records of this study will be kept confidential. If any published reports are produced as a 
result of this study, researchers will make every effort to omit or disguise information that may 
be used to directly identify a participant. All researchers will keep electronic information in a 
password protected computer file. Audio tape recordings will be held by the individual 
interviewer until a transcription has been completed and confirmed for accuracy.Those interview 
recordings will then be destroyed. 
Access to the records will be limited to the researchers; however, please be aware that the 
Institutional Review Board and internal Boston College auditors may review the research 
records. 
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose not to participate, it will not affect your current or 
future relations with the University. You are free to withdraw at any time for whatever reason. 
There is no penalty or loss of benefits for not taking part or for stopping your participation. If 
any significant findings emerge during the course of the research study that may affect your 
continued participation you will be notified immediately and the decision to withdraw or 
continue will be yours. In addition, you may refuse to answer individual questions but continue 
with participation in the study at any point during the interview process. 
 
Dismissal From the Study 
The investigator(s) may withdraw you from the study at any time for the following reasons: (1) 
withdrawal is in your best interests, (2) you have failed to comply with the study requirements, 
or (3) the study is terminated. 
 
Contacts and questions 
The researchers conducting this study are current doctoral students in the PSAP Ed.D program at 
Boston College: Jamie Chisum, Anna Carollo Cross, Jill Geiser, Charles Grandson 
For questions or more information concerning this research you may contact a member of the 
research team:   
Anna Carollo Cross (508) 875-7851 anna.cross@bc.edu 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact: Director, 
Office for Research Protections, Boston College at (617) 552-4778, or irb@bc.edu 
 
Copy of Consent Form 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records and future reference. 
 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the contents of this consent form and have been encouraged to ask questions. I have 
received answers to my questions. I give my consent to participate in this study. I have received 
(or will receive) a copy of this form. 
Signatures/Dates 
Study Participant (Print Name)______________________________________________ 
Participant Signature______________________________________Date____________ 
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Appendix D: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
We will be interviewing policy implementers in our single case study LEA. We will focus on our 
stakeholder groups (Teachers, Principals, Central Office Administrators, School board 
Members). 
The interview process will begin by having the interviewer go over the consent form and give a 
brief biography of him or herself in order to disclose any areas of potential biases. 
 
Background Questions: 
1. How long have you been in the LEA? (member of the community) 
2. How long have you been at this school? (serving as a school board, central office) 
3. How long have you been in your current role? 
4. What is your role? 
 
Sense-making 
5. What was going through your mind when you first learned that the school/LEA was 
 designated level D? 
      Probe: Did you see any specific concerns or advantages? 
6. Did you know it was a possibility? Why?  
7. What does the “turnaround plan”(redesign) mean to you? 
        Probe: Why do you think that? Where did you get that from? 
                    How did you find out about the turnaround plan or planning process? 
8. What do you think the LEA is being asked to do to implement the turnaround plan? 
        Probe: What steps has the LEA taken to implement the turnaround plan? 
                    To implement the turnaround plan what have the principal/teachers/school 
  board members/superintendent done?          
9. Who do you think is responsible for communicating the requirements of the turnaround 
 plan to you? 
        Probe: Who actually has communicated it to you? 
10.Who do you talk to when you have questions about school turnaround? 
        Probe: Where do those conversations take place? 
        Are there any other places you get information? 
        Do people share common understandings about the plan? 
        How does that make you feel? 
11. Did you have conversations with colleagues about data before the designation? 
        Probe (if yes): Can you describe those conversations? What did you talk about? 
 How did you talk about it? 
12. What is the school/organization turnaround philosophy? 
        Probe: what does that mean? 
 
Policy Implementation 
13. Who do you think is responsible for understanding the turnaround plan? 
 Probe: How does that understanding look for teachers, principals, central office  and 
school board? 
14. What is your role in the turnaround process? Is this role different now than it was  before 
your school became a turnaround school? 
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        Probe: If new to the school or new to the role adjust the question. 
15. Has your thinking about your role changed since pre-designation? 
16. What changes have you observed since the LEA/school was designated a level D 
 school? 
        Probe: Changes in teachers, leadership, community, staff, culture? 
 How would describe the leadership strategy here now and how that is different  from 
before? 
17. How have these changes affected you? (personally, behavior, professionally) 
        Probe: What changes have you seen in other people around you? 
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Appendix E: Interview Guide 
 
Notes to Interviewer 
 
This interview guide is meant to provide tips for effective interviewing based on the work of 
Seidman (2006).  “Listening is the most important skill in interviewing. The hardest work for 
many interviewers is to keep quiet and to listen actively” (Seidman, 2006, p. 78). 
Listen for: 
●   substance: pay attention to the details of what you are hearing to make sure it is as complete as 
you want it to be 
●   inner voice: probe for the thoughts or feelings that may be expressed under the words that are 
being spoken 
●   process: listen for substance but remain aware of time, nonverbal cues, pacing and participant 
fatigue 
●   Be flexible, ask questions in a different order or skip if the area has already been discussed. 
●   Focus on collecting data that answers the research questions 
●   Stay on topic 
●   Ask follow-up questions that enrich or clarify 
●   Explore topics if they will add to understanding 
●   Ask open ended questions, ask participants to “reconstruct” rather than to remember the 
situations exactly 
●   Trust your instincts 
●   Value silence for participant reflection and thoughtfulness 
●   Don’t rush 
●   Don’t answer questions for the interviewee. 
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Appendix F: Interview Script 
 
 
Thank you for participating in today’s interviews. 
My name is ______________ and I am one of four Boston College Doctoral students working on 
a research study for our final dissertation. 
I’d like to explain the study before we begin. 
 
 
 
We are researching the question of how individuals in turnaround LEA's make sense of the 
policies they are being asked to implement. 
 
 
 
At the end of this study we will be preparing a report that will be made available to you if you 
would like.   
Would you like to receive a copy? 
YES/NO 
Your email?__________________________________ 
 
 
 
We will be conducting interviews as a team. We will be interviewing principals, central office 
staff, teachers and school board members, approximately 30 individuals. 
We will be asking 24 questions of all participants. It will take about 55-60 minutes. 
The information you share with us today will be confidential. If we do use a quote in the report, 
it will not be attributed to any particular person.  If there are any questions you would like to skip 
or you would like to stop the interview at any time please let us know. If you have any questions 
or concerns that you would like to share before we begin the interviews we can stop at this point. 
Any questions? 
 
 
One of us will be taking notes during the interviews. We will also be taping the interview to 
make sure we can transcribe your words and comments as accurately as possible. Again we want 
to assure you that all your responses will be confidential. Shall we begin?  
Thank you. Let’s begin with the first question. 
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Appendix G: Observation Protocol 
 
Observational Field Notes 
Setting: 
Role of Observer 
Time: 
Length of Observation: 
 
Description of Event/Object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflective Notes 
 
 
 
